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1. Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
During the last years, tax avoidance of multinational entities (MNEs) has gained considerable 
attention, both within the public and political debate and also within academic research. Dyreng 
et al. (2008) “measure tax avoidance as the ability to pay a low amount of cash income taxes 
[…] relative to corporate pre-tax earnings”. In this thesis, I consider three ways of tax avoid-
ance. First, I investigate profit shifting, i.e., profit reallocations from subsidiaries in countries 
with a high tax rate (in the following referred to as high-tax subsidiaries) to affiliates in coun-
tries with a low one (in the following referred to as low-tax subsidiaries). Two well-known 
examples of this shifting are the following: First, those payments could be interests for loans 
that are granted to high-tax subsidiaries from low-tax subsidiaries. Second, it could be license 
fees for intellectual property (IP), i.e., patents or trademarks, which are assigned to the latter 
but used by the former. With those or other payments, the profits are shifted to subsidiaries in 
low-tax countries. Hence, the overall profit after taxes increases. A second way of tax avoidance 
is that profits in countries with high tax rates can also be reduced by external debt financing. A 
third example of tax avoidance is delaying the distribution of profits via dividends to periods 
with smaller tax rates on such dividends. Common cases of reductions of those taxes are double 
tax treaties (DTTs), which are targeted against double taxation.1 Since double taxation if often 
not intended, this third way of tax avoidance may be considered as less critical from a fiscal 
perspective. As mentioned above, all those three ways of tax avoidance are investigated within 
this thesis. Note that, while I frame the third analysis towards tax avoidance, initially it was 
written with a focus on the relevance of taxes for FDI. 
The consequences of tax avoidance are multifaceted. A critical consequence of tax avoidance 
are foregone revenues for public budgets. Though existing estimations of those effects are im-
paired by methodological issues (see Fuest et al. (2013) for a discussion of those issues), this 
aspect is prominent in the debate about tax avoidance. However, tax avoidance may also have 
positive effects. E.g., Fuest et al. (2018) find that employees bear a considerable part of the 
corporate taxes but in case of profit shifting opportunities, higher taxes do not seem to have 
such a  negative effect on wages. Another example is that tax avoidance opportunities can lead 
to higher investment in those subsidiaries of MNEs that are in countries with a high tax rate 
                                                            
1 Double taxation implies that the dividends are taxed by both, the country of the distributing and the country of 
the receiving firm (see Section 4 for a detailed discussion). 
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(Overesch (2009)). Furthermore, research activity of firms may increase if they have affiliates 
in tax havens (Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2016)).  
Given this relevance of tax avoidance, I investigate in this thesis how it is conducted by firms. 
As mentioned above, three types of tax avoidance, i.e., profit shifting (in particular via its effects 
on investment and debt ratios), external debt financing and the delaying of dividend repatria-
tions are considered. Furthermore, I analyze whether profit shifting is prevented by controlled 
foreign-corporation rules as a particular anti-avoidance measure. In addition, besides the first 
analysis, also in the third analysis I investigate investment effects of tax avoidance. The first 
analysis is joint work with Dr. Dominik von Hagen and the third analysis is joint work with 
Prof. Dr. Michael Overesch and Dr. Daniel Dreßler.2 
In the following, I give a summary of the three analyses: 
In the first analysis, I investigate investment of firms that at once have profit shifting opportu-
nities, since they were initially domestic firms (a firm with no affiliates in other countries), but 
become part of a MNE through an acquisition. Since tax avoidance via profit shifting thereby 
becomes possible, the profits after taxes are higher and hence more investment projects can be 
realized after the acquisition. In other words, the minimum required pre-tax rate of return of 
those projects (the so-called cost of capital) declines. However, I rather expect those effects for 
firms located in countries with a high tax rate (in the following referred to as high-tax targets), 
since the decline in the cost of capital is smaller for firms that already have a low tax rate (low-
tax targets). The acquired firms are obtained from the acquisition database Zephyr for the time 
period from 2008 to 2013. Data on investment as well as other firm level information are ob-
tained from the Amadeus database. Indeed, the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) panel 
regression show that after acquisitions real investment, i.e., investment in property, plant and 
equipment (PPE), is higher the higher the tax rate on corporate incomes. In addition, I consider 
the effect of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, which are targeted against profit shift-
ing. If those apply, the investment effect (higher investment in high-tax targets) can no longer 
be observed. Low-tax targets may however become destinations for profits shifted away from 
high-tax affiliates within the MNE. Indeed, the results show that after acquisitions financial 
revenues increase in those firms. However, I find no corresponding effect for the profit measure 
earnings before taxes (EBT) divided by PPE, which should decrease in the tax rate. 
                                                            
2 Although I wrote the papers with co-authors, I use the first form singular in the section Introduction and Section 
5, which is a common approach in doctoral theses. 
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After investigating profit shifting in general in the first part, my second analysis focuses on a 
specific well-known tax avoidance strategy, namely that MNEs locate debt in high-tax subsid-
iaries (also known as debt push down, see Jacobs (2011)). Besides profit shifting, this also 
includes external debt financing. Previous studies have found relatively small effects of taxes 
on debt-to-capital ratios of firms. In this study, I state that one explanation for those small ef-
fects may be that it is necessary to consolidate the financial structures of firms and their holdings 
in the same country. The simple intuition is as follows: the debt financing depends on the used 
capital. However, without such consolidation, a part of the capital, the equity of the firm, is 
counted twice, i.e., also within the capital of the holding. This leads to an underestimated debt 
ratio. The consolidation considers the holding and the subsidiary as one firm (also referred to 
as holding structure in this thesis). Consequently, the equity of the subsidiary is subtracted from 
the denominator of the debt ratio. The usage of holdings should be particularly relevant in case 
of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) because if a firm is acquired through a holding, the latter 
can take debt up to the market value of the firm (Ruf (2011)). At the level of the firm, debt 
could only be taken up to the amount of total assets, which differs from the market value through 
goodwill. The debt financing of the holding will cause additional interest payments, which can 
contribute to reduce the taxable profits of the subsidiary.  
I separate this second analysis into two steps. First, I investigate whether the usage of holdings 
is indeed driven by tax rates, particularly in case of firms that have entered the database via 
M&As (in the following referred to as M&A firms). As a necessary condition, I will account 
for the presence of a group tax regime in the country, since otherwise the subsidiary’s profits 
could not be offset by the holding’s interest payments. This first part is done with logit regres-
sions. Second, I measure the effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio with an OLS panel regression, 
both in the consolidated and unconsolidated case. Given that holdings are assumed to be more 
likely in case of high tax rates and the consolidation leads to an increase of the debt ratio, the 
effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio should increase with the consolidation. For both steps, I 
use firm level data from the Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (German Central Bank). MiDi has the advantage that it covers all German FDI 
(above certain reporting thresholds). This completeness of the database is guaranteed by man-
datory reporting. The database includes also holdings, which is particularly relevant for this 
analysis. Regarding the results, I do not find the expected effect of the tax rate on the probability 
of holdings for the subsample of M&A firms. In other words, the results do not indicate that 
holdings are more likely in countries with a high tax rate (in the following referred to as high-
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tax countries) in case of M&As. I argue that there may actually be such an effect, but firms in 
countries with a low tax rate (in the following referred to as low-tax countries) may also have 
holdings. However, this may be for other reasons such as the avoidance of capital gains taxes. 
Those two effects (for firms in high- respectively low-tax countries) may render the overall 
effect of taxes insignificant. In the second step, I indeed find an effect of the tax rate on the debt 
ratio, which is similar to previous research, and, as assumed, increases through the consolida-
tion. Since the results indicate that this particular way of tax avoidance has started to be used 
only in recent years, also other explanations seem to be relevant to explain the relatively weak 
findings in the past. I find the results for the debt ratios only for M&A firms, which, as another 
contribution of this analysis, may indicate that those are more active in tax avoidance. Further-
more, the insignificant effect for non-M&A firms in this recent sample may also be related to 
the finding of a meta-study, according to which the reaction of firms to incentives for profit 
shifting has declined over the years (Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017)).  
In the third analysis, I investigate how DTTs and repatriation taxes affect investment. DTTs are 
relevant if profits are repatriated to a firm from a foreign subsidiary via dividends or interests. 
In the absence of such treaties profits may be taxed twice, both by the country of the subsidiary 
(profit taxes and withholding taxes) and the country of the parent (profit taxes). The treaties 
avoid double taxation by reducing either the withholding taxes and/or the profit taxes in the 
country of the parent (both kinds of taxes are referred to as repatriation taxes in the analysis). 
The avoidance of double taxation is usually achieved by the choice of one out of two methods: 
the exemption respectively credit method. In case of the exemption method, the country receiv-
ing the profits does no levy a tax. In case of the credit method, it levies a tax but tax payments 
that have been made in the host country of the subsidiary are credited. As in the second analysis, 
I investigate the impact of taxes on investment. Therefore, I choose a similar empirical ap-
proach. However, I enhance the analysis by a dynamic panel estimator that accounts for the 
potential dependency of current investment to the investment in previous years. Furthermore, 
as for the second analysis, I use firm-level data from the MiDi database. The fact that this da-
tabase covers virtually all German outbound investments makes it possible to include all repat-
riation taxes, which may also arise from intermediary firms. Those intermediary firms may be 
missing in other databases that are based on data searches. Accordingly, MiDi is particularly 
advantageous in this context. 
The results do not indicate an effect for DTTs, but for repatriation taxes. The analysis shows 
different results for different asset types: whereas repatriation taxes exert the expected negative 
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effect on fixed assets, financial assets increase with those taxes. In line with previous theoretical 
papers, those results indicate that firms expect falling repatriation taxes and therefore, as long 
as taxes are high, reinvest their profits in financial assets instead of repatriating them. Thereby 
they avoid the high current taxes and pay lower taxes in future. The effect on financial assets is 
also confirmed by a positive effect of repatriation taxes on revenue reserves. The opposing 
effects for fixed and financial assets may further explain the insignificant effect on total assets. 
When treaties are enacted financial assets may be reduced in order to conduct dividend distri-
butions while investment in fixed assets may increase. This could also be an explanation for the 
insignificant overall effect of such treaties in this analysis as well as for the insignificant or 
even negative investment effects that have been found in previous research (see, e.g., Davies 
(2003)).   
The thesis is structured as follows. I start by describing the major contributions of the thesis to 
previous research and the used data sets for each analysis in the remaining part of the introduc-
tion. The three analyses then build the core of the thesis (Section 2 to Section 4). The thesis 
ends with concluding remarks. Please note that abbreviations and also terms that are defined 
specifically for the analyses in this thesis or that are probably not often used in the related 
literature are listed in the Section Glossary and Abbreviations.  
For all three analyses, I pursued the usual structure of scientific papers. Still there is some re-
maining heterogeneity between the analyses with respect to the structure. For example, the first 
analysis has a considerably long appendix, whereas for the second analysis, alternative specifi-
cations are already included in the main part of the analysis. In the third analysis, the alternative 
estimations (varying variables of interest) are included in the main regression tables. One reason 
for those diverging structures is that the different contents also favor varying structures. For 
example, the second and third analysis have on average more columns per table, which is more 
feasible to explain the content. However, this leaves space in the main part for regressions that 
in the first analysis have been shifted to the appendix (e.g., those regressions that consider cer-
tain anti-avoidance measures, other than CFC rules). Another reason is that the analyses have 
been started at different points in time and some analyses are therefore naturally in a more 
evolved state. For example, due to a journal submission of the first analysis, many robustness 
checks have already been conducted. 
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1.2 Research Contribution 
1.2.1 Impact of Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules on Post-Acquisition Investment 
and Profit Shifting in Targets 
My first analysis builds on two strands of literature. First, several previous papers have consid-
ered the effect of profit shifting opportunities on investment. Desai et al. (2006) derive in a 
theoretical paper that MNEs with affiliates in tax havens exhibit lower cost of capital in other 
affiliates. Accordingly, Dharmapala (2008) shows that this may cause higher investment in the 
other affiliates. The effect of profit shifting on investment is also supported by empirical find-
ings of Overesch (2009), who has shown that investment in fixed assets in German subsidiaries 
of MNEs increases with the tax rate differential to the direct owner’s home country. The results 
of Egger et al. (2014b) indicate that firms do not react to the host country’s tax rate, if they can 
conduct tax avoidance. As mentioned above, through acquisitions firms may become part of 
MNEs, within which such tax avoidance is possible. In accordance to that, Belz et al. (2013) 
find that the effective tax rates of targets decline after M&As.  
Second, others investigate the effect of CFC rules on profit shifting and investment. They find 
that those reduce financial investment in low-tax affiliates respectively profit shifting (Altshuler 
and Hubbard (2003), Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012), Büttner and Wamser (2013)). Further-
more, Belz (2015) and Egger and Wamser (2015) have found detrimental effects on investment 
in other assets types. Whereas the former finds this effect for investment in total assets, the 
latter find it for fixed assets.  
My analysis contributes to the previous research by combining the investigations of different 
asset types in one analysis, i.e., both, the effect on financial investment of firms to which profits 
are shifted and the effect on fixed assets of firms from which profits are shifted away. Hence, 
the whole picture of profit shifting is shown in one investigation, which adds to the visibility of 
those results, which have also been found in previous research. In addition, through this re-
newed consideration, the reliability of those results is increased. 
1.2.2 Tax Influence on Financial Structures of M&As 
My second analysis comprises an investigation on how taxes affect the financial structures of 
firms with a particular focus on M&As. Several papers have identified high debt financing as a 
tax avoidance strategy, i.e., the location of debt in high-tax subsidiaries (see, e.g., Jog and Tang 
(2001) or Desai et al. (2004) for early work on this topic). In a meta-study, Feld et al. (2013) 
find that the debt ratio increases by 3 percentage points if the tax rate increases by ten percent-
age points. Given that the tax rates of the countries that I include in this analysis, i.e., of the EU 
Introduction 18 
 
 
and OECD countries, range from 10% for Bulgaria to 38.93% for France in 2014 (see Table 
1.1, where all tax variables are presented), the effect is rather small.  
Previous research has found some explanations why the effects are that small. E.g., large debt 
financing may lead to bankruptcy risks (Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)) or hinder the realiza-
tion of new attractive investment opportunities (Myers (1977)). Furthermore, anti tax avoidance 
rules may prevent such profit shifting (Altshuler and Hubbard (2003), Ruf (2011), Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012), Büttner et al. (2012), Büttner and Wamser (2013)). In addition, tax rate 
differentials to affiliates may have to be considered (see Huizinga et al. (2008), Büttner and 
Wamser (2013), Overesch and Wamser (2014)). Another explanation could be that firms have 
other capabilities to reduce their tax base (Büttner et al. (2011)).  
I however show that it is also necessary to consolidate the financial structures of holdings with 
their subsidiaries and that this leads to a stronger effect of taxes on the debt ratio compared to 
the unconsolidated case. As mentioned above, this relates also to the discussion of Ruf (2011) 
who has already stated that the usage of holdings for such purposes may be particularly relevant 
in case of M&As. Furthermore, I show that M&A firms and those stemming from greenfield 
investment may react differently to incentives for tax avoidance. Even in the unconsolidated 
case, only for the former an effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio is found. Since those findings 
differ from previous literature, they may indicate that it is necessary to differentiate between 
the two types of FDI and/or that the general extent of tax avoidance has maybe become smaller 
over time (Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017)).    
1.2.3 The Impact of Tax Treaties and Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited 
Several previous studies have investigated the effects of repatriation taxes respectively DTTs 
on FDI. But the results are not clear cut.  
Some studies find insignificant or even negative effects of DTTs (Davies (2003), Blonigen and 
Davies (2004), Egger et al. (2006)).  
The results of other papers however confirm the expectations for DTTs. They can be differen-
tiated between those that investigate the effect of DTTs on firms decisions to start an FDI pro-
ject (extensive margin) and those that investigate the effect on the amount of investment (in-
tensive margin). Di Giovanni (2005), Davies et al. (2009), Egger and Merlo (2011) and Marques 
and Pinho (2014) find a positive effect (primarily) on the extensive margin. Millimet and 
Kumas (2007) find positive as well as negative impacts of DTTs on that margin. Behrendt and 
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Wamser (2018) find that the effect of DTTs decreases if the difference between the tax rate of 
the country of the subsidiary and the parent increases. Regarding the intensive margin, Smart 
(2010) shows for the case of Canada that DTTs that particularly included the switch from the 
credit method to the exemption method, have led to an increase of this margin. Egger and 
Wamser (2013) find an effect, if DTTs are accompanied by other agreements that target at 
economic integration. The findings of Blonigen and Piger (2014) indicate that the effects of 
DTTs are stronger for FDI into non-OECD countries. Petkova et al. (2018) find an effect on the 
intensive margin if treaties reduce the repatriation tax for direct repatriation to at least the min-
imum of the taxation for indirect repatriation routes. Furthermore, their results indicate an effect 
on FDI only for large tax reductions. Blonigen et al. (2014) find an effect on both margins, 
which is larger for firms using differentiated inputs (precisely, besides the extensive margin, 
they consider sales, which can be considered as some sort of intensive margin). 
For looking at the effect of repatriation taxes in general, one can differentiate again between 
effects on the extensive and intensive margin. Overesch and Wamser (2009) find a negative 
effect on the former for withholding taxes in particular. Barrios et al. (2012) find that the effect 
of repatriation taxes on that margin depends, inter alia, on whether deferral is actually possible 
due to the parent country’s tax legislation. With respect to the intensive margin, Hines Jr. (1996) 
finds that the method to avoid double taxation of the parent company in combination with dif-
ferent tax rates in the US at state level affects the distribution of FDI among those states. Egger 
et al. (2009) find the expected negative effect of withholding taxes on FDI stocks. Finally, Hong 
(2017) finds that FDI without an intermediary subsidiary is larger in situations where the repat-
riation tax is smaller than the one for repatriations via potential conduit countries.  
The aim of this study is to shed light on those contradictory results, i.e., positive as well as 
insignificant or negative effects of DTTs. Therefore, I build on previous research that finds that 
firms adjust their repatriation behavior to repatriation taxes. Several papers, starting with Desai 
et al. (2001), find that repatriation taxes negatively affect repatriations. This may increase fi-
nancial investment (Weichenrieder (1996)) and indeed, e.g., Hanlon et al. (2015) show that high 
repatriation taxes affect acquisition activity. Since a trend of declining repatriation taxes over 
time can be observed, it is reasonable to assume that firms anticipate this development and defer 
the repatriation of profits until such tax cuts occur. However, once the repatriation taxes are 
reduced, repatriations should be conducted and hence financial investment should decrease. 
This was indeed observed for the temporary reduction of US repatriation taxes in 2004 and 
2005, which led to substantial repatriations (see, e.g., Redmiles (2008)). 
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Based on those considerations, I consider different asset types, which allows me to provide a 
potential explanation for both, the significant positive and negative as well as insignificant ef-
fects from previous research. My results confirm the previously found positive effects of taxes 
on financial investment, indicate a negative relationship between those taxes and fixed assets 
and thereby show that an insignificant effect on total assets (which is also found in this study) 
may be explained by the opposing effects of those two underlying asset types.  
1.3 Description of Data 
1.3.1 Impact of Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules on Post-Acquisition Investment 
and Profit Shifting in Targets 
In the first analysis, I use the M&A database Zephyr and merge data on investment as well as 
profits from the Amadeus database. This merge is possible since both databases are from the 
same data provider (Bureau van Dijk) and hence the firms in both databases have the same 
identifiers. I consider M&As in the time period 2008 to 2013 (2008 to 2012 in case of EBT per 
PPE). The data from Amadeus range from 2004 to 2014 (from 2004 to 2013 in case of EBT per 
PPE). Similar variables could also be obtained from the MiDi database, which I use in the sec-
ond and third analysis, which comprises ownership information for more firms and which 
would hence increase the sample. However, I focus on the change of investment and tax avoid-
ance through acquisitions. Hence, it is necessary to observe information on those variables also 
before the acquisition. Through the combination of Zephyr and Amadeus, this can be achieved 
whereas MiDi does not provide information on the firms before the acquisition. 
The dependent variables (PPE, financial revenues and EBT per PPE) as well as various control 
variables at the target level (an indicator, whether the target had a loss in the previous year, the 
target’s number of employees, non-PPE assets and sales) are obtained from Amadeus. 
Given that the focus of this analysis is on the change of investment and tax avoidance through 
acquisitions, it is necessary to identify whether observations lie before or after the acquisition. 
This information is based on Zephyr, where the M&A year is given. Furthermore, Zephyr pro-
vides information on the amount of shares that is acquired. This is relevant, since I consider 
only those acquisitions, where 100% of the shares of the target are acquired within one step. 
This is made in order to avoid observations where other owners potentially prevent profit shift-
ing.  
The tax variables are obtained largely from the OECD, IBFD Tax Handbooks and Ernst & 
Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides. Several country specific control variables stem 
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from the World Bank (GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation and corruption). Further-
more, the information on CFC rules are also obtained from tax guides. Table 1.1 shows the 
major tax variables used in my thesis.  
Table 1.1: Tax variables for countries in samples for 2014 
Tax variable Statutory profit 
tax rate (in %)  
CFC rule Transfer pricing 
documentation 
rule 
Thin-capitaliza-
tion (TC) or 
earnings-strip-
ping rules (ES) 
Group taxation 
regime 
Withholding 
tax towards 
Germany 
Analyses, where 
the variables 
are used 
Analysis 1*, 
Analysis 2, 
Analysis 3 
Analysis 1 Analysis 1 Analysis 1, 
Analysis 2 
Analysis 2 Analysis 2** 
Australia 30 1 N/A TC or both 1 15 
Austria 25 0 0 None 1 0 
Belgium 33.99 0 0 TC or both 0 0 
Bermuda 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Brazil 34 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Bulgaria 10 N/A N/A TC or both 0 0 
Canada 26.5 1 N/A TC or both 0 5 
Cayman Islands 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Chile 20 N/A N/A TC or both 0 35 
China 25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Colombia 25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Croatia 20 N/A N/A TC or both 0 0 
Cyprus 12.5 N/A N/A None 0 0 
Czech Republic 19 0 0 TC or both 0 0 
Denmark 24.5 1 1 TC or both 1 0 
Dominican Re-
public 
28 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Estonia 21 1 1 None 0 21 
Finland 20 1 1 ES 1 0 
France 38.93 1 1 TC or both 1 0 
Germany 30.175 1 1 ES N/A N/A 
Greece 26 N/A 1 TC or both 0 0 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
16.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hungary 20.86 N/A 1 TC or both 0 0 
Iceland 20 N/A N/A None 1 5 
India 32.445 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Indonesia 25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland 12.5 0 1 ES 1 0 
Israel 26.5 1 N/A None 1 25 
Italy 30.9 1 1 ES 1 0 
Japan 35.71 1 N/A TC or both 1 10 
Korea, Rep. 22 N/A N/A TC or both 1 5 
Latvia 15 N/A N/A TC or both 0 0 
Liechtenstein 12.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lithuania 15 1 N/A TC or both 0 0 
Luxemburg 29.22 N/A N/A TC or both 1 0 
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Table 1.1: Tax variables for countries in samples for 2014 
Tax variable Statutory profit 
tax rate (in %)  
CFC rule Transfer pricing 
documentation 
rule 
Thin-capitaliza-
tion (TC) or 
earnings-strip-
ping rules (ES) 
Group taxation 
regime 
Withholding 
tax towards 
Germany 
Analyses, where 
the variables 
are used 
Analysis 1*, 
Analysis 2, 
Analysis 3 
Analysis 1 Analysis 1 Analysis 1, 
Analysis 2 
Analysis 2 Analysis 2** 
Malaysia 25 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Malta 35 0 N/A None 1 0 
Mexico 30 N/A N/A TC or both 1 0 
Netherlands 25 0 1 None 1 0 
New Zealand 28 1 N/A TC or both 1 15 
Norway 27 1 1 ES 1 0 
Peru 30 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Poland 19 0 1 TC or both 1 0 
Portugal 30 1 1 ES 1 0 
Romania 16 N/A N/A TC or both 0 0 
Russian Federa-
tion 
20 0 N/A TC or both N/A N/A 
Singapore 17 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Slovak Republic 22 N/A 1 None 0 0 
Slovenia 17 N/A N/A TC or both 0 0 
Spain 35.25 1 1 ES 1 0 
Sweden 21.5 1 1 ES 1 0 
Taiwan, China 17 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Thailand 20 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkey 20 N/A N/A TC or both 0 5 
Ukraine 18 N/A N/A ES N/A N/A 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
United Kingdom 21 1 1 TC or both 1 0 
United States 37.87 0 N/A TC or both 1 0 
Uruguay 25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: All variables are based on information from the OECD and different tax guides, in particular the IBFD Tax 
Handbooks, the PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries and the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. 
Not all variables appear in each analysis, which is the main reason why they are sometimes not available (N/A) in 
the table. Precisely, they are not available for those countries that are not used in the analysis that uses them. In 
fact, such regulations may be observed for those countries. Some countries are included in the first analysis despite 
no information on transfer pricing documentation rules is given for them (Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the 
Russian Federation and the Ukraine). This is no considerable problem, since those rules are only exploited for a 
robustness check.  
*In Analysis 1, slightly different tax rates are used (for Germany and Ukraine, the tax rate from the first analysis 
are shown, since only there the tax rate is used for those countries). 
**The withholding taxes are denoted as being used only in the second analysis. In fact, they are used also in the 
third analysis. For the third analysis, information on withholding taxes is however given more extensively in Table 
A 17. In this table (Table 1.1) the withholding taxes are given for the year 2014. This year is also not used in the 
third analysis. 
 
The sample is considerably reduced by several adjustments. Starting with 207,545 acquisitions 
for the time period 2007 to 2013, 75% are dropped since I consider only those cases where 
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100% of the shares are acquired at once. Further analysis could increase the number of obser-
vations by allowing for the inclusion of gradual acquisitions where finally also 100% of own-
ership are achieved. In addition, I have made five further large adjustments. First, I consider 
only unconsolidated data. Second, I drop observations with missing information on the coun-
tries of the targets, acquirers and their global ultimate owners (GUO). Given that information 
on GUOs is only given starting from 2008, the sample of acquisitions generally reduces to 2008 
to 2013. Third, I drop information with missing information on the acquired shares. Fourth, I 
drop firms from the financial services sector due to special regulations on taxation in that sector. 
Finally, I drop several implausible observations, e.g., duplicates. Together, those adjustments 
reduce the sample by about another 23%. After some additional small adjustments, 213 acqui-
sitions remain for the basic regression with PPE as the dependent variable (114 in case of fi-
nancial revenues and 93 in case of EBT per PPE).  
This reduction may raise concerns whether the sample is representative. Figure 1.1 shows the 
shares of the values of acquisitions of targets from each sector in the overall value of all acqui-
sitions, both, for the sample (Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Zephyr database) and based on the 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017 (UNCTAD (2017)), which measures global FDI 
flows. 
The shares for the sectors manufacturing, transportation and public utilities as well as services 
are relatively similar. Whereas the share of acquisitions in the mining and construction sector 
is much smaller in the sample, the share for wholesale trade and retail trade is considerably 
larger. This may however be explained by the fact that in this sample I only investigate Euro-
pean targets (at least in the regressions in the main part3). In case of the mining sector, there are 
presumably considerably more companies outside Europe. For the trade sector, the opposite 
may be the case. Hence, the sample is roughly representative with respect to the sector distri-
bution. 
  
                                                            
3 At least in one robustness check, the observations vary compared to the main part and hence theoretically (though 
rather unlikely) there may also be non-European targets. 
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Figure 1.1: Shares of sectors of targets in overall value of acquisitions 
 
*Public Administration has no observations in the sample and accounts for about 0.04 in the UNCTAD World 
Investment Report 2017 (UNCTAD (2017)).  
 
1.3.2 Tax Influence on Financial Structures of M&As 
As mentioned above, I use MiDi as the database for this analysis. Precisely, I use subsidiary-
level data for the period 2005 to 2014. Four kinds of data are obtained from MiDi. First, based 
on the identifiers of the firms and their owners, I derive ownership structures. Based on that, I 
define the dependent variables for the first set of regressions: two dummy variables that are 
equal to one if the considered subsidiary is held by a holding in the same country respectively 
in an intermediary country between the firm’s and its parent’s country. In addition, the identi-
fiers of the MNEs are given, which facilitates the above mentioned consolidation. Second, I use 
balance sheet items. Here, I obtain internal, external and total debt, total capital as well as equity 
in order to calculate the debt ratios, which are the dependent variables in the second part of the 
empirical analysis. Furthermore, I calculate tangibility as a control variable based on fixed as-
sets, intangible assets and again total capital. Third, I use items from the profit and loss account, 
including information on whether a firm has a loss carryforward as well as information on sales 
and profits (profits are used for the calculation of the debt ratios). Finally, I consider variables 
that denote relevant characteristics of the firms. The most important one is the mode of entry 
(M&A vs. greenfield investment), which I use in order to distinguish the investigated effects of 
the tax rate on holding structures and debt ratios for the two modes. Furthermore, I use several 
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other variables, such as the sector and legal form of the firm, in order to exclude firms for which 
I do not expect the considered effects of taxation.  
Besides that, I again merge several datasets with tax variables as well as country-specific con-
trol variables. Similar to the first analysis, the tax variables are largely based on IBFD Tax 
Handbooks and Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides (see again Table 1.1). The 
additional control variables (GDP, GDP per capita, inflation and corruption) are all obtained 
from the World Bank.  
Given that the data is based on mandatory reporting, there are no concerns about whether the 
data is representative. However, starting from all outbound FDI of German MNEs the sample 
reduces considerably for certain reasons. First, I consider observations after 2004 and until 
2014, because only in those years the mode of entry can be observed. This gives a sample of 
288,469 firm year observations.4 Since MiDi considers firms only above certain reporting 
thresholds and those varied over time, I apply a uniform one, total capital of at least 3 million 
Euros and full ownership, in order to avoid the risk of certain sample selection. Full ownership 
is higher than the maximum ownership value in the reporting thresholds. This far-reaching re-
striction of full ownership is however made for two reasons. First, high shares of ownership are 
often required for group tax regimes to be applicable. These in turn are needed for offsetting 
the subsidiary’s profits by the holding’s interest payments. Second, full ownership also ensures 
control by the owner, which may be needed in order to conduct tax avoidance. Those re-
strictions reduce the number of observations by about 54%. In addition, I restrict the sample to 
firms that are legally independent and whose parent is incorporated and legally independent 
(reduction by about 5%). Further, I exclude firms from sectors with special regulations on tax-
ation and the balance sheet structure (mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organi-
zations, financial services sector), which reduces the sample by about 9%.5 Moreover, I only 
consider OECD and EU countries (reduction by about 5%). Finally, several minor reductions 
(about 17% in total) leave a sample of 30,714 observations, i.e., 11% of the initial sample (to-
gether for M&A and non-M&A firms in the unconsolidated case).6  
                                                            
4 Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
5 Note that those reductions (54%, 5% and 9%) are always applied for all observations of firms in the same group 
and host country, i.e., a observation is dropped if one of those reasons for dropping is fulfilled for any affiliate 
of the group in the country in at least one year. This rather cautious adjustment is made because of the applied 
consolidation and the consideration of firms over time. 
6 Note that rounding leads to a sum of those percentage values of 101%. In fact, it is of course 100%.  
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1.3.3 The Impact of Tax Treaties and Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited 
As in the second analysis, I use MiDi as the database also for the third one. However, since this 
is an earlier project, I consider observations for the time period 1996 to 2008. Like in the second 
analysis, information on ownership structures, balance sheet positions and from the profit and 
loss account are obtained from MiDi. The ownership structures are needed, in order to identify 
relevant DTTs, i.e., whether there are DTTs between a firm and its owner, to whom it may 
repatriate profits. Furthermore, the knowledge of the structures allows to determine to what 
extend generally taxes are raised on those repatriations. The balance sheet positions are relevant 
for the dependent variables since investment is measured by total, fixed and financial assets. In 
addition, I also consider the share of revenue reserves and nominal capital to total capital. Fur-
thermore, profitability is obtained and used as a control variable. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, I consider DTTs and repatriation taxes according to 
the ownership structures. Similar to the other analyses, I obtain those information as well as the 
statutory profit tax rate (which is here used as a control variable) from IBFD Tax Handbooks 
and Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and again I obtain various macroeco-
nomic control variables (GDP, GDP per capita and inflation) from the World Bank. Note that 
Table 1.1, which gives an overview on tax variables, does not include all tax variables that are 
used in this analysis. Extensive exemplary information on withholding taxes, methods of how 
incoming dividends are dealt with by the countries and DTTs that are used in this third analysis, 
are given in the Appendix (Appendix to Section 4). In addition, I use the Country Risk indicator 
of the OECD to measure further investment conditions.  
In the following, I will describe again, how adjustments of the dataset reduce the final sample. 
I consider all outbound cases of the MiDi version for the years 1996 to 2008, which yields a 
sample of 358,395 observations.7 One major reduction (about 36%) is again the application of 
a uniform reporting threshold and/respectively the limitation to firms that are fully owned by 
their German parents. In addition, I restrict the sample again to firms that are legally independ-
ent and whose parent is incorporated and legally independent (about 12%). After several smaller 
adjustments (which together however account for about 28% of the observations), the sample 
comprises about 84,627 observations (about 24% of the initial sample). 
  
                                                            
7 Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1996-2008. 
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2. Impact of Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules on Post-Acquisition In-
vestment and Profit Shifting in Targets8; 9  
Abstract: We investigate real investment, financial revenues and profits in formerly domestic 
firms once they enter a MNE through an acquisition. We argue that following the acquisition, 
those targets are tax-optimized in a profit shifting context if they are acquired by MNEs with 
no CFC rules in their headquarters’ countries. In this case, we hypothesize that MNE-wide 
profit shifting opportunities decrease high-tax targets’ cost of capital, which may have a posi-
tive effect on real investment of these targets. In addition, we hypothesize that financial reve-
nues respectively profits of low-tax targets increase after the acquisition, since they may be-
come destinations of profit shifting themselves. We find evidence for the effects on real invest-
ment. Further, these effects can no longer be observed in case of existing CFC rules in the 
acquirer’s headquarters’ country. This finding may suggest that CFC rules effectively mitigate 
MNE-wide profit shifting, which in turn has detrimental investment effects. We also find some 
evidence for the expected effects for financial revenues but not for the profit measure. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Taxation, Multinational Entities, Profit Shifting, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, Mergers and Acquisitions, CFC Rules, Empirical Analysis 
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8 This paper is joint work with Dr. Dominik von Hagen. 
9 We gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments and suggestions from Julia Braun, Ron Davies, Simon 
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2.1 Introduction and motivation 
We investigate investment and profit shifting in firms after they have been acquired by a foreign 
firm. Such cross-border acquisitions are an important form of FDI as in 2016, 52% of global 
FDI, i.e., about 828 billion USD, were conducted via such acquisitions respectively mergers 
(M&As)10 (UNCTAD (2017)). Further, cross-border acquisitions comprise several advantages 
for the acquirer and target such as tax avoidance opportunities (e.g., Belz et al. (2013)). In 
particular, if a formerly domestic target in a high-tax country becomes part of a MNE, this target 
may shift profits to affiliates in countries with a low tax rate (in the following referred to as 
low-tax affiliates) within the MNE after the acquisition.11 Thereby, the tax burden for economic 
activity of this high-tax target and, consequently, its cost of capital decreases, which may en-
hance investment incentives in this target.12 On the other hand, a target in a low-tax country 
could serve as a recipient of shifted profits. Hence, by acquiring such a low-tax target, the MNE 
may gain enhanced profit shifting opportunities. 
However, countries try to prevent profit shifting by anti-avoidance measures. One such measure 
are CFC rules, which are implemented in several countries worldwide. These rules lead to an 
immediate taxation of the profits of low-tax subsidiaries in the MNE’s headquarters’ country. 
Consequently, profit shifting opportunities of a MNE with its headquarters in a country with 
effective CFC rules (in the following referred to as “CFC rule MNE”) are substantially reduced 
compared to a MNE with no CFC rules in its headquarters’ country (in the following referred 
to as “non-CFC rule MNE”). Those theoretical considerations serve as the starting point of our 
analysis: We investigate whether investment increases if a formerly domestic target from a 
high-tax country enters a MNE, which could be the consequence of the lowered cost of capital. 
Correspondingly, as mentioned above, targets in countries with low tax rates may become des-
tinations for profit shifting. Therefore, we analyze whether profits decline with an increasing 
tax rate. Finally, we investigate whether the presence of CFC rules (which are targeted against 
such profit shifting) in an acquiring MNE has an effect on those potential outcomes.  
                                                            
10 In case of a M&A, two firms either join in one firm (merger) or one firm is acquired by another firm (acquisition), 
i.e., it becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer. There is no balance sheet information given on merged firms be-
cause they become part of other firms. Hence, we can only observe investment in acquired firms. 
11 Formerly domestic targets are defined as firms that are stand-alone firms or that belong to a group of firms that 
are all from the same country before the acquisition (see Section 2.3 for a more detailed explanation). 
12 Cost of capital is the minimum pre-tax rate of return on an investment required by the investor (Devereux and 
Griffith (1998)). For a more detailed explanation of the relationship between the cost of capital and investment, 
see Section 2.2.1. 
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We base our analysis on a cross-border acquisition sample from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr and 
Amadeus databases. We look at real investment of targets by analyzing the development of PPE 
following the acquisition. Profit shifting is investigated via financial revenues and EBT per 
PPE. We consider acquisitions in the period from 2008 to 2013. 
We contribute to existing research on the effect of profit shifting and CFC rules on investment 
(e.g., Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) or Egger and Wamser (2015)), particularly by considering 
the whole picture of profit shifting in one sample: the effect of tax rates on the distribution of 
profits within a MNE and the effect of those profit shifting opportunities on real investment 
(see Section 2.2.2 for a detailed discussion). 
Our results show that high-tax targets acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs increase their invest-
ment in PPE after the acquisition. We explain this result by MNE-wide profit shifting opportu-
nities, which decrease the high-tax targets’ cost of capital relatively more than low-tax targets’ 
cost of capital. Regarding acquisitions of CFC rule MNEs, in line with our assumptions, we do 
not find a significant effect due to a lack of profit shifting opportunities. Correspondingly, we 
find an increase in financial revenues in low-tax targets, which supports the assumption of fi-
nancial profits being shifted to low-tax subsidiaries within the MNE (though we find this effect 
only for the overall sample and not for non-CFC rule MNEs in particular). Finally, this effect 
cannot be observed for our second measure of profit shifting, EBT per PPE.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In, Section 2.2 we provide a brief review of 
the literature and develop our hypotheses. This is followed by information on our data in Sec-
tion 2.3. Section 2.4 presents our empirical approach. Graphical analyses, regression results, 
extensions and robustness checks are discussed in Section 2.5. Finally, we make concluding 
remarks in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Literature Review on Profit Shifting and CFC Rules 
A vast amount of empirical research finds evidence that MNEs engage in tax-motivated profit 
shifting (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder (2009), Grubert (2012), Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013)). The basic idea is that profits generated in high-tax subsidiaries are shifted 
to low-tax subsidiaries to avoid taxation in high-tax countries. One common profit shifting 
strategy is locating debt in high-tax subsidiaries (e.g., Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), Desai et 
al. (2004), Huizinga et al. (2008), Büttner and Wamser (2013), Miniaci et al. (2014)), which 
leads to interest expenses in those subsidiaries and corresponding interest income in low-tax 
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subsidiaries. Another profit shifting strategy is setting transfer prices for intragroup transactions 
in a way that high-tax subsidiaries have to pay high prices to low-tax subsidiaries. This is par-
ticularly conducted by locating IP in low-tax countries or countries with favorable IP tax treat-
ment (see, e.g., Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. 
(2014)). That way, high-tax subsidiaries pay royalties for using the IP leading again to expenses 
in high-tax subsidiaries and income in low-tax subsidiaries.13 Taken together, these strategies 
reduce taxable income in high-tax subsidiaries and, consequently, reduce the MNE’s overall 
tax burden. Although Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) find that transfer pricing respectively 
profit shifting via royalties seems to be the dominant profit shifting channel. Yet, in general, 
both profit shifting channels are relevant.  
The focus of this paper will be on profit shifting after acquisitions in cases where a formerly 
domestic target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE. Hence, the target, which could not shift 
profits before, enters a MNE that can generally engage in group-wide profit shifting. Conse-
quently, in the years following the acquisition, the target may be tax-optimized in a profit shift-
ing context. Belz et al. (2013) have already provided general evidence for this reasoning by 
showing that formerly domestic targets experience a decrease in their effective tax rates by up 
to 8% following an acquisition by a MNE.  
In addition to profit shifting, we are also interested in the change of investment after acquisi-
tions. We expect that the investment effect is a consequence of profit shifting, i.e., a decrease 
in the effective tax rate also affects the target’s cost of capital. The cost of capital denotes the 
minimum pre-tax rate of return of an investment required by the investor (Devereux and Griffith 
(1998)). The cost of capital increases with an increasing tax burden of the real investment rela-
tive to the alternative (i.e., capital market) investment available to the investor. Therefore, once 
a target enters a non-CFC rule MNE, its cost of capital may decrease since its (effective) tax 
burden may decrease due to the above-mentioned profit shifting opportunities. This reasoning 
is supported by theoretical work of Desai et al. (2006) who show that MNEs with investments 
in tax havens have lower cost of capital in non-tax havens. Consequently, as Dharmapala (2008) 
points out, the existence of tax havens can lead to an increase in investment in non-tax havens. 
Empirical evidence for this reasoning is provided by Overesch (2009). He shows for high-tax 
German subsidiaries that real investment in these subsidiaries increases with a rising tax rate 
differential between the German subsidiary and the direct owner’s home country. He argues 
                                                            
13 In addition, these royalty payments can be manipulated in a tax-optimal way with relative ease since objective 
market prices usually do not exist for those IP transfer prices. 
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that this is due to profit shifting out of Germany to the direct owner’s country, which decreases 
the subsidiary’s cost of capital. Also, Egger et al. (2014b) show that firms that can avoid taxes 
do not react to the tax rates in the host country. 
A large number of countries have implemented CFC rules, which target against MNE-wide 
profit shifting strategies. These rules lead to an immediate taxation of low-tax subsidiary’s prof-
its in the MNE’s headquarters’ country. Thereby, the typical profit shifting strategies as de-
scribed above become generally ineffective within CFC rule MNEs, which may also affect the 
above mentioned investment effects. For CFC rules to be applicable, certain requirements have 
to be fulfilled, which depend on the set up of those rules in the respective countries. Common 
requirements are ownership (for the German CFC rules, e.g., the German parent has to hold 
more than 50% of the shares or voting rights in the foreign subsidiary), the profits have to be 
passive income (e.g., income from financial portfolio investment or loans to affiliated firms) 
and the tax rate in the country has to be low (e.g., less than 25%). Variations in the design of 
CFC rules are, e.g., the inclusion of also active income or the general applicability of CFC rules 
except for some countries (‘Whitelist’).  
Some empirical studies have already considered the effect of CFC rules on profit shifting be-
havior of MNEs. Altshuler and Hubbard (2003) investigate US CFC rules, which were tight-
ened in the Tax Reform Act 1986. They find that after 1986 US investment in financial service 
subsidiaries was no longer responsive to differences in host-country tax rates with other sub-
sidiaries. In other words, tax planning opportunities with profit shifting vehicles in low-tax 
countries were substantially reduced. In 1997, however, the US introduced the so-called check-
the-box regulation, which may allow for an escape from CFC rules for US MNEs. Indeed, sev-
eral studies (e.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert (2009)) show that US CFC 
rules became largely ineffective in combatting profit shifting of US MNEs after 1997. Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012) investigate German CFC rules and find that these rules effectively reduce 
passive investment in low-tax countries. In a subsequent study, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) 
investigate the effects of the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling of the European Court of Justice in 
2006 on passive investment of German MNEs. The ruling triggered a mitigation of the appli-
cation of CFC rules within the European Economic Area (EEA). The authors find evidence for 
a relative increase in passive investment in subsidiaries in EEA countries with low tax rates and 
a parallel decrease in passive investment in subsidiaries in non-EEA countries. Büttner and 
Wamser (2013) accordingly find that the German CFC rules limit profit shifting via debt fi-
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nancing. Holzmann (2014) finds that profit shifting by placing debt in high-tax countries in-
creased through the breakup of binding CFC rules after the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling. Overall, 
these studies provide evidence that the presence of CFC rules reduces profit shifting opportu-
nities of MNEs. Belz (2015) analyzes investment in formerly domestic targets following acqui-
sitions by MNEs. He finds significant positive effects of the tax differential between the target 
country’s tax rate and the minimum tax rate among all affiliates within the group on total assets 
and the employee number. If transfer pricing rules are in place, profit shifting seems to be re-
placed by shifting real activity. However, he finds that CFC rules may be an appropriate way 
to eliminate shifting real economic activity to low-tax countries if they cover also active in-
come, i.e., such real economic activity. Finally, Egger and Wamser (2015) show that German 
MNEs, whose subsidiaries are subject to CFC rules, have significantly lower fixed assets than 
subsidiaries who are not subject to CFC rules. They conclude that binding CFC rules lead to a 
sharp increase in cost of capital. 
2.2.2 Research Question, Contribution and Hypotheses Development 
We address the questions whether real investment in firms increases due to profit shifting op-
portunities, whether financial revenues respectively profits of low-tax targets increase, given 
that they potentially become destinations of profit shifting themselves and whether CFC rules 
are effective in avoiding such profit shifting. We focus on targets that were domestic before the 
acquisition, i.e., we consider only targets that were not tax-optimized in a profit shifting context 
before the acquisition. We consider real investment (measured by PPE) and different measures 
of profit shifting (financial revenues and EBT per PPE) in our analyses. When considering PPE, 
we indirectly also measure potential profit shifting since we identify the part of the change of 
PPE that is attributable to such shifting. In case of the two other dependent variables, we pre-
sumably directly observe profit shifting (to targets in low-tax countries).  
We contribute to previous literature especially through the consideration of different dependent 
variables in one analysis, which helps to show the whole picture of profit shifting. This picture 
should cover three effects. First, since we assume profit shifting opportunities for high-tax tar-
gets that enter a non-CFC rule MNE, real investment in those firms should increase. Second 
and third, tax rates should accordingly affect whether profits are shifted to other targets. This is 
investigated in the regressions with financial revenues and EBT per PPE as dependent variables. 
If we are able to confirm those three effects, we can be more certain that generally profit shifting 
is indeed conducted after such acquisitions. This adds to the visibility and reliability of the 
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results on profit shifting and investment effects, which have also been found in previous litera-
ture.  
Based on this previous literature and the focus of the paper, we will now formulate hypotheses 
in the following subsections. We differentiate between two cases: First, we consider targets of 
non-CFC rule MNEs. Second, we consider targets of CFC rule MNEs.  
2.2.2.1 Case 1: Target enters a non-CFC rule MNE 
As mentioned above, in one of our two settings, we consider the case where a formerly domestic 
target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE. This has the effect that the target can generally 
engage in group-wide profit shifting lowering its cost of capital. This lower cost of capital 
should positively influence real investment.14 We expect the increase in real investment to be 
more pronounced with an increasing statutory profit tax rate of the target. The reasoning is as 
follows: If the target resides in a low-tax country, its cost of capital is already quite low, i.e., 
more real investment projects have already been conducted in the pre-acquisition period com-
pared to a high-tax target with relatively high cost of capital. We, therefore, hypothesize the 
following: 
H-1: With an increasing statutory profit tax rate of a formerly domestic target, real in-
vestment of the target increases following an acquisition by a MNE with no CFC 
rules in its headquarters’ residence country. 
Referring to the profit shifting strategies outlined in Section 2.2.1, we expect that financial 
revenues of a formerly domestic target in a low-tax country will increase once this target enters 
a MNE that can generally engage in group-wide profit shifting. The idea is that financial reve-
nues are shifted from high-tax affiliates to the low-tax target. We, therefore, hypothesize the 
following: 
H-2: With a decreasing statutory profit tax rate of a formerly domestic target, financial 
revenues of the target increase following an acquisition by a MNE with no CFC 
rules in its headquarters’ residence country. 
                                                            
14 One limitation is that sellers may be aware of this advantage of the buyers and hence demand higher acquisition 
prices. This additional spending might reduce the funding for investment and hence counteract the effect. But 
we still expect investment effects since, particularly due to limited information, it is unlikely that the sellers may 
set the prices in a way to fully account for those advantages of the buyers. Further, the influence of the sellers 
on the acquisition price depends on their bargaining power. 
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As mentioned above, another measure of profit shifting is EBT per PPE. Here the effect may 
be driven by high-tax as well as low-tax targets: For high-tax targets, due to increasing invest-
ment in case of profit shifting, the denominator is expected to increase while the numerator is 
supposed to decrease due to reduced profits (see hypothesis H-1). In low-tax targets, which may 
become destinations of profit shifting, this measure should increase (see hypothesis H-2). 
Hence, EBT per PPE should generally decline with the tax rate and we conclude our next hy-
pothesis: 
H-3: With an increasing statutory profit tax rate of a formerly domestic target, EBT per 
PPE of the target decreases following an acquisition by a MNE with no CFC rules 
in its headquarters’ residence country. 
2.2.2.2 Case 2: Target enters a CFC rule MNE 
In case a formerly domestic target is acquired by a CFC rule MNE, the target enters a MNE 
that cannot engage in group-wide profit shifting. We do not expect to observe the above de-
scribed positive effect of acquisitions on high-tax target real investment as the target’s cost of 
capital remains unchanged due to the lack of profit shifting opportunities in this case. We, 
therefore, hypothesize the following: 
H-4a: Real investment of a formerly domestic target does not increase with the statutory 
profit tax rate following an acquisition by a MNE with CFC rules in its headquar-
ters’ residence country. 
Moreover, as the profit shifting strategies outlined in Section 2.2.1 are not achievable within 
such a MNE, real investment profit shifting may be used to circumvent these limitations. In 
particular, if the MNE’s CFC rules include only passive income (as denoted above this includes 
financial portfolio investment as well as loans to affiliated firms), the MNE might be eager to 
conduct real investment in low-tax targets because the generated active income resulting from 
this investment is taxed at low tax rates. This is reflected by the following hypothesis: 
H4-b: With a decreasing statutory profit tax rate of a formerly domestic target, real in-
vestment of the target increases following an acquisition by a MNE with CFC rules 
that only include passive income. 
Finally, we again consider two measures of profit shifting: financial revenues and EBT per PPE. 
We expect that the effect of the tax rate on those measures of a formerly domestic target does 
not change, when it enters a MNE that cannot engage in group-wide profit shifting. That is due 
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to the lack of opportunities to shift profits into low-tax targets or out of high-tax targets within 
the MNE. Hence, with respect to financial revenues, we state our fifth hypothesis: 
H-5: Financial revenues of a formerly domestic target do not decrease with an increasing 
statutory profit tax rate following an acquisition by a MNE with CFC rules in its 
headquarters’ residence country. 
Accordingly, we also expect no effect of the tax rate on EBT per PPE: 
H-6: EBT per PPE of a formerly domestic target does not decrease with an increasing 
statutory profit tax rate following an acquisition by a MNE with CFC rules in its 
headquarters’ residence country. 
There are also other regulations targeted against profit shifting, such as thin-capitalization or 
earnings-stripping rules and transfer pricing documentation rules. Because of those rules, even 
in the absence of CFC rules profit shifting may not be possible. Therefore, we account for those 
rules in the extensions part.  
2.3 Data 
We investigate the above-mentioned hypotheses with an empirical analysis. Our data is taken 
from the Zephyr database (Bureau van Dijk), which contains worldwide acquisition transac-
tions and provides information on the countries of the direct acquirer and target as well as ac-
quired shares of the target. We select all completed acquisitions through which at once 100% 
of the target shares were acquired (ensuring that the MNE has enough influence on the firm to 
conduct profit shifting) and which took place in the period 2008 to 2013 (2008 to 2012 in case 
of EBT per PPE). This however reduces the sample by about 75%. Future research could relax 
this restriction by allowing also for acquisitions, where the 100% ownership is achieved through 
multiple acquisition steps. This could increase the sample size and hence the statistical power. 
Before 2008 we do not have information on GUOs, so we cannot investigate the effects of CFC 
rules.  
To answer our research question on the effect of CFC rules on target investment following 
acquisitions, we have to merge target financial data, which are not provided in the Zephyr da-
tabase. Therefore, we merge PPE, financial revenues and EBT from the Amadeus database 
(Bureau van Dijk) using Bureau van Dijk identification numbers, which link Zephyr with 
Amadeus. For our regression analysis, we require at least one observation before and after the 
acquisition per target firm. We do not consider observations in the acquisition year since the 
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exact acquisition dates vary within the acquisition years between the acquisitions. Further, we 
exclude targets from the financial services sector due to special regulations on their balance 
sheet structure, which may bias our results. In addition, we consider only targets with uncon-
solidated financial data since we are interested in the investment effects only at the target-level. 
Finally, we exclude targets that have an accumulated loss over our considered period. Further, 
we exclude observations that have an extraordinarily small or large EBT per PPE, i.e., we drop 
observations with an EBT per PPE within the 1%-percentile or above the 99%-percentile. In-
formation on those target financial data, which we consider before and after the acquisitions, 
are given for the years 2004 to 2014 (for 2004 to 2013 in case of EBT per PPE). 
Further, we need to ensure that the target was a domestic one before the acquisition and be-
comes part of a MNE through the acquisition. To address this data set requirement, we use 
ownership data of the target and direct acquirer provided by Amadeus in the following way: 
For the target, we merge its GUO before the acquisition. We keep the acquisition in our data 
set if the target GUO has only domestic subsidiaries.15 If the target is the GUO itself or a stand-
alone firm, we follow the same logic. Also for the direct acquirer, we merge its GUO before 
the acquisition. We keep the acquisition in our data set if the acquirer GUO is from another 
country than the target or has non-domestic subsidiaries (besides possible domestic subsidiar-
ies). This is necessary so that the GUO or affiliates are in other countries. Only then, profits 
may be shifted. If the direct acquirer is the GUO itself, we follow the same logic. 
To investigate the effect of acquirer GUO CFC rules on target investment following acquisi-
tions, we collect data on whether the acquirer GUO’s residence country applies CFC rules or 
not and – in case of binding CFC rules – whether only passive or passive and active income is 
taxed in the acquirer GUO’s residence country. We split our final sample into two parts for our 
regression analysis (see Section 2.4). In the first part, we analyze target investment, financial 
revenues and profits following the acquisition if the acquirer GUO resides in a non-CFC rule 
                                                            
15 Note that the information on whether the GUO has subsidiaries from certain countries is based on data from 
2016. It is reasonable to assume a persistence of corporate structures over time. Regarding those GUOs that are 
not a part of MNEs in 2016, one can assume that a group that once was a MNE presumably didn’t became such 
a domestic group afterwards. Regarding those GUOs that are part of a MNE in 2016, one can assume that, given 
that many firms already exist for many years, those were with a large probability also a MNE several years ago. 
However, it may not necessarily be the case and hence we may underestimate the effect (some targets may 
already have been part of MNEs before the acquisition and some may have entered groups that were actually 
no MNEs). 
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country (hypotheses H-1, H-2 and H-3). In the second part, we analyze those measures if the 
acquirer GUO resides in a CFC rule country (hypotheses H-4a, H-4b, H-5 and H-6).16 
Due to quite demanding data set requirements (financial and/or GUO data are often missing) 
our final sample consists of 1,505 observations (213 acquisitions) in case of PPE as the depend-
ent variable. For financial revenues respectively EBT per PPE the sample reduces to 731 (515) 
observations. In about two thirds of the cases, the acquirer GUO comes from a CFC rule coun-
try. The number of observations before and after an acquisition varies across firms. Though for 
a considerable number of firms (at least 50) we have observations for 6 years before and 4 years 
after an acquisition (5 years before and 3 years after for financial revenues and 3 years before 
and 2 years after for EBT per PPE).   
Table 2.1 shows the origins of the acquirer GUOs and targets in our sample and information on 
CFC rules based on a regression with PPE as the dependent variable and CFC rule as well as 
non-CFC rule MNEs included. The cells on CFC rules of the table are always denoted as not 
available (N/A) if there are no GUOs from that country. For each country, the number of GUOs 
and targets that appear in our sample and are located in the respective country are listed. Aus-
tralia, e.g., is the host country of 10 GUOs but no firms in Australia have been acquired. Note 
that Zephyr is global in coverage, whereas Amadeus, besides exceptions, only contains finan-
cial data for European firms. Therefore we generally do not observe targets outside Europe (at 
least in the regressions in the main part17). In line with Di Giovanni (2005), we observe that 
countries with the largest financial markets (US and United Kingdom) have the most acquirer 
GUOs in our acquisition sample. For all those countries, where we observe targets, it is reason-
able to expect real investment effects as outlined in Section 2.2.2 because those countries are 
presumably sufficiently large economies to perform real activity. 
Table 2.1 shows also that almost all developed countries (if, e.g., OECD membership is con-
sidered as a criterion for development) have CFC rules. Certain countries are exemptions, i.e., 
developed countries without CFC rules, namely Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland. The US have CFC rules, but, as mentioned before, those 
have de facto become ineffective through the so-called check-the-box regulation, so we do not 
                                                            
16 Note that, in our sample, CFC rules either do exist or do not exist for each acquirer’s headquarters’ country 
throughout the whole considered period. We therefore exclude acquisitions with an acquirer GUO from China 
as China introduced CFC rules in 2008 and, hence, cannot be grouped into the CFC or non-CFC rule country 
sample in our considered period. 
17 At least in one robustness check, the observations vary compared to the main part and hence theoretically (though 
rather unlikely) there may also be non-European targets. 
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consider the US as a country with CFC rules (potential changes from the 2018 US tax reform 
are not considered since the dataset goes only up to 2014). Since those countries (at least de 
facto) have no CFC rules, we can be confident that it is not the difference between developed 
and other countries that actually determines the effect that we assign to CFC rules. As men-
tioned above, the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling triggered a mitigation of the application of CFC 
rules within the EEA. The rules may even be considered to be ineffective since the requirements 
for their non-applicability have become relatively low. However, the minimum achievable tax 
rate is only the lowest one within the EEA. Hence, shifting profits to a country with a smaller 
tax rate is still not possible and the EEA countries are considered as CFC rule countries also 
after the ruling. If we would still see an increase of real investment in high-tax countries for 
targets of CFC rule MNEs, we could adapt this classification of EEA countries. However, our 
results (as described in Section 2.5) show that this is not the case.  
  
Impact of Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules on Post-Acquisition Investment and Profit Shifting in Targets 39 
 
 
Table 2.1: Origins of acquirer GUO and target firms. 
Country Number of deals with ac-
quirer GUO residing in the 
country 
Number of targets Existence of CFC rules 
in acquirer GUO coun-
try (yes/no) 
Australia 10 0 1 
Austria 1 4 0 
Belgium 3 9 0 
Bermuda 4 0 0 
Canada 4 0  1 
Cayman Islands 1 0 0 
Croatia 0 1 N/A 
Czech Republic 1 6 0 
Denmark 1 1 1 
Estonia 1 4 1 
Finland 6 9 1 
France 6 17 1 
Germany 13 26 1 
Greece 0 2 N/A 
Hungary 0 1 N/A 
India 6 0 0 
Ireland 4 2 0 
Israel 5 0 1 
Italy 5 10 1 
Japan 2 0 1 
Latvia 0 2 N/A 
Lithuania 3 1 1 
Malaysia 1 0 0 
Malta 1 0 0 
Netherlands 9 10 0 
New Zealand 1 0 1 
Norway 4 7 1 
Panama 1 0 0 
Poland 2 3 0 
Portugal 1 2 1 
Romania 0 2 N/A 
Russian Federation 4 6 0 
Slovak Republic 0 1 N/A 
Spain 7 5 1 
Sweden 11 2 1 
Switzerland 2 0 0 
Taiwan, China 1 0 0 
Ukraine 0 1 N/A 
United Kingdom 42 79 1 
US 50 0 0 
Total 213 213  
Notes: Firm-specific variables stem from the Amadeus and Zephyr databases from Bureau van Dijk. Tax variables 
(including the information on the CFC rules) are derived from the OECD, IBFD Tax Handbooks and the World-
wide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. The cells on CFC rules of the table are always denoted as not 
available (N/A) if there are no GUOs from that country. 
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2.4 Empirical Approach 
We analyze investment in targets after acquisitions using the following panel regression: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, (2.1) 
where Yi,t is the dependent variable that measures either the natural logarithm of PPE 
(lnTarPPE), the natural logarithm of financial revenues (lnTarFinRevenue) or EBT per PPE 
(TarEBTperPPE) for target i in year t. postMAyeari,t takes the value one for years following the 
acquisition and TarSTRi,t measures the target’s statutory profit tax rate.18 
𝛽𝛽1 measures the effect of synergy gains achieved through the acquisition at target level. We 
have no expectation on the sign of the coefficient of 𝛽𝛽1 because a priori the effect of synergy 
gains is ambiguous. On the one hand, the acquisition may lead to an increase in target invest-
ment, e.g., because the target avails of a certain technology that is new for the MNE and is 
expanded at target level (or the MNE avails of such a technology, which can now be used also 
within the target). On the other hand, the acquisition may lead to target divestment, e.g., because 
some target functions are already performed elsewhere within the MNE, i.e., rationalization 
takes place at target-level.19 Financial revenues are not expected to be affected by such synergy 
gains because those gains presumably rather affect real production or services in general. Profits 
may increase (if the MNE avails of a better technology or target functions are shifted to affiliates 
while output stays constant), decrease (if new functions are shifted from affiliates to the target 
while output stays constant) or stay constant (if none of this happens). 
𝛽𝛽2 measures the basic effect of the target’s statutory profit tax rate on the dependent variables 
(i.e., the effect that is independent on whether the observation is before or after the acquisition 
year). We expect a negative coefficient for 𝛽𝛽2 for all dependent variables. In case of PPE, the 
tax rate has a positive effect on the cost of capital and, consequently, fewer investments are 
undertaken. Regarding the other dependent variables, they should be negatively affected by the 
tax rate because firms are expected to locate financial revenues and profits in low-tax countries.  
                                                            
18 One limitation is that whenever we consider financial revenues, we presumably only observe profit shifting via 
debt. Income from IP would rather fall under operational income since in many cases licensing of such IP is 
probably the main operation of the respective firm. 
19 For a similar argumentation of the effects of acquisitions on target employment and output, see Conyon et al. 
(2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004). 
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After the acquisition, i.e., if  postMAyeari,t is equal to one, we have to distinguish whether the 
MNEs’ headquarters reside in a country with CFC rules or not. This is carried out by running 
separate regressions (sample split) for the two cases. 
𝛽𝛽3 measures the effect of the target’s statutory profit tax rate on investment that additionally 
arises after acquisitions. We expect a positive sign of this coefficient in the regression with PPE 
as the dependent variable in case a target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE. This effect is 
due to profit shifting opportunities, which may decrease the cost of capital after the acquisition 
of high-tax targets in particular (hypothesis H-1). Low-tax targets may, however, become des-
tinations of profit shifting themselves. In line with this reasoning, we expect a negative sign for 
𝛽𝛽3 in the regressions with financial revenues and EBT per PPE as dependent variables (hypoth-
eses H-2 and H-3). Note, as a side remark, that the effect for EBT should not just be a conse-
quence of the profit shifting to low-tax targets (and hence an increase for those observations), 
but also follow from the shifting of profits out of high-tax targets (and hence a decrease for 
those observations). On the contrary, financial revenues should only be affected in low-tax tar-
gets.  
If a target is acquired by a CFC rule MNE, we generally expect no effect on PPE after the 
acquisition since the typical profit shifting strategies outlined in Section 2.2.1 are ineffective. 
Accordingly, 𝛽𝛽3 is expected to be zero for these dependent variables (hypothesis H-4a). In case 
the CFC rule only includes passive income, we expect a negative sign for 𝛽𝛽3 in the regression 
with PPE as dependent variable since we assume higher real investment in low-tax countries 
after the acquisition. We argue that decreasing the MNE’s tax burden may only be achieved via 
real investment profit shifting (hypothesis H-4b). For financial revenues and EBT per PPE, 𝛽𝛽3 
is again expected to be zero (hypotheses H-5 and H-6). 
It is important for understanding our estimation setting that for PPE it is irrelevant whether the 
target falls under CFC rules because we consider profit shifting opportunities to affiliates. We 
do not account for whether the CFC rules actually apply to the affiliates since it is difficult to 
observe the full group structure in the data set. However, since, as we will see later, we find 
that the suspected profit shifting effect can no longer be observed in case of CFC rules, we can 
assume that they are binding for the affiliates of at least some MNEs. For financial revenues 
and EBT per PPE, which are assumed to increase if the targets become destinations for profit 
shifting opportunities, it is however relevant whether the CFC rules apply. If we would observe 
potential profit shifting for CFC rule MNEs, it might be better to exclude those targets where 
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the CFC rules actually do not apply. For the remaining ones, i.e., those were the rules apply, 
we definitely should see no effect. However, since we presumably do not observe profit shifting 
for CFC rule MNEs, we abstain from this extended analysis in this paper. Further, one may also 
argue that it is relevant to consider also CFC rules of intermediate subsidiaries in third countries. 
However, we assume that if there are CFC rules in such subsidiaries, there should also be CFC 
rules in the headquarters’ country since it is not likely that MNEs worsen their profit shifting 
opportunities by interposing an intermediate subsidiary with CFC rules if there are no such rules 
in the headquarters’ country. 
In addition to our variables of interest, we include a vector of target firm and country control 
variables Xi,t. Whereas some control variables are used only for some of the dependent varia-
bles, others are used for all. Our selection of control variables is largely oriented on previous 
literature measuring effects of taxes on investment (e.g., Overesch (2009), Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012)) and profits (Weichenrieder (2009)). At the target-level, we control for 
losses in the previous period, which could have a negative effect on investment decisions and 
profits in the following period. In case of PPE and EBT per PPE as dependent variables, we 
also control for the target’s non-PPE assets, i.e., all balance sheet items other than PPE. We 
expect a positive effect of non-PPE assets because an increase in other assets, such as liquid 
assets may have a positive effect on investment in PPE. This may lead to more economic activ-
ity in the target, which should also increase EBT (in large firms, economies of scale may lead 
to a higher profitability). On the contrary, for financial revenues, we use PPE as another ex-
planatory variable. For this variable, we expect a positive effect because financial revenues are 
obtained from liquid assets (bonds and financial portfolio investment), which larger firms pre-
sumably tend to hold in higher quantities (Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)). At the country level, 
we control for macroeconomic conditions, including GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth and a 
corruption index. In the regressions with financial revenues as the dependent variable, we also 
control for inflation as a measure for local lending conditions. If the lending conditions in the 
country are relatively good (i.e., the inflation is low), debt may be taken there and forwarded 
via internal lending to affiliates with adverse local lending conditions. This should increase the 
financial revenues of the subsidiary. 
Further, we include target firm fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and year fixed effects 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. Firm fixed effects 
control for unobserved target-specific factors, which could have effects on the dependent vari-
ables, i.e., target-specific heterogeneity materializing in changes of the dependent variable. 
Year fixed effects control for unobserved time trends, such as business cycles, which may influence 
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the dependent variable. 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the residual. Table 2.2 provides variable 
definitions, data sources and summary statistics of all variables. 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
TarPPE* PPE of target (in millions of USD). 11.101 56.772 
TarFinRevenue* Financial revenues of target (in millions of USD). 1.883 25.447 
TarEBT_perPPE EBT divided by PPE of target. 4.098 13.349 
postMAyear 1 if year is after acquisition. 0.345 0.475 
TarSTR Statutory profit tax rate in target country. 0.286 0.052 
AcqGUO_CFC 1 if CFC rules exist in acquirer GUO country.  0.587 0.493 
TarAssets_noPPE* Assets other than PPE of target (in millions of USD). 41.670 267.231 
TarLoss_lag  1 if target has a loss in previous year. 0.079 0.270 
TarEmployees* Employees of target.  122.930 148.039 
TarSales* Sales of target (in millions of USD). 140.682 1,028.305 
TarGDP* GDP in target country (in trillions of USD). 1.857 1.132 
TarGDP_growth GDP growth in target country (in %). 1.473 3.053 
TarGDP_percapita* GDP per capita in target country (in thousands of 
USD). 
39.268 14.240 
TarCorruption Corruption index in target country. 1.422 0.733 
TarInflation Inflation in target country (in %). 2.732 3.135 
Notes: Firm-specific variables stem from the Amadeus and Zephyr databases from Bureau van Dijk. Tax variables 
(including the information on the CFC rules) are derived from the OECD, IBFD Tax Handbooks and the World-
wide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. All other country specific variables are obtained from the World 
Bank. 
*In the regressions, logarithms are used. 
It is possible that the observed targets within the different countries are not independently and 
identically distributed and so the standard errors are clustered. This could lead to biased stand-
ard errors, especially since our variable of interest (TarSTR) is a variable at the country level 
(Cameron and Trivedi (2009)). To account for this issue, we use cluster-robust standard errors 
on the target country level.20 However, as mentioned in the previous section, our data set is 
restricted to only 26 target countries (21 countries in case of financial revenues and 23 countries 
in case of EBT per PPE). Since with few clusters (five to thirty) cluster-robust standard errors 
are downward biased and the H0-hypothesis of no effect is rejected too often, bootstrapping has 
                                                            
20 For more details on cluster-robust standard errors, see Cameron and Miller (2015). 
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to be applied (Cameron et al. (2008)). We follow Greene (2012) and apply 1,000 bootstrap 
replications.21 
There are two major limitations to our identification strategy:  
First, we are careful in stating the exact mechanism behind the discussed effects. It could be 
that already the acquisition decision is determined by CFC rules. Regarding PPE for example, 
out of the group of MNEs that want to invest, it may only be the ones with no CFC rules that 
acquire targets in high-tax countries to invest there because only they can do profit shifting and 
hence conduct investment that is profitable after taxes. So we can think of two possible chan-
nels. In case of the first channel, targets are acquired independently of CFC rules and then, after 
the acquisition, CFC rules affect investment. In case of the second channel, profit shifting or 
CFC rules already affect the acquisition decision. In any of the two cases, we however end up 
with our hypotheses. Further analyses could apply further reductions of the sample based on 
other drivers of acquisitions. One driver could be the degree of synergies. If we would only 
consider those samples, where such drivers are particularly relevant, this may dominate tax 
considerations and allow to precisely measure the first channel. Besides making CFC rules ex-
ogenous, it would also have this effect on the incentive to conduct profit shifting. However, the 
limited number of observations makes such an approach difficult so far. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.3, a relaxation of the ownership requirements may however increase the number of ob-
servations.  
Second, as research has found out, the presence of CFC rules in a MNE’s headquarters’ country 
increases the probability that the headquarters are relocated to a non-CFC rule country (Voget 
(2011)). Hence, several of the MNEs that still have their headquarters in a country with CFC 
rules, might be less tax aggressive and, therefore, may not engage in profit shifting. Therefore, 
it would actually not be the CFC rules but the tax aggressiveness that affects investment. Here, 
future research could exploit short run effects of abrupt changes of CFC rules (like in Holzmann 
(2014)), which may be exogenous. 
2.5 Results and Robustness Analysis 
2.5.1 Property, Plant and Equipment 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. As discussed in Section 2.2, we 
expect different effects of acquisitions on real investment (PPE) in the targets depending on 
                                                            
21 For more details on bootstrapping, see Cameron et al. (2008).  
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whether there are CFC rules or not in the acquirer’s headquarters’ country. We start our analysis 
with two graphs illustrating the development of low-tax and high-tax targets’ PPE in Figure 
2.1.  
Figure 2.1: Development of target PPE before and after acquisition 
  
Source: Amadeus database and Zephyr database (see Section 2.3). 
Notes: This figure illustrates the development of target PPE (median value) over 10 years. Normalized year 0 is 
the acquisition year, which is excluded. PPE is on the y-axis and normalized years are on the x-axis. The 
observations are 1,412 (2,400) for low-tax (high-tax) targets. Low-tax targets (high-tax targets) are defined as 
targets with a statutory profit tax rate that is smaller (equal or higher) than the median target statutory profit tax 
rate in each year, i.e., the considered targets are classified as either low-tax or high-tax targets. In addition, for 
each data point in the graphs, we require at least 20 observations for the median value calculation.  
 
In line with hypothesis H-1, PPE of high-tax targets acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs increases 
after the acquisition. We trace this finding back to the decline in cost of capital of formerly 
domestic high-tax targets due to arising profit shifting opportunities once they enter a non-CFC 
rule MNE. This may lead to the realization of more investment projects (see Section 2.2.2.1). 
PPE of high-tax targets acquired by CFC rule MNEs does not seem to be much affected by the 
acquisition.22 In low-tax targets, we see an increase of investment for targets acquired by CFC 
rule MNEs in the third year after the acquisition, which supports our assumption of profit shift-
ing via real investment (hypothesis H-4b).  
Table 2.3 shows the results for the regressions with PPE as the dependent variable. Column (1) 
includes our full sample of target firms, whereas the following two distinguish between targets 
acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs (column (2)) or CFC rule MNEs (column (3)). Different from 
                                                            
22 Since PPE for non-CFC rule MNEs is already slightly higher in years before the acquisition, we test in the 
Appendix (Table A 4 to Table A 9) whether there is a common trend before the acquisition for PPE (and also 
the other dependent variables). We distinguish between those targets that are acquired by CFC rule respectively 
non-CFC rule MNEs though only the results for non-CFC rule MNEs, which are of most interest to us, are 
shown. We conduct this test by looking at whether the observed post-acquisition effects may actually have 
started several years before or after the acquisition by variants of the regressions. We find, inter alia, an increase 
of PPE already in the year before the acquisition. We will explain that this is however presumably not problem-
atic for our results. 
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the graphs, we now consider the tax rate as a continuous variable. Column (4) shows the results 
for CFC rules that only include passive income. 
Table 2.3: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
(only passive in-
come included) 
     
postMAyear -0.508 -1.104* 0.037 0.559 
 (0.398) (0.567) (0.738) (1.244) 
TarSTR -1.223 -3.846 1.821 0.032 
 (1.594) (3.042) (2.957) (4.316) 
postMAyear#TarSTR 1.402 3.569* -0.691 -0.989 
 (1.287) (1.966) (2.526) (4.110) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.499*** 0.421*** 0.557*** 0.388* 
 (0.086) (0.117) (0.100) (0.199) 
TarLoss_lag -0.071 0.066 -0.127 -0.027 
 (0.083) (0.134) (0.129) (0.154) 
lnTarGDP 7.035*** 7.858 8.577** 4.356 
 (2.598) (5.462) (4.322) (7.113) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -5.881** -6.413 -7.576* -3.809 
 (2.460) (5.197) (4.041) (6.640) 
TarGDP_growth -0.027** -0.020 -0.032 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.045) 
TarCorruption 0.089 -0.326 0.479 0.613 
 (0.317) (0.533) (0.479) (0.620) 
Constant -128.410*** -144.715 -154.725** -76.313 
 (45.446) (97.381) (76.452) (127.448) 
Observations 1,505 622 883 331 
Deals 213 91 122 66 
R-squared 0.214 0.199 0.242 0.201 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (1.1). For variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
 
In our results, the general effect of an acquisition (postMAyear) is negative and statistically 
significant in case of no CFC rules in the acquirer’s headquarters’ country (column (2)). As 
outlined in Section 2.4, the acquisition effect could be either positive or negative. Here we 
observe significant divestment in PPE after the acquisition, which may indicate that rationali-
zation takes place at target level. We do not find this effect for the other specifications. Further, 
we find that TarSTR has no significant effect on real investment. It may be that, given that there 
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is relatively little variation over time, the effect of this variable is absorbed by the firm fixed 
effects. 
Our variable of interest, the interaction term, is significantly positive in the second specifica-
tion. Therefore, the results indicate that once a target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE, 
investment increases after the acquisition with an increasing tax rate. This is evidence in support 
of hypothesis H-1. To quantify the effect of the acquisition on PPE, we compare this effect for 
the lowest and highest target tax rates in our sample (12.5% respectively 38.9%).23 For low-tax 
targets, we calculate the acquisition effect on PPE to be -0.658 (-1.104+3.569*0.125). Given 
that our dependent variable is given as the natural logarithm, this translates into a decrease of 
48% (=e(-0.658)-1) in PPE after acquisitions. For high-tax targets, we calculate the effect to be 
0.284 (-1.104+3.569*0.389). In this case, the estimated effect is an increase of 33% (=e(0.284)-
1) in PPE after acquisitions. The F-Test for joint significance of postMAyear and its interaction 
with TarSTR holds (p-value of 0.072). As outlined in Section 2.2.2.1, the effect is supposed to 
be observed because profit shifting reduces the target’s cost of capital to a higher degree in 
high-tax countries compared to low-tax countries. Therefore, relatively more investment is car-
ried out in high-tax countries.24 
The aforementioned effect should not be observed if the target is acquired by a CFC rule MNE. 
Indeed, the interaction term is insignificant in column (3), which supports hypothesis H-4a. We 
would expect a negative effect of the interaction term in column (4), where we consider only 
CFC rules that include passive income, i.e., active income from real investment activity is ex-
cluded when applying CFC rules. In this case, we assume that those MNEs shift profits via real 
investment to low-tax targets (hypothesis H-4b). We find that the coefficient for the interaction 
term is insignificant. Hence, we do not find support for this hypothesis. However, note that, as 
a caveat, our sample for this case includes only a relatively small number of 66 deals with 331 
observations in total.  
Regarding control variables, we find a significantly positive effect for non-PPE assets in all 
specifications. This is as expected, because, as discussed in Section 2.4, other assets, such as 
liquid assets, may allow for more investment in PPE. The positive and significant effect of GDP 
but opposing effects for GDP per capita and GDP growth (at least in some specifications) may 
                                                            
23 Referring to expression (2.1), we measure this effect by calculating the derivative 𝛿𝛿𝑌𝑌 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝⁄ . 
24 However, our results indicate that acquisitions have an overall negative effect on real investment in targets with 
a relatively low tax rate. As outlined in Section 2.4, this may be due to rationalization at target-level, e.g., 
because some business functions may already be performed elsewhere within the MNE at lower cost. 
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be a slight indication that within our sample the size of the economy (GDP) but not its growth 
or wealth (GDP per capita) is favorable for higher investment.   
2.5.2 Financial Revenues 
Whereas the results in the previous section have shown that PPE increases in high-tax targets 
due to profit shifting opportunities, financial revenues are expected to increase in low-tax tar-
gets after the acquisition by non-CFC rule MNEs. This would be caused by profit shifting op-
portunities from high-tax affiliates within the MNE to those low-tax targets (hypothesis H-2). 
Similar to the graphical analysis in Section 2.5.1, we illustrate the development of financial 
revenues in Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: Development of target financial revenues before and after acquisition 
  
Source: Amadeus database and Zephyr database (see Section 2.3). 
Notes: This figure illustrates the development of target financial revenues (median value) over 9 years. Normalized 
year 0 is the acquisition year, which is excluded. Financial revenues are on the y-axis and normalized years are on 
the x-axis. The observations are 639 (1,585) for low-tax (high-tax) targets. Low-tax targets (high-tax targets) are 
defined as targets with a statutory profit tax rate that is smaller (equal or higher) than the median target statutory 
profit tax rate in each year, i.e., the considered targets are classified as either low-tax or high-tax targets. In 
addition, for each data point in the graphs, we require at least 20 observations for the median value calculation.  
 
The graph on the left side surprisingly shows that financial revenues of low-tax targets acquired 
by CFC rule MNEs increase after the acquisition. We would expect this effect rather for non-
CFC rule MNEs (see hypothesis H-2). However, this effect reverts in the third year after the 
acquisition. In addition, we do not find a clear pattern for the development of financial revenues 
in high-tax targets.  
In line with our discussion from Section 2.2.2.1, column (1) in Table 2.4 shows that target 
financial revenues increase after the acquisition with a decreasing target statutory profit tax rate. 
We assume that this is the case, since low-tax targets become destinations of shifted profits. We 
expect this effect only for targets that are acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs. It may be possible 
that this effect also dominates in the overall sample. However, if we consider those MNEs in 
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particular (column (2)) the effect can no longer be observed, so we cannot confirm hypothesis 
H-2. In line with hypothesis H-5, we observe in column (3) that financial revenues are insensi-
tive to the statutory profit tax rate of a formerly domestic target following an acquisition by a 
CFC rule MNE. However, given that we found no effect in case of no CFC rules, this is of 
limited interest.  
Table 2.4: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 1.559 2.121 0.739 
 (1.132) (1.634) (1.371) 
TarSTR 3.484 9.562 1.642 
 (5.207) (10.458) (6.054) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -7.052* -8.990 -4.672 
 (4.197) (6.272) (4.809) 
lnTarPPE 0.250** 0.035 0.349*** 
 (0.098) (0.200) (0.131) 
TarLoss_lag -0.230 -0.609 0.005 
 (0.263) (0.615) (0.239) 
lnTarGDP -6.503 -13.545 -5.271 
 (7.680) (15.851) (8.870) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 5.063 10.930 4.640 
 (7.826) (15.968) (9.362) 
TarGDP_growth 0.040 0.097 -0.027 
 (0.045) (0.077) (0.072) 
TarCorruption 0.501 -0.020 1.117 
 (1.177) (1.690) (1.396) 
TarInflation 0.042 0.001 0.043 
 (0.070) (0.102) (0.076) 
Constant 133.871 273.623 101.705 
 (136.367) (277.409) (152.673) 
Observations 731 314 417 
Deals 114 50 64 
R-squared 0.0746 0.0872 0.114 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (1.1). For 
variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year 
fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
 
Regarding the other variables, as discussed above, we have no clear expectation about the co-
efficient for postMAyear, but again expect a negative effect of the tax rate. However, we find 
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no significant effect here. Regarding firm size (measured by PPE), financial revenues seem to 
increase with this variable, at least in the overall sample and for CFC rule MNEs. As discussed 
above, this may be explained by a tendency of larger firms to hold higher quantities of liquid 
assets. The other control variables are insignificant. Presumably, as discussed for the tax rate in 
Section 2.5.1, their effects are absorbed by the firm fixed effects. 
2.5.3 EBT per PPE 
In addition to financial revenues, which we considered in the previous subsection, we now in-
vestigate the effect of taxes, profit shifting opportunities and CFC rules on another measure of 
profit shifting, namely EBT per PPE. Again, we start our empirical analysis with descriptive 
statistics on the evolvement of this variable after the acquisition (Figure 2.3).  
Figure 2.3: Development of EBT per PPE before and after acquisition 
  
Source: Amadeus database and Zephyr database (see Section 2.3). 
Notes: This figure illustrates the development of EBT per PPE (median value) over 9 years. Normalized year 0 is 
the acquisition year, which is excluded. EBT per PPE is on the y-axis and normalized years are on the x-axis. The 
observations are 1,328 (2,011) for low-tax (high-tax) targets. Low-tax targets (high-tax targets) are defined as 
targets with a statutory profit tax rate that is smaller (equal or higher) than the median target statutory profit tax 
rate in each year, i.e., the considered targets are classified as either low-tax or high-tax targets. In addition, for 
each data point in the graphs, we require at least 20 observations for the median value calculation. 
  
Both, for low-tax targets as well as for high-tax targets we see a decrease of this measure after 
acquisitions (in case of CFC rule and non-CFC rule MNEs). Whereas the picture for low-tax 
targets, where the profits more or less return to the level before the acquisitions over time, is 
not clear, in high-tax targets there is a strong decline after acquisitions. The latter may indicate 
that, in line with our findings for PPE, profits are shifted away from high-tax targets once they 
enter a MNE. However, surprisingly, this development can be found for both, CFC rule and 
non-CFC rule MNEs.  
Regarding the regression results, as for financial revenues, we do not find a significant effect 
for the interaction in column (2) (see Table 2.5). Hence, this dependent variable does not give 
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further evidence to the profit shifting effect, which presumably is found in the previous subsec-
tions, and we cannot add support to hypothesis H-3. Regarding control variables, another de-
terminant of EBT per PPE should be economic activity. Indeed we show that non-PPE assets 
and sales have a positive and significant effect on this dependent variable, though only in col-
umn (2). 
Table 2.5: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 4.096 -1.549 8.063 
 (6.139) (8.848) (10.691) 
TarSTR 42.768 78.384 38.528 
 (35.253) (68.075) (81.736) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -11.991 12.851 -29.979 
 (20.085) (32.898) (33.951) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.459 1.853* 1.609 
 (1.370) (1.048) (1.943) 
lnTarEmployees -1.862 -2.483 -1.885 
 (2.276) (2.286) (5.092) 
lnTarSales 1.711 3.095* 0.583 
 (1.451) (1.764) (3.058) 
TarLoss_lag -1.083 -0.081 -1.054 
 (1.188) (2.846) (2.763) 
lnTarGDP 44.133 -14.391 85.162 
 (41.360) (63.888) (71.585) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -33.041 22.130 -72.377 
 (35.347) (61.512) (62.532) 
TarGDP_growth 0.366 0.332 0.460 
 (0.231) (0.234) (0.452) 
TarCorruption -13.634 -22.594 -7.432 
 (9.384) (20.938) (8.425) 
Constant -915.521 100.116 -1,609.873 
 (791.880) (1,156.754) (1,339.324) 
Observations 515 225 290 
Deals 93 43 50 
R-squared 0.0857 0.247 0.101 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see expression (1.1). For variable descriptions and 
data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are 
estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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2.5.4 Extensions and Robustness Checks 
In addition to the main analysis, we conduct two extensions and two robustness checks: 
As our first extension, we augment our analysis by considering thin-capitalization or earnings-
stripping rules and transfer pricing documentation rules at target level in Table A 1 to Table A 
3 in the Appendix (Appendix to Section 2). Thin-capitalization rules or earnings-stripping rules 
may effectively hinder profit shifting activities at target-level by limiting or penalizing the de-
duction of interest payments. Whereas thin-capitalization rules limit or penalize interest deduc-
tion if the debt financing exceeds a certain debt to capital ratio, earnings-stripping rules apply 
in case of an excessive interest to earnings ratio. Transfer pricing documentation rules require 
detailed information on the height of intra-group transfer prices, which makes profit shifting 
obvious. We run separate regressions for the countries, where transfer pricing documentation 
rules exist (column (1) in Table A 1 to Table A 3), thin-capitalization or earnings-stripping rules 
exist (column (2)) or both kinds of rules exist (column (3)). Table A 1 shows that the interaction 
of postMAyear and TarSTR turns insignificant in the analysis of PPE in case of transfer pricing 
documentation rules or if both kinds of rules are applied by the respective country (columns (1) 
and (3)). This may indicate that they are, at least to a certain extent, effective in preventing 
profit shifting. However, for thin-capitalization or earnings-stripping rules alone (column (2)), 
the results slightly indicate that even in countries that have such rules, profit shifting may still 
be possible (PPE still increases with the tax rate after acquisitions). A possible explanation for 
this effect could be a limited effectiveness of those rules. Thin-capitalization rules, e.g., may be 
compensated by setting high interest rates (Schindler and Schjelderup (2016)). For the other 
two dependent variables, the effect stays insignificant (Table A 2 and Table A 3).  
As our second extension, we also vary the acquisition date, i.e., we rerun the above regressions 
modelling the acquisition dummy as if the acquisition would have happened in the second to 
fifth year before respectively in the first to fourth year after the actual acquisition year. This 
investigation is a consequence of the graphs shown above, which raise concerns about whether 
there is a common trend of targets before the acquisition independent of whether they are then 
acquired by CFC rule or non-CFC rule MNEs. The results for targets acquired by non-CFC rule 
MNEs are shown in Table A 4 to Table A 9 in the Appendix. The results for CFC rule MNEs 
are not shown in this paper since the focus is on the effects for non-CFC rule MNEs. But also 
for them, relevant findings are discussed. For PPE, we also find the effect (increasing invest-
ment in high-tax targets bought by non-CFC rule MNEs) if we consider the second year before 
the acquisition as if it would be the year, where the acquisition took place (see column (4) in 
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Table A 4). One possible explanation could be an anticipation of the acquisition, which may 
lead to an increase of investment already before the acquisition, because future profit shifting 
opportunities are taken into account. This, however, would still be in line with our overall as-
sumption about the effect of acquisitions and CFC rules. In addition, we also find a significant 
effect if we model the first year after the acquisition as the acquisition year (see column (1) in 
Table A 5). This additional effect, which implies a further increase of PPE starting from the 
second year after the acquisition, may indicate that the investment effect after acquisitions in-
creases over time. For financial revenues, as for the year of the acquisition, we also find no 
effect if we vary the acquisition date, except, surprisingly, for the fourth year after the acquisi-
tion in case of CFC rule MNEs (as mentioned above, those results are however not shown in 
this paper). There, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative. However, we 
are not too concerned about this result, since this is the only year for which we observe such an 
effect and it lies considerably far away from the acquisition year. The same applies for EBT per 
PPE, where we again find an effect for the fourth year after the acquisition, but now in case of 
non-CFC rule MNEs (see column (4) in Table A 9). Overall, those extensions with the varied 
acquisition date support our assumption that the effects that we observe are indeed driven by 
the acquisition. As mentioned above, there may be some potential further aspects in case of 
PPE (e.g., anticipation of the acquisition) that lead to the effect (investment increases with the 
tax rate) already before the acquisition. This could be accounted for in future research.  
As mentioned above, we also run two robustness checks. This is also relevant, since so far we 
find no evidence for our hypotheses H-2, H-3 and H-4b (which however may be the case in 
those robustness checks).  
First, instead of the tax rate, we use the tax rate differential to the GUO of the acquirer (Table 
A 10 to Table A 12). This differential accounts for the fact that a high tax rate does not neces-
sarily mean that profits are shifted away from the respective firm (if it is assumed that profits 
would be shifted to the GUO). If the tax rate of the GUO is higher, it would not be beneficial 
from the MNEs perspective to shift profits to the latter. However, as a caveat, this measure is 
limited, since, besides the GUO, there may also be affiliates to which profits may be shifted. 
Second, we exclude control variables that are other balance sheet items than the dependent 
variables and certain other firm characteristics. Those excluded variables are non-PPE assets in 
case of PPE as the dependent variable, PPE in case of financial revenues as the dependent var-
iable and non-PPE assets, the number of employees and sales in case of EBT per PPE as the 
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dependent variable (Table A 13 to Table A 15). We do this check because there may be some 
reverse causality. 
In both robustness checks, the effect of acquisitions on PPE in high-tax countries for non-CFC 
rule MNEs can no longer be observed (column (2) in Table A 10 and Table A 13). For financial 
revenues, the effect that we found in our basic regressions, i.e., the amount of financial revenues 
decreasing with an increasing tax rate after acquisitions (in the overall sample) can still be found 
in both robustness checks (column (1) in Table A 11 and Table A 14). Finally, it is noteworthy 
that in the second robustness check, where we exclude certain control variables, we find the 
expected negative effect of the tax rate on EBT per PPE (column (1) in Table A 15).  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
We investigate the development of real investment, financial revenues and profits (EBT per 
PPE) in formerly domestic targets once they are acquired by foreign MNEs. In our analysis, we 
distinguish whether the headquarters of the acquiring MNEs reside in a country with or without 
CFC rules. This distinction is crucial because only in the absence of CFC rules, full profit shift-
ing opportunities are potentially possible. Overall, we find that profit shifting opportunities and 
CFC rules affect target real investment (PPE). The development of financial revenues supports 
the assumption of profit shifting but not of counteracting effects of CFC rules. However, we do 
not find corresponding effects for EBT per PPE. 
In particular, if a target is acquired by a MNE without CFC rules at the headquarters’ level, we 
conclude the following: First, we show that the effect of acquisitions on target real investment 
depends on the tax rate. We find a negative effect in case of a low tax rate in the target country 
and a positive effect in high-tax targets. We discuss that this result may be explained by MNE-
wide profit shifting opportunities, which decrease the cost of capital of high-tax targets, once 
they enter the MNE. Such a decrease leads to relatively more new profitable investment projects 
compared to low-tax targets, which had already relatively low cost of capital before the acqui-
sition. We find that in low-tax targets rationalization effects may dominate and lead to divest-
ment. Second, financial revenues increase in low-tax targets following acquisitions. This find-
ing supports the assumption of profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax subsidiaries within 
MNEs. However, we do not find evidence that EBT per PPE increases in low-tax targets (re-
spectively decreases in high-tax targets).  
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If a target is acquired by a MNE with CFC rules at the headquarters’ level, we conclude the 
following: First, PPE does not change following the acquisition with regard to the target’s stat-
utory profit tax rate. Accordingly, CFC rules seem to prevent typical profit shifting, i.e., via 
interest or royalties, within these MNEs. This finding supports the assumption that CFC rules 
are effective measures against profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax subsidiaries within 
MNEs. In addition, we do not find evidence that, as a reaction to this limitation, these MNEs 
engage in profit shifting via real investment in low-tax targets. For financial revenues, however, 
we find the effect of profit shifting opportunities only for the overall sample and cannot make 
a clear distinction between CFC rule and non-CFC rule MNEs.  
Our paper contributes to tax research by considering PPE, financial revenues and EBT per PPE 
as different dependent variables. Thereby we show the whole picture of profit shifting within 
one analysis. Since our estimates for two of those dependent variables at least partly confirm 
our hypotheses, we can be more certain that generally profit shifting is indeed conducted after 
such acquisitions.  
Our results may also be of interest for tax policy makers, because, by analyzing the effect of 
CFC rules on profit shifting, we study an anti-avoidance measure that is addressed in the OECD 
BEPS project (OECD/G20 (2015)) and in an EU directive (European Council (2016)) that aims 
at CFC rule implementation to tackle profit shifting of MNEs. Further, we elaborate that such 
a measure may however distort real investment decisions in targets following acquisitions, 
which policy makers should be aware of when implementing such rules. 
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3. Tax Influence on Financial Structures of M&As25 
Abstract: A well-known strategy of tax avoidance by multinationals is to locate debt in sub-
sidiaries resident in countries with a high tax rate. In case of M&As it is particularly advanta-
geous to locate debt at the level of holdings. By using firm-level data provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (German Central Bank), I show that consolidating the balance sheets of firms and 
their holdings leads to a stronger effect of taxes on the debt ratio in case of M&As. But, since 
this particular form of tax observations can be observed for only relatively few observations 
(which are however from a relatively large number of different MNEs) it seems to be a rather 
new phenomenon. Hence, also other aspects seem to be relevant in explaining why previous 
studies have found relatively low effects of taxes on debt financing. In case of greenfield in-
vestment, I find no effects of tax rates on the debt ratio. This denotes the importance of account-
ing for potentially heterogeneous tax avoidance behavior for both types of FDI. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Taxation, Multinational Entities, Foreign Direct Investment, Capital 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on tax avoidance in the context of M&As. M&As account for an increasing 
part of FDI (48% in 2015; UNCTAD (2016)) and are therefore potentially relevant for tax plan-
ning in MNEs. Indeed, it is, e.g., shown that effective tax rates of formerly domestic targets 
decline by around 3% after M&As (Belz et al. (2013)). Furthermore, Huizinga and Voget 
(2009) show that potential double taxation has an effect on the location of headquarters in 
MNEs after M&As.  
Targets are often not acquired directly but via holdings (in this analysis I will use the term 
holding structures for such combinations of subsidiaries and their holdings). It is a question, 
whether the acquisition via holdings happens for tax reasons. Several papers have investigated, 
why operating firms are held via holdings. They can be separated into three main groups: 
First, some show that so-called treaty shopping, i.e., the avoidance of withholding taxes, is a 
relevant determinant of holdings (see, e.g., Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010), Dyreng et al. 
(2015), Weyzig (2013) and Hong (2018)).  
Second, the results of Dyreng et al. (2015) exemplarily indicate that holdings are sometimes 
used to compensate unfavorable conditions in the country of the investment. They find that 
holdings are rather located in countries, where less corruption and investment risk is present, 
than in the one of the investment.  
Third, holding structures are also used to implement certain financial structures. From a tax 
perspective the interest tax shield should be allocated in a location with a high tax rate (debt 
push down; see Jacobs (2011)). Mintz (2004) shows that in this context so-called “double-dip-
ping” can explain the use of holdings: Parent firms invest in operating firms via holdings in 
intermediary countries. While the parent finances this investment by taking a loan, the operating 
firm receives its funds also as a loan from the holding. Whereas the holdings are located in 
countries where the interests from the operating firm are not considered as income, the interests 
may be deducted from the taxable profit twice. In case of M&As, the debt may also particularly 
be loaded at the level of a holding in the same country. This is advantageous since it allows for 
debt financing up to the purchase price (and not just the amount of total assets) (Ruf (2011)). 
Indeed, for German inbound investment, Ruf (2010) shows that debt is particularly shifted to 
holding companies. In line with that, he shows that a higher tax rate of the parent firm (i.e., a 
relatively lower tax rate of the subsidiary) decreases the probability of the usage of a holding 
(Ruf (2011)). Another explanation could be that debt push down, by including the usage of 
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holdings, can particularly be used to circumvent thin-capitalization rules (Jacobs (2011)). Thin-
capitalization rules are targeted against excessive debt financing, since they limit the deduction 
of interests from the tax base in case of excessive debt ratios.  
I focus on the relevance of holding structures for financial structures in case of M&As. I con-
sider German outbound FDI and thereby exploit more variation in the explanatory and control 
variables than previous studies that considered German inbound FDI. The dataset I am using is 
the Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (German 
Central Bank). Concerning outbound investment, this dataset allows to observe the complete 
chain of ownership including holding companies, since it is based on mandatory reporting for 
all outbound FDI from German MNEs. I will consider not just firms that became FDI through 
M&As (in the following referred to as “M&A firms”) but also greenfield investment (“non-
M&A firms”). Based on that, I can show whether there are specific effects for the former.  
Loading debt at the level of holdings may also explain why previous studies that do not account 
for this kind of debt financing, have found relatively small tax effects on debt financing (see, 
e.g., Jog and Tang (2001) and Desai et al. (2004), which were among the first studies). In a 
meta-study based on 46 primary studies, Feld et al. (2013) predict, as a consensus estimate, that 
the debt ratio (relative to total capital) increases by 3 percentage points if the tax rate increases 
by ten percentage points. However, if one considers the maximum tax rate differential of coun-
tries, the variation of the debt ratio due to the tax rate is rather small. In this analysis, I include 
EU and OECD countries. Here the rates range from 10% for Bulgaria to 38.93% for France in 
2014 (see Table 1.1, where all tax variables are presented). 
Several papers have made theoretical contributions or found empirical results that may explain 
the relatively small effects of the tax rate on the debt ratio. They can be distinguished into two 
main groups and several other papers: 
The first group stresses the importance of accounting for tax differentials to affiliates or the 
parent company, which indicate the attractiveness of debt financing in the respective firm com-
pared to the others. The results from Huizinga et al. (2008) put emphasis on the need to account 
for tax differentials to the parent and foreign affiliates instead of just the host country’s tax rate. 
Büttner and Wamser (2013) find for German MNEs that debt financing depends on the differ-
ential between the tax rate of the host country and the minimum tax rate in the group. Overesch 
and Wamser (2014) show the importance of accounting for tax differentials between the bor-
rowing and lending affiliate.  
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The second relevant group are the papers that consider anti-avoidance measures. CFC rules (a 
common regulation of countries against tax avoidance), for example, by immediately taxing 
income in low-tax subsidiaries at the tax rate of the parent company, make the firms reducing 
the accumulation of internal debt financing in low-tax affiliates (see, e.g., Altshuler and 
Hubbard (2003), Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012), Büttner and Wamser (2013)). Ruf (2011) finds 
that transfer pricing regulations, which restrict the height of interest rates, may also have a 
negative effect on debt financing. Büttner et al. (2012) show that thin-capitalization rules reduce 
internal debt shifting. Another explanation could be that in case of thin-capitalization rules and 
no strict transfer pricing regulations, the height of interests rather than the debt ratios are 
adapted (Schindler and Schjelderup (2016)). 
Several other papers investigate various aspects with respect to debt financing that may also 
explain the small effects. Excessive external debt financing may lead to bankruptcy risks (Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973)) or debt overhang (too much debt may hinder attractive new invest-
ment projects; see Myers (1977)). Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) differentiate firms by own-
ership shares and find no effect on debt financing for partially owned firms. Similarly, Krämer 
(2015) finds that the tax sensitivity of debt ratios increases with the concentration of ownership. 
Büttner et al. (2011) find that the effect of taxes on the debt ratio is rather strong for firms with 
less capabilities to reduce their tax base through non-debt tax shields and for firms with a 
smaller probability to experience losses. Egger et al. (2014a) find several reasons that may ex-
plain the relatively small tax sensitivity: First, previous studies have focused rather on large 
firms. This is misleading since the results of Egger et al. (2014a) show that small firms increase 
the results for the tax sensitivity of the internal debt ratio to some extent. Second, they show 
that the tax sensitivity also increases if an empirical model is chosen that accounts for the 
boundedness of the dependent variable between zero and one. Third, they find that relative 
advantages to locating debt at alternative affiliates (including non-tax related determinants of 
internal debt financing) reduce debt financing of a firm. The results of Weyzig (2014) show 
that debt financing is higher, if the firms are held via Dutch Special Purpose Entities, which 
render withholding taxes on interest payments ineffective. Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find 
that the effect of the debt ratio on debt financing is higher for profitable firms and firms with 
better credit ratings. Schindler et al. (2015) provide evidence that in case of losses, transfer 
pricing can be adjusted more flexible than debt shifting. Another general issue may be that the 
effects are affected by omitted variable bias if variables that affect the external debt ratio but 
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are correlated with determinants of the internal debt ratio are excluded from regressions ex-
plaining the latter (and vice versa) (Møen et al. (2011)). However, this last issue does not lead 
to considerable differences in the effect of taxes on debt ratios.  
I however expect that, as mentioned above, it is relevant to account for the use of holdings. 
Precisely, I show that it is necessary to consolidate financial structures of operating firms and 
holdings in order to measure the debt ratio more precisely.26 Note that this analysis focuses on 
this innovation of consolidation. Therefore, many of the above mentioned findings of the pre-
vious literature are not comprised in the empirical part. Future research could combine this 
approach with adjustments based on those previous findings. 
My paper is organized as follows: in the following section, I start by developing relevant hy-
potheses for my research. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I then describe the identification strategy and 
the used data. Afterwards, I present my results. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.  
3.2 Development of Hypotheses 
I analyze how taxes affect the financial structures of M&As. The analysis is separated in two 
steps. First, I investigate, whether financial considerations and associated tax benefits determine 
holding structures that emerge from M&As. As a second step, I investigate the effect of taxes 
on debt ratios and particularly account for debt push down including holdings. To be precise, I 
consolidate financial structures of operating firms and holdings located in the same host country 
before evaluating the tax influence on the debt ratio.  
Note that in my empirical analysis I will always consider M&A and non-M&A firms separately. 
The hypotheses will however be formulated for M&As in particular. In most cases, the effect 
is expected to be given also for non-M&A firms, but to a weaker extent. The only exception is 
the investigation of withholding taxes on the probability of holdings. Here, the effect is assumed 
to be similar for M&A and non-M&A firms. After each hypothesis, it is mentioned if and why 
the effect differs for non-M&A firms. 
3.2.1 Determinants of Holding Structures in the Case of M&As 
I start by investigating the effect of several determinants of holding structures implemented in 
the course of M&As. Debt financing, which reduces the tax base, is especially relevant in case 
of a high corporate tax rate in the host country. In the introduction, it was already mentioned 
                                                            
26 Note that whenever I refer to consolidation, I do not refer to the well-known meaning of consolidating financial 
statements of MNEs as a whole but of consolidating those balance sheet positions that enter the calculation of 
the joint debt ratio for all subsidiaries of a MNE in a given country.  
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that in case of M&As, debt financing at the level of holdings is particularly advantageous. This 
however requires group taxation, i.e., both firms have to be considered as de facto one firm for 
tax purposes. The reason is as follows: The subsidiary generates profits that should be reduced 
before taxation by interest payments (including those interest payments at the holding level). 
However, if both firms would be taxed separately, a high tax burden for the subsidiary would 
occur before the tax base could be reduced by additional interest payments of the holding (this 
reduction would only be possible after the distribution of the already taxed profits to the parent). 
Therefore, in order to offset the profits of the subsidiaries with the interest payments of the 
holding firms in the same country before taxes are raised, a group tax regime is necessary. 
Those considerations lead to my first hypothesis: 
 
H-1: The tax rate of the host country has a positive effect on the probability that a firm is 
held indirectly by a holding in the same country, if there is a group tax regime in 
the host country.  
According to the considerations in the introduction holding structures may also be used to 
circumvent thin-capitalization rules. Hence the effect may also be observed for non-M&A 
firms. But since the holdings’ advantage of taking debt up to market value is only given for 
M&A firms, this effect of the tax rate on holding structures is assumed to be smaller for non-
M&A firms.  
As mentioned above, an alternative explanation of the usage of holdings is treaty shopping, 
i.e., the avoidance of withholding taxes. In that case they would be located in intermediary 
countries. I want to test that those taxes indeed only affect the usage of holdings in interme-
diary countries but do not drive the use of domestic holdings. In accordance to that, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H-2: The withholding tax rate on dividends of the host country has a positive effect on the 
probability that a firm is held indirectly by a holding in an intermediary country, 
but not on the probability of a holding in the same country. 
This avoidance behavior should be similar for non-M&A firms.  
Tax Influence on Financial Structures of M&As 62 
 
 
Another driver of using a holding may be that there is a credit system in the headquarters 
home country (e.g., like in the US until the tax reform of 201827). If the home country taxes 
exceed the tax credit, setting up a holding in an exemption country would be beneficial 
(Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008)). However, this is not relevant in my case, where I only 
consider subsidiaries of German MNEs and observations after 2004. Starting from 2001, 
Germany generally exempted foreign dividends. 
3.2.2 Debt-Push-Down Strategies and Capital Structure Choices 
In the second part of my analysis, I focus on the financial structures and in particular on debt 
financing of holding and target firms. First, I refer to previous literature that has already ana-
lyzed the tax effect in capital structure choices. Therefore, I attempt to confirm previous find-
ings about a positive relationship between the host-country tax rate and leverage.  
H-3: The tax rate of the host country is assumed to have a positive effect on the debt ratio.  
The effect for non-M&A firms may be weaker. The intuition is as follows. One reason why 
M&As are conducted is possibly that the new owners have possibilities to better avoid taxes 
(Belz et al. (2013)). Hence, since profit shifting may be particularly relevant in this kind of FDI, 
the effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio in other forms of FDI may be smaller. Therefore, it is 
presumably less likely that debt shifting is equally relevant in case of greenfield investment.  
Unlike previous literature, my focus is on debt push down by means of holding firms. I expect 
that previous literature has underestimated the effect of host-country taxes on debt financing if 
the different entities of a holding structure are analyzed separately.  
The following simple example may help to clarify this argument. I start by describing the ex-
ample and then, based on that, I will argue why the consolidation is needed. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a simple holding structure where there is a target firm (Firm 2) that is 
owned by a holding in the same country (Firm 1). Let us suppose that the holding firm reports 
exclusively financial assets, i.e., the shares of the target firm, and that no intercompany loans 
are used here. The target firm however invests the capital in fixed assets. For the moment, no 
goodwill is assumed. 
                                                            
27 Note that the US tax reform de facto may not lead to a full shift to an exemption system since it also includes 
the instrument Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) according to which low taxed foreign profits from 
intangibles are included in a higher US taxation (see, e.g., Becker and Englisch (2018), Fuest (2018), Schreiber 
et al. (2018) or Spengel et al. (2018b) for an explanation of this instrument).   
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Figure 3.1: Simple holding structure 
 
Firm 1 (Holding Firm): 
 
       
financial assets1,t = 
cap1,t 
equity1,t 
 
liab1,t 
 
 
 
   
 
Firm 2 (Target Firm): 
  
 
fixed assets2,t = cap2,t equity2,t 
 
liab2,t 
 
 
 
Notes: The index of all balance sheet positions (i,t) includes the number of the firm before the comma (i) and the 
period after the comma (t). Liabi,t denotes the liabilities of the respective firm. 
 
Traditionally the total debt ratio (TDR) was calculated as the average of the ratios of debt to 
total capital (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, i.e., 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 respectively 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡): 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙1,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙2,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡2  (3.1) 
The consolidated total debt ratio (CTDR) of the two entities can be computed as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙2,𝑡𝑡)(𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡) (3.2) 
Note that I subtract 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡 in the denominator because it is already included in 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 and 
hence it would be counted twice. In other words, if one considers the consolidation starting with 
the subsidiary, the debt ratio comprises in the denominator its capital (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡 net 
out in expression (3.2)) and in the numerator its debt financing (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙2,𝑡𝑡) plus the additional debt 
financing of the holding (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙1,𝑡𝑡). The latter is included in 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡, which is equal to 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡. 
If, instead, there is goodwill, the value of 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 may be larger than 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡 and therefore the 
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market value of Firm 2 exceeds is book value by this difference. This difference allows, as 
mentioned above, for additional debt financing of the holding.   
The consolidation is needed for the following reason: The measure of the debt ratio in the re-
lated empirical literature refers to firms that ceteris paribus have profits proportional to their 
capital. However, if one firm is a holding of another, the capital of the holding occurs twice 
while profits are only generated relatively to the capital of the subsidiary. Hence, the conven-
tional relation between the debt ratio and profits does not hold any longer. Therefore, I state 
that the CTDR has to be used, where 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡 is subtracted. It follows from this subtraction 
that the CTDR of both firms is presumably larger than the average TDR.  
Note, that simple examples can show that the CTDR may also be lower than the TDR if there 
are multiple holding structures in one country. This would be the case if one holding structure 
is relatively large and has a low debt ratio. Hence, in the overall sample, the effect of a higher 
CTDR must not necessarily be observed. However, in case of debt push down the debt ratios 
should be similar across different aggregates. If debt is used to reduce profits (and there are no 
financing constraints), there is no reason why this should only be conducted for some subsidi-
aries of a MNE. As mentioned above, debt push down with holding structures should particu-
larly be likely in case of M&As in high-tax countries. Hence, at least for this sample, I expect 
a larger CTDR relative to the TDR. 
I conclude that I expect a higher level of the CTDR compared to debt ratios measured for each 
single entity. However, as for hypothesis H-1, this requires that there is a group tax regime in 
the host country of the firm.  
H-4: Measures for the debt ratio show higher levels of debt-financing if I consolidate all 
liabilities assigned to subsidiaries of a MNE located in the same country and there 
is a group tax regime in that country.    
Since holdings are particularly likely in case of M&A firms, the increase (stemming from 
the consolidation of subsidiaries and their holdings) should be smaller for non-M&A firms.  
The consolidation, which allows to observe the debt ratio more precisely, will presumably 
lead to a higher measured effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio. This is assumed since hold-
ings and accordingly higher levels of debt financing are more likely in countries with a high 
tax rate. I therefore expect that previous literature has underestimated the tax effect on capital 
structure choices. 
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H-5: The effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio is larger compared to previous results if 
I consolidate all liabilities assigned to subsidiaries of a MNE located in the same 
country and there is a group tax regime in that country.    
For non-M&A firms, which are less likely to have holdings, the increase should be less pro-
nounced.  
If I consolidate financial information of all entities controlled by the same MNE in a certain 
host country, I can compute the ratio for total debt as well as similar measures for total inter-
company debt and total bank loans. I therefore further look at internal and external debt financ-
ing in particular. As for total debt financing, I also expect a stronger effect of the tax rate on 
those two ratios once I consider the consolidated financial items.  
H-6: The effect of the tax rate on the internal debt ratio and the external debt ratio is 
larger if I consolidate all liabilities assigned to subsidiaries of a MNE located in 
the same country and there is a group tax regime in that country.  
As in case of H-5, the increase should be smaller for non-M&A firms.  
3.3 Identification Strategy 
3.3.1 Determinants of Holding Structures in the Case of M&As 
In the following empirical part, I inter alia determine the probability that a firm is held by a 
holding. I estimate this probability with a logit model. For my first regression, I consider a 
dummy variable as my dependent variable that is equal to one if the firm is held indirectly by a 
holding in the same country (Holding (same country)) in the first year where it appears in the 
database. I only consider firms that are not holdings for firms in the same country themselves 
(though they may have subsidiaries in other countries). Expression (3.3) shows my empirical 
approach, where i denotes the respective firm: 
𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻 (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀 (3.3) 
My variables of interests are the statutory profit tax rate in the host country of the firm (STR) 
as well as the existence of a group tax regime (GT Regime) in the host country. I expect a 
positive effect of the tax rate on the probability of a holding whenever there is a group tax 
regime. Hence I assume a positive value for 𝛽𝛽3 (see hypothesis H-1). Since I expect this effect 
rather for M&A firms, I run separate regressions for those firm as well as those that have entered 
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the database through greenfield investment. Furthermore, I also include the withholding tax rate 
(WhT) in the host country as an explanatory variable but I only expect an effect in the second 
regression, which I will describe below and where I change the dependent variable. Including 
withholding taxes is also helpful for the reason that they may be correlated with the statutory 
profit tax rate. If WhT would be excluded, STR may capture its effect (actually no effect on 
holdings in the same country), which may drive down the effect of STR. X denotes a vector of 
country specific control variables.  
For the second regression I now exchange the dependent variable by the variable Holding (in-
term. country) that is equal to one if there is a holding in an intermediary country.  
𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠. 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀 (3.4) 
In this second regression, I now focus on WhT. I expect a positive effect for 𝛽𝛽4 (see hypothesis 
H-2). 
3.3.2 Debt-Push-Down Strategies and Capital Structure Choices 
In this second step, I investigate the effect of taxes on financial structures. I refer to well-known 
strategies to identify a tax effect on the capital structure choice but I also consider consolidated 
debt ratios as a dependent variable. 
For my basic set of regressions, I consider the total as well as the external and internal debt ratio 
as dependent variables. The total debt ratio (TDR) is now defined as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (see 
Section 3.2.2 for the definition of the variables in the ratio (except 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, which is defined 
in the footnote below)).28 Different from that, the internal debt ratio (IDR) considers only lia-
bilities to affiliates and the parent of the firm. For the external debt ratio (EDR), the difference 
between the total liabilities and those internal liabilities, i.e., the external liabilities, is divided 
by total capital. Again I use STR as the explanatory variable and conduct two separate regres-
sions for M&A- and non-M&A firms. However, different than in Section 3.3.1, all subsidiaries 
of a MNE in a country are now considered as M&A firms, if any of them has such a mode of 
entry. On the contrary, firms are considered as non-M&A firms, if no firm within the same 
MNE and country has such a mode of entry. However, the mode of entry is only given for firms 
                                                            
28 This definition of TDR is similar to the one in expression (3.1) except for two adjustments. First, in expression 
(3.1) I consider the average of those debt ratios for the special case of two firms. Second, now I also subtract 
current profits (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) from total capital, since they may also be considered as equity. 
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that became FDI after 2004, so I consider only the time period 2005 to 2014.29 Expression (3.5) 
shows the regression equation for the case of the TDR, where i denotes the respective firm and 
t the year: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3.5) 
X is a vector of firm and country level characteristics. According to my hypothesis H-3 I expect 
a positive sign for 𝛽𝛽1. As mentioned above, the effect for non-M&A firms may be weaker. 
Furthermore, I consider the consolidated debt ratios as dependent variables, i.e., the CTDR, the 
consolidated internal debt ratio (CIDR) and the consolidated external debt ratio (CEDR). They 
are basically constructed as in expression (3.2) but now generally as one debt ratio for all the 
firms in each holding structure (including also chains of subsidiaries). The firms of each holding 
structure are always completely located in one country and the equity of the firms that are no 
holdings is subtracted in the denominator. Different from the stylized case in expression (3.2), 
now also internal liabilities between the firms in the holding structure are subtracted in order to 
avoid double counts (they are generally subtracted from the numerator and the denominator of 
all three debt ratios, except from the numerator of the CEDR). Furthermore, as for the uncon-
solidated debt ratios, the debt ratios differ in so far from the example of the CTDR in Section 
3.2.2 as now I also subtract current profits from total capital, since they may also be considered 
as equity. Finally, for simplifying the aggregation, this consolidation is conducted for all affil-
iates in the same MNE and country, i.e., a common debt ratio is, for example, also constructed 
if there are multiple such structures (arranged in a parallel way) of one MNE in a country.30  
Given that the consolidation requires a group tax regime, I conduct all regressions with the debt 
ratios as dependent variables only for firms in those countries that have such regimes (also for 
the unconsolidated case in order to make the results comparable).  
                                                            
29 As mentioned above, I can observe the mode of entry only for new firms after 2004. Hence, it may be questioned 
whether non-M&A firms may not have affiliates in the same country that entered the database through a M&A 
before 2005. However, it can be assumed that the probability for this is similar for M&A firms and non-M&A 
firms or even higher for the former. In the first case (a similar probability), the estimation would measure the 
effect of additional M&As, given an equal likelihood of previous M&As. Since new M&As add to the previous 
average effect by increasing the likelihood/extent of debt push down via holdings, in essence, the interpretation 
of this paper should still hold. In the second case (a higher probability of M&A firms to have older affiliates 
that are also M&A firms), I would still measure the specific effect of M&As, which would then also be increased 
by past M&As. Again, in essence, the interpretation should hold. 
30 Note that in fact I not necessarily do the consolidation for all firms of a MNE in a country. I identify MNEs via 
their German parents. However, a German MNE may invest in a country via multiple German parents. 
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Expression (3.6) shows the example of the CTDR, which I again analogously consider for the 
internal and external debt ratio:  
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3.6) 
The variable STR is defined as for expression (3.5). I also expect a positive effect of the tax rate 
on this debt ratio, i.e., 𝛽𝛽1 should be positive in expression (3.6). In addition, because of the 
consolidation, the effect should be stronger than in the unconsolidated case (see hypothesis H-
5 respectively H-6 for CIDR and CEDR). Furthermore, as stated above, I assume a smaller 
increase for non-M&A firms (those are the cases where holding structures are less likely and 
hence the consolidation should be less relevant).  
According the underlying reasoning, the effect should stem from firms belonging to a holding 
structure. Therefore, in additional regressions, I will only consider firms where there is such a 
holding structure in the respective host country, MNE and observation year.  
Moreover, I will consider the potential influence of thin-capitalization rules and further reduce 
the sample to firms that are located in countries with such rules. As mentioned above, account-
ing for thin-capitalization rules is relevant since one purpose of using holdings may also be to 
circumvent those rules, which limit the deduction of interests in case of excessive debt ratios 
(Jacobs (2011)). Accordingly, I also expect a stronger effect in case there are thin-capitalization 
rules in the host country. However, this should rather be the case for the internal debt ratio, 
which, different then the external debt ratio, has been found to be particularly affected by those 
rules (Büttner et al. (2012)).  
3.4 Data 
I use firm data for multinationals from the MiDi database, which are collected by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (German Central Bank). This database includes information on both FDI of Ger-
man MNEs (outbound) as well as FDI of foreign MNEs in Germany (inbound). I consider Ger-
man outbound FDI, which – as mentioned in Section 3.1 – allows me to exploit more varia-
tion.31 Due to mandatory reporting, this database provides balance-sheet information on all FDI 
                                                            
31 I exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special tax 
regimes may be available there. Furthermore, I exclude firms from the financial services sector, for which spe-
cial regulations for the balance sheet structure apply, which may lead to biased results. Finally, I also exclude 
observations whose German parent is not an incorporated and legally independent entity, as well as subsidiaries 
that are not legally independent. In all those cases, I drop all observations of the MNE (in all years) in one 
country, since otherwise I might drop some firms from a holding structure whereas others remain, which may 
bias the debt ratios.  
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positions (subsidiaries) of German MNEs abroad.32 Furthermore, I can observe chains of own-
ership including the holdings. MiDi provides panel data with information on the mode of entry 
(M&A project vs. greenfield project), so I can observe the group structures over time, including 
the emergence of new subsidiaries through M&As. As mentioned above, I am restricted to the 
time period 2005 to 2014. I consider only fully owned subsidiaries so that the MNE has suffi-
cient influence to conduct the described tax avoidance.  
I consider investment in countries belonging to the EU or the OECD (based on membership in 
2014) excluding Germany, which is the country of the MNEs’ headquarters. However, this does 
not mean that necessarily all those countries are in the final sample. My sample includes 1,842 
observations for the regressions explaining the holding structures (this number is here also equal 
to the number of firms since I consider always only the first year per firm), 30,714 observations 
for the regressions explaining the unconsolidated debt ratios and 27,854 observations for the 
regressions explaining the consolidated debt ratios.33 
The descriptions, means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
are listed in Table 3.1 to Table 3.3. I generally use the dependent variables and variables of 
interests as described in Section 3.3. The variables of my first set of regressions (i.e., for ex-
plaining holding structures) are listed in Table 3.1.  
                                                            
32 The mandatory collection is determined in the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation 
(Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). The criteria, when an investment has to be reported varied over time. From 
1999 until 2001, FDI had to be reported if the participation was 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the 
respective foreign investment exceeded 5 million Euros or if the participation was 50% or more and the balance-
sheet total exceeded 500.000 Euros. From 2002 until 2006, FDI had to be reported if the participation was 10% 
or more and the balance-sheet total exceeded 3 million Euros. Since 2007, the threshold of 10% applies only for 
direct shares, whereas for indirect shares or a mixture of direct and indirect shares the threshold has been raised 
to 50% (for details see Schild and Walter (2016)). I uniformly apply the threshold of 3 million Euros, in fact, by 
slightly diverging from this rule in order to receive the results efficiently, observations with total capital of less 
than 3 million Euros (instead of up to 3 million Euros) are not considered and full ownership is always required.  
33 The observations are always from a sample that comprises both, M&A and non-M&A firms. E.g., for the re-
gressions explaining holding structures, the number of observations is 1,842. This is equal to the sum of columns 
(3) and (4) in Table 3.5, i.e. to the sum of the sample of M&A and non-M&A firms in the regressions with 
Holding (interm. country) as the dependent variable. The sum of colums (1) and (2) is slightly smaller. This is 
due to the fact that some observations are dropped since no entries as greenfield investment in 2008 had a 
holding in the same country. Hence the respective year dummy would perfectly predict that outcome. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for regressions on determinants of holding structures 
Variable Description Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Holding (same country) Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is held 
indirectly by a holding in the same country in the first 
year where it appears in the database. 
0.163 0.370 
Holding (interm. coun-
try) 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is held 
indirectly by a holding in an intermediary country in 
the first year where it appears in the database. 
0.067 0.250 
Statutory profit tax rate 
(STR) 
Statutory profit tax rate in the firm’s host country. 0.282 
 
0.071 
Group Tax Regime 
(GT Regime) 
The firm is located in a country with a group tax re-
gime. 
0.745 0.436 
Withholding Tax 
(WhT) 
Withholding tax rate in the firm’s host country. 0.014 0.043 
GDP* Gross Domestic Product in the firm’s host country; 
measured in billion USD. 
2,387.753 4,162.962 
GDP per Capita* Gross Domestic Product per home country national in 
the firm’s host country; measured in USD. 
39,307.708 19,805.559 
Inflation Inflation rate in the firm’s host country. 2.228 2.145 
Corruption Value of World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index in 
the firm’s host country. 
1.189 0.811 
Notes: The number of observations is 1,842. Firm specific variables are obtained from the Microdatabase Direct 
investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) (DOI = 
10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). Tax variables are derived from IBFD Tax Handbooks and the Worldwide Cor-
porate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. GDP, GDP per Capita, Inflation and Corruption stem from the World 
Bank. 
*In the regressions, logarithms are used. 
Here, I consider the dependent variables and variables of interest as defined in section 3.3.1, 
namely Holding (same country), Holding (interm. country), STR, GT Regime and WhT.  
Regarding control variables, certain country specific factors may also have an impact on 
whether subsidiaries are held directly or via holdings (see Dreßler (2012)). Therefore I include 
GDP, GDP per capita, Inflation and Corruption (measured by the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption index where higher values denote less corruption) in the regressions. Since GDP 
and GDP per capita indicate the market size and purchasing power and hence maybe profits, 
which could be offset by interest payments, they may increase the probability of holdings in the 
same country. Further, they may reduce the probability of holdings in an intermediary country, 
since high values of those variables may indicate favorable investment conditions where firms 
are presumably rather directly held by the headquarters (see the discussion related to Dyreng et 
al. (2015) in Section 3.1). Both, Inflation and Corruption may however be indicators of invest-
ment risks in the respective countries and are hence assumed to have opposite signs to the GDP 
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measures in regressions explaining the usage of holdings in intermediary countries (for domes-
tic holdings, I have no clear expectations). 
Table 3.2 shows the variables for my second set of regressions, precisely those with the uncon-
solidated debt ratios as dependent variables.  
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for regressions on capital structures (unconsolidated 
debt ratios) 
Variable Description Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
TDR Liabilities of a firm, divided by total capital (excluding 
profit). 
0.494 0.252 
IDR Internal liabilities of a firm, divided by total capital (ex-
cluding profit). 
0.214 0.225 
EDR External liabilities of a firm, divided by total capital (ex-
cluding profit). 
0.280 0.220 
Statutory profit tax rate  
(STR) 
Statutory profit tax rate in the firm’s host country. 0.299 0.067 
LCF The firm has a loss carryforward. 0.215 0.411 
Sales* Sales of the firm (in million Euro). 52.651 195.281 
Tangibility Fixed and intangible assets of the firm, divided by total 
capital (balance sheet total).  
0.215 0.229 
Inflation Inflation rate in the firm’s host country. 1.852 1.547 
Corruption Value of World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index in the 
firm’s host country. 
1.318 0.720 
Notes: The number of observations is 30,714. Firm specific variables are obtained from the Microdatabase Direct 
investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) (DOI = 
10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). Tax variables are obtained from IBFD Tax Handbooks and the annual World-
wide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. Inflation and Corruption stem from the World Bank. 
*In the regressions, logarithms are used. 
Here, I keep the tax rate as an explanatory variable. In addition, I include several variables at 
the firm level that should affect the ability respectively willingness of firms to take loans, 
namely Loss Carryforward (LCF), Sales and Tangibility. Furthermore, I again include Inflation 
and Corruption as control variables at the country level. Agency conflicts may be another ex-
planation for higher debt financing (Jensen (1986)). However, those should largely be covered 
by fixed effects (Overesch and Voeller (2010)).  
In the following, I briefly discuss the expected effects for the control variables: 
For LCF, the effect is not clear cut ex ante. If a firm carries forward losses, it has relatively low 
current profits and hence should have a lower incentive to reduce its tax base via a high debt 
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ratio (see, e.g., MacKie-Mason (1990)). However, losses may also lead to stronger indebted-
ness.  
For the variable Sales different effects can be thought of. First, for large firms (i.e., firms with 
large sales) it is assumed to be easier to receive external debt financing (see, e.g., Graham and 
Harvey (2001)). Second, corresponding to that, the effect on the internal debt ratio may have 
the opposing sign, since internal debt financing may be used to compensate lower external debt 
financing, if the latter is not possible because of low Sales. Third, large firms may typically be 
more mature and hence might rather finance themselves with retained earnings (Ruf (2011)). It 
follows from those considerations that there may be a negative effect of Sales on the internal 
debt ratio. For the external debt ratio, the two relevant considerations however have opposing 
signs. Hence, I have no clear expectation concerning external debt but assume that the internal 
debt ratio declines with Sales. Because of those opposing signs, I also expect no specific effect 
on the total debt ratio.  
Like Sales, also a high value of Tangibility (measured by fixed and intangible assets of the firm 
divided by total capital (balance sheet total)) should increase the willingness of external lenders 
to give a loan. Furthermore, as for Sales, I expect that limitations for external debt financing 
because of low Tangibility may be compensated by internal debt financing. Hence, I expect 
opposing signs for both debt ratios and have no expectations on the total debt ratio.  
Inflation serves as a measure for lending conditions because high inflation often makes the 
central banks raising the interest rates. This should decrease external borrowing but again have 
an opposing effect on internal debt financing. In addition, the real value of the deducted interests 
and hence the incentive to have high debt ratios declines with the inflation rate. Therefore, I 
expect a negative effect of Inflation on external debt financing but no specific effect on internal 
debt financing.  
Finally, as in the analysis explaining holding structures, I again include Corruption, which, as 
stated above, takes a high value in case of low corruption. It presumably has a positive effect 
on the debt ratios, since lenders may be eager to give loans rather to firms in more secure coun-
tries. As for Tangibility I expect again a negative effect on the internal debt ratio and a positive 
effect on the external debt ratio. 
For the consolidated case, the tax rate and the country specific control variables are the same 
as in the unconsolidated case (see Table 3.3). Furthermore, the firm specific variables stay the 
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same for those firms that do not belong to a holding structure. If there are holding structures, 
they are however not considered for separate firms, but for all firms in the same MNE and 
country together. Besides the debt ratios, therefore also some explanatory variables (LCF, Sales 
and Tangibility) differ, since they are now not calculated for a single firm but as a minimum 
outcome (the variable LCF is defined as equal to one if any firm has a loss carryforward) re-
spectively sum (Sales and Tangibility) for all firms in the same MNE and country.  
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for regressions on capital structures (consolidated debt 
ratios) 
Variable Description Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
CTDR Liabilities of the firm/consolidated liabilities of all firms 
belonging to the same MNE and country, divided by con-
solidated total capital (see Section 3.3.2 for a description 
of those consolidated items). 
0.470 0.248 
CIDR Internal liabilities of the firm/consolidated internal liabili-
ties of all firms belonging to the same MNE and country, 
divided by consolidated total capital (see Section 3.3.2 for 
a description of those consolidated items). 
0.205 0.217 
CEDR External liabilities of the firm/consolidated external liabili-
ties of all firms belonging to the same MNE and country, 
divided by consolidated total capital (balance sheet total). 
0.265 0.210 
Statutory profit tax rate 
(STR) 
Statutory profit tax rate in the firm’s/group of firms’ (in 
same MNE and country) host country. 
0.298 0.067 
LCF (consolidated) The firm/at least one firm in the group of firms (in same 
MNE and country) has a loss carryforward. 
0.239 0.426 
Sales* Total sales of the firm/group of firms (in same MNE and 
country; in million Euro). 
58.057 214.769 
Tangibility (consoli-
dated) 
Total fixed and intangible assets of the firm/group of firms 
(in same MNE and country), divided by total capital (bal-
ance sheet total).  
0.206 0.216 
Inflation Inflation rate in the firm’s/group of firms (in same MNE 
and country) host country. 
1.859 1.562 
Corruption Value of World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index in the 
firm’s/group of firms (in same MNE and country) host 
country. 
1.329 0.716 
Notes: The number of observations is 27,854. Firm specific variables are obtained from the Microdatabase Direct 
investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) (DOI = 
10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). Tax variables are obtained from IBFD Tax Handbooks and the annual World-
wide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. Inflation and Corruption stem from the World Bank. 
*In the regressions, logarithms are used. 
Table 3.4 shows the means of the total debt ratio for the consolidated and unconsolidated case, 
which I consider in order to test my hypothesis H-4. As in the regressions with the debt ratios 
as dependent variables, I only consider firms in countries with group tax regimes. I consider all 
firms (row (1)) and M&A firms in particular (rows (2) to (5)). In the case of all firms, the debt 
Tax Influence on Financial Structures of M&As 74 
 
 
ratio is surprisingly slightly smaller for the consolidated case compared to the unconsolidated 
case (0.459 compared to 0.476 in row (1)). However, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2, this may 
be the case if multiple holding structures of a MNE in one country are consolidated. But, as 
stated above, in case of debt push down I expect an increase in the debt ratio through the con-
solidation. In the following rows, I consider subsamples where debt push down with holding 
structures and therefore higher debt ratios should become more likely given my discussion in 
Section 3.2. First, debt push down should be more likely in case of M&As. Starting from row 
(2) I only consider such firms. Here, the debt ratio in the consolidated case is at first still smaller 
than in the unconsolidated case (row (2)). So I find no stronger effect for M&A firms in general. 
In a next step (row (3)), I further restrict my sample to firms in countries with a high tax rate 
(above the 75%-percentile of all countries). Here, the outcome of higher consolidated debt ra-
tios is even more likely, given that in this case tax avoidance is more favorable and debt financ-
ing at the level of holdings is particularly advantageous. Furthermore, this should also hold in 
case of multiple holding structures, since in countries with a high tax rate the debt ratios should 
be similar across different holding structures. Indeed, the consolidated debt ratio in row (3) 
(0.497) is slightly higher than the unconsolidated debt ratio (0.485). Not surprisingly, this effect 
becomes stronger if I consider only firms belonging to holding structures, i.e., those firms from 
which the increase stems (a consolidated debt ratio of 0.577 compared to an unconsolidated 
debt ratio of 0.481 in row (4)). But the sample is now relatively small. Though, 86 MNEs in the 
sample have such structures, so the considered way of tax avoidance is not very seldom. Since, 
there are only about 3 observations per MNE, it may however be a rather new phenomenon. 
Finally, the effect should also be stronger if there are thin-capitalization rules (row (5)), because 
circumventing such rules is another purpose of holding structures. However, here the consoli-
dated debt ratio slightly declines to 0.565 (compared to the value in row (4)). Hence, there may 
be other factors affecting the debt ratios for which the chosen descriptive statistics do not con-
trol for. This renders regression analyses particularly relevant, for which the results will be 
shown in the following section. For now, I can conclude that the results support my hypothesis 
H-4, according to which the consolidated debt ratios should be higher than the unconsolidated 
ones. 
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Table 3.4: Means of the total debt ratio 
Row 
num-
ber 
Only 
M&A 
firms 
Country with a high 
tax rate (above 75%-
percentile of all coun-
tries) 
Belonging 
to holding 
structure 
Thin-
capi-tali-
zation 
rule 
Mean (un-
consoli-
dated) 
Mean 
(consoli-
dated) 
Number of ob-
servations (un-
consolidated) 
Number 
of MNEs 
(1)     0.476 0.459 34,180 2,964 
(2) x    0.480 0.479 5,181 668 
(3) x x   0.485 0.497 1,638 264 
(4) x x x  0.481 0.577 708 86 
(5) x x x x 0.473 0.565 660 83 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 (DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Determinants of Holding Structures in the Case of M&As 
In this section I present my results for the empirical analysis as specified in Section 3.3. The 
interaction term is significant in column (1) in Table 3.5. The finding indicates that for non-
M&A firms, the tax rate has a positive effect on the probability of holdings in the same country 
if there is a group tax regime in the host country. However, according to the hypothesis H-1, I 
expect the effect in particular for M&A firms, because in case of M&As, debt financing at the 
level of holdings is especially attractive. 
Table 3.5: Determinants of holding structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Holding (same country) Holding (interm. country) 
Sample Non-M&A firms M&A firms Non-M&A firms M&A firms 
     
STR -0.438 2.930 0.683 -4.376 
 (4.398) (3.150) (3.771) (3.395) 
GT Regime  -2.816** 1.187 -1.220 -2.199*** 
 (1.371) (1.075) (1.402) (0.836) 
STR # GT Regime 10.848** -3.066 1.113 6.314* 
 (4.936) (3.931) (5.102) (3.437) 
WhT -4.674** -4.111 -0.411 -0.117 
 (2.254) (4.905) (4.282) (2.466) 
ln(GDP) -0.062 0.177* -0.082 0.059 
 (0.077) (0.101) (0.145) (0.106) 
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.227 0.275 -0.573 -0.004 
 (0.292) (0.257) (0.607) (0.315) 
Inflation -0.098 -0.038 -0.173 0.076 
 (0.090) (0.057) (0.140) (0.047) 
Corruption -0.236 0.135 0.636 0.053 
 (0.188) (0.126) (0.605) (0.215) 
Constant -3.831 -6.435** 3.515 -1.795 
 (2.676) (2.904) (5.953) (3.020) 
Number of observations 490 1,313 529 1,313 
Pseudo R-squared 0.089 0.060 0.102 0.031 
Wald chi-squared 88.87 250.34 66.76 52.26 
Chi-squared-test∆ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 (DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). 
Notes: ∆p-value reported. The dependent variable is one, if the firm was held by a holding in the same country 
(column (1) and (2)) or an intermediary country (column (3) and (4)) in the year when it was founded. The standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country level. The regressions include year-
specific effects. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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There are possible explanations for those unexpected findings. Besides the advantage of debt 
financing up to the market value, holdings can also be used to circumvent thin-capitalization 
rules. This may explain the observed significant effect for non-M&A firms. Regarding M&A 
firms, it may be that, as expected, they have holdings in high-tax countries but that this effect 
is covered since M&A firms in low-tax countries also have holdings. Though not discussed in 
the literature so far, the latter could be relevant in order to avoid capital gains taxes. Acquirers 
may plan to resell the firm again at some point in time. Therefore, it is favorable to acquire the 
firm via a holding in the same country, if the capital gains taxes there are lower than in the 
country of the parent firm. Since low capital gains taxes may go hand in hand with low statutory 
profit taxes, this may explain the correlation between the usage of holdings and low tax rates in 
case of M&As. This reasoning is supported by the findings for the determinants of holdings in 
intermediary countries: high tax rates, and therefore maybe also a high capital gains taxes, are 
related with a higher probability of those intermediary holdings in case of M&As (column (4) 
in Table 3.5). Again, holdings may be used to avoid high capital gains taxes in the parent coun-
try. But if those taxes are high in the country of the operating firm, too, an intermediary country 
with lower rates may be chosen as the holding location. To conclude, H-1 may be valid, but it 
may not be observed, since it is maybe covered by other effects. Future research could therefore 
account for capital gains taxes.  
Since withholding taxes exert no significant effect on the likelihood of holdings in an interme-
diary (columns (3) and (4)), I find no evidence for the hypothesis H-2. 
Regarding control variables, only ln(GDP) is significant in one specification (column (2)), but 
this effect is however as expected: Countries with high GDP have presumably also a large mar-
ket size and purchasing power, which may lead to higher profits. Here it is particularly relevant 
to have holdings in the same country, whose additional debt financing could help to reduce the 
large tax base.  
As mentioned above, another way to investigate debt push down is by looking at the debt ratios. 
Those results are shown in the following section.  
3.5.2 Debt-Push-Down Strategies and Capital Structure Choices 
The results from the previous regressions do not clearly indicate that MNEs place debt in par-
ticular at the level of holdings. In the following I present my results from the analysis where I 
test, whether however the investigation of financial structures supports this finding. I start by 
investigating my hypothesis H-3. The respective results are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Tax influence on capital structures (unconsolidated debt ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable TDR IDR EDR 
Sample Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms 
       
STR -0.018 0.344** 0.028 0.196 -0.046 0.148 
 (0.068) (0.174) (0.064) (0.202) (0.064) (0.198) 
LCF 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) 
ln(Sales) 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.009*** 0.016* 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) 
Tangibility 0.061*** -0.071* 0.043*** 0.031 0.018 -0.102*** 
 (0.016) (0.041) (0.013) (0.038) (0.014) (0.038) 
Inflation 0.002** -0.003 0.002* -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.016** 0.032 -0.014* -0.022 -0.002 0.055** 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.008) (0.025) (0.006) (0.027) 
Constant 0.327*** 0.198*** 0.156*** 0.100 0.171*** 0.098 
 (0.023) (0.068) (0.024) (0.079) (0.021) (0.078) 
Number of observations 26,362 4,352 26,362 4,352 26,362 4,352 
Adjusted R-squared 0.769 0.783 0.702 0.687 0.707 0.712 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 (DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and firm-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in parenthe-
ses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1%. 
 
I find a significant positive effect of the tax rate on the total debt ratio for M&A firms (column 
(2)). According to this result, an increase of the tax rate by 10 percentage points increases the 
total debt ratio by about 3.4 percentage points. Hence, the effect is about 10% larger than the 
one that Feld et al. (2013) find as a consensus estimate in their meta-study. However, I do not 
find corresponding effects for the external and internal debt ratio. This may however be the 
case, since the two can and presumably are used alternatively and so high tax rates may lead to 
high levels of those debt ratios for only some cases, leaving the overall effects for those ratios 
insignificant. Internal debt may particularly be used, if firms find it difficult to receive external 
debt financing. For external debt financing, one could think of the advantage that it may be used 
to discipline managers.34 For non-M&A firms, I also expect a positive, but weaker effect of the 
tax rate on the debt ratio (see Section 3.2.2). However, the effect is insignificant. It may be that 
also the growing awareness on profit shifting and respective anti-avoidance measures have led 
                                                            
34 Note that also internal debt financing may be used in case of agency problems, since it allows to concentrate 
profits at the level of the parent. This concentration has been found to be a common strategy of firms (see 
Dischinger et al. (2014)). 
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to a decline of the effect over time and hence also compared to previous studies. This is in line 
with the findings of Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017), who derive from a meta-study that the 
reaction of firms to incentives for shifting has declined over the years.  
Also several control variables are significant. LCF has a positive effect in each specification 
indicating presumably that the increase of debt due to losses outweighs the effect that losses 
reduce the incentives for tax avoidance (see again Section 3.4 for an explanation of both ef-
fects). Regarding the positive effect of Sales on external debt financing, the effect that for large 
firms debt financing is easier seems to outweigh the effect that large firms may also rather 
finance themselves with retained earnings (columns (5) and (6)). According to the discussion 
in Section 3.4, only the second effect should be existent for internal debt financing. The effect 
is in fact smaller, but still positive (columns (3) and (4)). Hence also for internal capital markets, 
the amount of Sales seems in fact to be relevant. The coefficient for Tangibility, which should 
also give a positive signal to external lenders, exerts a negative effect on the external debt ratio 
in case of M&A firms and a positive effect on the internal debt ratio in case of non-M&A firms. 
However, given that those effects, which are against the expectations, can always only be ob-
served for a subsample, those findings should not be of too large concern. For Inflation, I expect 
a negative effect on the external debt ratio but no specific for the internal debt ratio. Hence the 
slightly positive effect for certain subsamples of the internal and total debt ratio is in line with 
the expectations. Finally, at least some subsamples indicate that there is more external debt 
financing in case of low corruption (high values of the variable Corruption indicate low cor-
ruption) and that high corruption is maybe compensated by more internal debt financing. 
As a first conclusion, I can state that my results confirm my hypothesis H-3 since the local tax 
rate has a positive effect on debt financing. For non-M&A firms, no effect is found. The latter 
shows that it may be relevant to distinguish heterogeneous effects of tax avoidance for M&A 
and non-M&A firms. 
As already seen in Section 3.4, in case the debt ratios of holding structures are consolidated, the 
debt ratios are higher at least in particularly relevant subsamples. According to my hypothesis 
H-5 I therefore expect a stronger effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio if I consolidate firms 
with their holdings in the same country. In addition, I assume this increase of the tax sensitivity 
also for internal and external debt financing separately (hypothesis H-6). As can be seen in 
Table 3.7, the effect of the tax rate on the total debt ratio increases (the coefficient is about 5 
percentage points larger). Hence, I find support for my hypothesis H-5. Furthermore, I find no 
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evidence for hypothesis H-6. However, as mentioned above, there are plausible explanations 
for the latter. The effects of some control variables in some subsamples change their signifi-
cance compared to Table 3.6 but the directions stay mainly the same. 
Table 3.7: Tax influence on capital structures (consolidated debt ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
Sample Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms 
       
STR -0.047 0.390** 0.008 0.145 -0.055 0.244 
 (0.070) (0.179) (0.062) (0.213) (0.063) (0.204) 
LCF 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.018*** 0.017* 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) 
ln(Sales) 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.008** 0.011 0.016*** 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
Tangibility 0.112*** -0.029 0.070*** 0.021 0.042*** -0.050 
 (0.016) (0.041) (0.014) (0.037) (0.014) (0.037) 
Inflation 0.002* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.009 0.047* -0.012 -0.028 0.002 0.075*** 
 (0.009) (0.025) (0.009) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025) 
Constant 0.345*** 0.213*** 0.155*** 0.127 0.190*** 0.086 
 (0.023) (0.069) (0.023) (0.079) (0.021) (0.069) 
Number of observations 24,555 3,299 24,555 3,299 24,555 3,299 
Adjusted R-squared 0.780 0.778 0.703 0.680 0.716 0.719 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 (DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and firm-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in parenthe-
ses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1%. 
 
For now I can conclude that my first results indicate that consolidating financial structures leads 
to higher debt ratios (see Section 3.4) respectively a higher measured effect of the tax rate on 
the debt ratio (Table 3.7). 
I would expect that the increasing tax sensitivity is rather driven by those firms that are part of 
a holding structure. This subsample is considered in the regressions in Table 3.8. However, the 
effect of the tax rate on the total debt ratio for the sample of M&A firms (column (2)) now turns 
insignificant. Though, due to the smaller number of observations this may simply be the case 
because of limited statistical power. 
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Table 3.8: Tax influence on capital structures (consolidated debt ratios, only holding 
structures) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
Sample Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms 
       
STR 0.251 0.257 0.201 0.352 0.050 -0.095 
 (0.244) (0.465) (0.299) (0.620) (0.189) (0.395) 
LCF 0.032*** 0.048** 0.016 0.062*** 0.016 -0.015 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) 
ln(Sales) 0.028*** 0.018 0.000 -0.036** 0.028** 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) 
Tangibility 0.255*** 0.036 -0.055 -0.172 0.310*** 0.208 
 (0.070) (0.126) (0.059) (0.156) (0.072) (0.133) 
Inflation 0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 0.007** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Corruption -0.046 0.023 -0.023 0.027 -0.023 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.069) (0.032) (0.090) (0.030) (0.057) 
Constant 0.259*** 0.278 0.171 0.256 0.088 0.022 
 (0.086) (0.186) (0.106) (0.246) (0.086) (0.159) 
Number of observations 1,521 653 1,521 653 1,521 653 
Adjusted R-squared 0.834 0.805 0.765 0.662 0.800 0.754 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 (DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and firm-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in parenthe-
ses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1%. 
 
Finally, in Table 3.9, I consider only such firms that again belong to a holding structure but are 
now also located in countries with thin-capitalization rules. As mentioned above, holding struc-
tures may inter alia be used to circumvent such rules. Again I expect a stronger effect of the tax 
rate on the debt ratio, but the effect stays insignificant. 
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Table 3.9: Tax influence on capital structures (consolidated debt ratios, only holding 
structures, thin-capitalization rules in host country) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
Sample Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms Non-M&A 
firms 
M&A firms 
       
STR 0.259 0.697 0.277 0.562 -0.018 0.134 
 (0.276) (0.462) (0.323) (0.581) (0.219) (0.537) 
LCF 0.039*** 0.028 0.009 0.051** 0.030** -0.023 
 (0.011) (0.026) (0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.020) 
ln(Sales) 0.020 0.036** 0.010 -0.043* 0.010 0.079*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.012) (0.021) 
Tangibility 0.287*** -0.097 -0.130** -0.033 0.417*** -0.063 
 (0.093) (0.196) (0.056) (0.194) (0.089) (0.215) 
Inflation 0.007 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.011** -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Corruption -0.127*** 0.138 -0.118*** 0.295** -0.009 -0.157* 
 (0.044) (0.088) (0.039) (0.112) (0.041) (0.079) 
Constant 0.404*** -0.081 0.254** -0.210 0.150 0.129 
 (0.129) (0.253) (0.128) (0.327) (0.107) (0.262) 
Number of observations 1,098 368 1,098 368 1,098 368 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.856 0.759 0.726 0.809 0.749 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 (DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03). 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and firm-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in parenthe-
ses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1%. 
 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I investigate the influence of tax incentives on the financial structures of M&As. 
In case of M&As, purchase prices are often financed by high amounts of debt. From a tax 
perspective, it is beneficial to load the loans particularly on subsidiaries in countries with a high 
tax rate (so called debt push down). Furthermore, as I explain in this paper, it is often advanta-
geous to place the debt at a holding in the country of the target firm since it allows for debt 
financing up to the purchase price (and not just the amount of total assets). 
I investigate this potential tax influence on financial structures set up through M&As using a 
dataset of German MNEs. The analysis is separated into two steps. First, I investigate, whether 
financial considerations and associated tax benefits determine holding structures. I do not find 
evidence that the probability that a firm is held by a holding in the same country increases with 
the tax rate. However, I argue that this does not necessarily mean that firms in high-tax countries 
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are not often held via holdings, but that the insignificance of the tax rate effect may stem from 
firms in low-tax countries also being held by holdings, although for other reasons.  
In addition, if debt push down involves holding structures, I show theoretically that it is neces-
sary to consolidate financial structures of operating firms and those holdings, which leads to 
higher debt ratios. I again measure particular effects of M&A firms. Different than in the esti-
mations explaining holding structures, firms are now defined as M&A firms if any firm in the 
same MNE, country and year had such a mode of entry after 2004. I find that in the overall 
sample of firms and also for M&A firms in particular the total debt ratio however slightly de-
clines with this consolidation. But if I consider M&A firms that are located in countries with a 
high tax rate, i.e., where the usage of holdings is particularly advantageous, I see an increase 
from the unconsolidated debt ratio (48.5% of debt relative to total capital) to the consolidated 
debt ratio (49.7%). For holding structures in particular, I observe an increase from 48.1% to 
57.7%. However, the composition of the observations indicates that this specific way of tax 
avoidance may rather be new. According to that, I also find that indeed the effect of the tax rate 
on the total debt ratio increases with such a consolidation. To be precise, my results for the 
unconsolidated case show that an increase of the tax rate by 10 percentage points increases the 
total debt ratio by 3.4 percentage points. For the consolidated case, this effect increases to 3.9 
percentage points. However, I find an effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio only for M&A 
firms. Given that previous research has found this effect for both M&A and non-M&A firms, 
this study denotes the importance of considering potentially heterogeneous effects of those two 
forms of FDI. 
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4. The Impact of Tax Treaties and Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited35; 
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Abstract: We revisit the effects of DTTs on FDI. Previous empirical studies provide somewhat 
counterintuitive results suggesting insignificant or even negative effects of tax treaties. Using a 
rich firm-level dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank) we ana-
lyze the investment impact of DTTs and repatriation taxes between more than 3,000 country 
pairs. Whereas we do not find a significant effect of tax treaties on overall investment, we show 
that repatriation taxes have an adverse effect on fixed assets and a positive effect on financial 
assets. The latter supports the assumption that firms defer profit distribution to avoid taxes. 
Correspondingly, we also find that revenue reserves increase in repatriation taxes. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Multinational companies invest in their subsidiaries all over the world. There are several rea-
sons for the increase of FDI over the last decades. Most of them come down to the argument of 
lower transaction costs. In this paper, we work out how the improved coordination concerning 
taxation affects FDI. In particular, we revisit the impact of DTTs and especially repatriation 
taxes on FDI. We model repatriation taxes as the sum of the nominal withholding tax effectively 
imposed on intercompany dividends by the country where the FDI takes place and the taxes 
imposed on those dividends in the home country of the receiving entity of the MNE. 
Without a DTT, profits that are repatriated from a subsidiary to its parent or an intermediary 
firm may be taxed by both countries. In order to avoid double taxation, states enter into bilateral 
DTTs. Besides other aspects, a DTT allocates the claims to tax the same income, limits the tax 
rates imposed by source countries and defines a method to avoid double taxation. In particular, 
tax treaties define the percentage of distributed dividends the host country is allowed to keep 
as a withholding tax and how the dividends are taxed at the receiving entity.  
During the last decades, hundreds of DTTs have been concluded or amended and many of them 
lowered the permissible tax imposed on dividends between the respective countries. We com-
bine this extensive institutional variation with a rich micro-level data set of German multina-
tionals active in more than 50 host countries. Especially, we have detailed information on the 
chains of ownership. Moreover, we can use the fact that Germany has one of the most extensive 
tax treaty networks all over the world and always stipulates the exemption of foreign dividends 
from home country taxes. This data allows us to identify DTTs, withholding tax rates and the 
effective taxes on repatriations between more than 3,000 country pairs over a period from 1996 
to 2008. We provide evidence suggesting that repatriation taxes indeed significantly affect in-
vestments of multinational subsidiaries.  
Previous research has found mixed results regarding the effects of DTTs on FDI and expected 
negative effects of repatriation taxes. In the following those results are presented, first for DTTs 
and then for repatriation taxes in general: 
Whereas DTTs are expected to increase FDI, surprisingly, some papers also found insignificant 
or even negative effect. Davies (2003) considers US FDI data from the 1960s and 1970s and 
finds a negative response to tax treaties and mixed results for tax treaty amendments. Blonigen 
and Davies (2004) find mostly insignificant and also some negative effects of the existence of 
a DTT on US inward and outward FDI in aggregated data. Egger et al. (2006) consider outward 
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FDI of OECD countries. Yet, their results again suggest a significant negative impact of newly 
implemented tax treaties on FDI. Louie and Rousslang (2008) make another attempt and try to 
identify effects of US tax treaties on required returns, which should be lower with less taxation, 
but also fail to find statistically significant effects.  
But there is also evidence that DTTs positively affect FDI. Here, one can differentiate between 
the extensive margin, i.e., whether firms invest at all, and the intensive margin, i.e., how much 
they invest. Di Giovanni (2005), Davies et al. (2009), Egger and Merlo (2011) and Marques 
and Pinho (2014) find that DTTs increase investment (primarily) at the extensive margin. 
Millimet and Kumas (2007) find both, positive and negative, results of DTTs on FDI. The re-
sults of an analysis by Behrendt and Wamser (2018) indicate that DTTs have a larger effect on 
the location decisions if the tax rate of the parent is relatively large compared to the one of the 
subsidiary. With respect to the intensive margin, Smart (2010) shows that a reduction of repat-
riation taxes caused by a change in the method to avoid double taxation (towards exemption) 
within DTTs increased FDI stocks of Canadian firms by about 80%. Egger and Wamser (2013) 
find an effect on that margin if the DTT is inaugurated together with other agreements fostering 
economic integration. Blonigen and Piger (2014) find that DTTs are rather relevant for invest-
ment into non-OECD countries. Those firms benefit from increased support in determining 
transfer prices through the DTTs. Petkova et al. (2018) find that DTTs only have effects on FDI 
stocks, if they reduce the tax burden at least to the minimum one within all the possible combi-
nations of conduit countries through which the profits could be repatriated. Furthermore, they 
find a positive effect of the tax reduction on FDI only in a non-linear setting, indicating that 
only large reductions of the tax rate are effective. Blonigen et al. (2014) find effects on both, 
the extensive margin and the intensive margin, while for the latter, they actually consider sales. 
In addition, they find that the effects are stronger for firms with differentiated inputs. 
Regarding repatriation taxes in general, we again consider the intensive and extensive margin 
separately. Concerning the extensive margin, Overesch and Wamser (2009) find negative ef-
fects of withholding taxes on location decisions of German multinationals, i.e., the number of 
subsidiaries in the respective country. Barrios et al. (2012) find that the sensitivity to double 
taxation depends on the return to assets, the amount of fixed assets and whether deferral is 
actually allowed in the parent-country tax legislation. In the particular context of M&As, 
Huizinga and Voget (2009) find striking effects of repatriation taxes on both, the direction of 
acquisitions and the number of acquired firms per country. As an acquisition always involves 
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two firms, they show that a high repatriation tax on dividends from one firm to the other de-
creases the probability that the latter becomes the acquirer (and not the target) and, in accord-
ance to that, the number of M&As with the latter being the acquirer (the second approach ac-
counts not just for the directions of the M&As but also the number of cases where certain coun-
tries are involved in M&As). With respect to the intensive margin, Hines Jr. (1996) finds that 
low-tax US states are particularly attractive to investors from home countries that exempt for-
eign income compared to investors from credit countries and hence repatriation taxes also affect 
the impact of host-country taxes on investment. A study by Egger et al. (2009) finds a signifi-
cant negative effect of host-country withholding taxes on bilateral FDI stocks. Hong (2017) 
finds that FDI stocks are higher if the tax burden for direct repatriation is minimal compared to 
repatriation via intermediary countries.  
We test whether the puzzling results found in the literature correspond with theoretical predic-
tions respectively findings about the role of repatriation taxes on investment of subsidiaries. 
One assumption is that firms reinvest their profits in financial assets instead of repatriating them 
(Weichenrieder (1996)). This should particularly be the case if they expect a reduction in repat-
riation taxes. Desai et al. (2001) was one of the first of several papers that found that indeed 
repatriation taxes have a negative effect on repatriation. Accordingly, Hanlon et al. (2015) show 
that repatriation taxes increase acquisition activity. However, once there is a reduction in those 
taxes, profits may be distributed and hence financial assets may decline. If FDI data does not 
allow a differentiation between physical and financial investment, the effect of repatriation 
taxes on financial assets might compensate the one on fixed assets, which in turn may lead to 
the wrong conclusion that tax treaties generally exert no effect or a negative effect on FDI. 
Therefore, we disentangle different kinds of investment and financing and execute detailed tests 
of the predictions brought forward in the previous literature. First, we analyze whether new or 
renegotiated tax treaties exert significant effects on investment of subsidiaries, but the estimated 
results are not statistically significant. In addition, we find no effects of repatriation taxes on 
total assets. However, we find that repatriation taxes negatively affect investment in fixed as-
sets. In addition, we find a positive effect of repatriation taxes on financial investments. More-
over, we find corresponding evidence regarding the structure of equity finance. Higher repatri-
ation taxes are associated with a significantly higher share of revenue reserves. This finding 
supports the view that firms postpone repatriation because they have the general expectation 
that, owed to new tax treaties, high repatriation taxes will decrease in the future.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss effects of the 
institutional details of the international tax system and derive empirically testable hypotheses. 
Thereafter, the investigation approach is presented in Section 4.3. The data is presented in Sec-
tion 4.4 and Section 4.5 presents empirical results. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Development of Hypotheses 
International business taxation significantly affects FDI. Several studies have come to the result 
that an increase of the host country’s corporate tax negatively affects FDI (for an overview see 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), Feld and Heckemeyer (2011)). Moreover, intercompany trans-
actions are subject to withholding taxes in the host country and are considered as foreign income 
at the level of the parent company. Consequently, the taxation of these transactions is also ex-
pected to influence FDI.  
4.2.1 Double Tax Treaties and FDI 
A DTT is an agreement between two countries on the taxation of dividends, which, without 
such an agreement, may be taxed by both treaty partners. A DTT limits the claims of those 
countries to tax the income. Moreover, DTTs coordinate the definition of terms and determine 
mutual agreement procedures.  
Considering these functions, DTTs are expected to affect FDI of MNEs. It is, however, unclear 
if the introduction of a DTT increases or decreases FDI. On the one hand, DTTs are expected 
to be associated with additional FDI for the following reasons: elimination of double taxation, 
reduction of withholding taxes, standardization of terms and definitions, enhanced certainty 
about the tax environment and elimination of double taxation of expatriates. On the other hand, 
the previous literature has argued that tax treaties might also negatively influence FDI because 
treaties refer to the arm’s length principle to asses transfer prices. This principle means that 
intrafirm transactions have to be priced at what third parties would agree upon. Therefore, DTTs 
would reduce profit shifting opportunities via those so called transfer prices. Further, DTTs 
eliminate loopholes by enhancing the information exchange between the treaty partners, pro-
voke additional repatriations by reducing withholding taxes and prevent firms from setting up 
holding structures that aggressively exploit the international treaty network (see, e.g., Blonigen 
and Davies (2004)). 
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We argue that the rationales suggesting an adverse effect of tax treaties on FDI are not very 
convincing.37 First, OECD countries as well as other countries already apply the arm’s length 
principle to assess transfer prices on the basis of national tax legislation. Consequently, a tax 
treaty usually does not change the assessment of transfer prices.38 Nevertheless, some tax trea-
ties include specific rules on mutual agreement procedures in transfer pricing disputes. These 
rules, however, tend to avoid double taxation risk and might therefore be associated with more 
rather than less FDI. Second, information exchange does only contribute to closing loopholes 
if transactions are invisible to tax authorities. Yet, FDI is associated with significant control of 
investors by the administration. Parent companies and subsidiaries have to disclose many de-
tails in their financial accounts. Therefore, the effects of enhanced information exchange are 
expected to be rather limited in the particular case of FDI. Third, rules to prevent firms from 
what is called treaty shopping only eliminate incentives that just arise from the fact that a treaty 
has been concluded.39 However, the adverse effects of DTTs on FDI may not be completely 
neglected since Behrendt and Wamser (2018) find that the elasticity to taxes increases after 
DTTs, i.e., profit shifting is more difficult. In addition, also Marques and Pinho (2014) find that 
besides repatriation taxes, also other aspects of DTTs affect the extensive margin of FDI. 
Still, in a nutshell, it seems to be a very reasonable conclusion that positive effects of tax treaties 
on FDI outweigh negative treaty effects. A total positive effect is also expected after a renego-
tiation of a tax treaty, because renegotiations are often associated with significant cuts in repat-
riation taxes. This leads to our first testable hypothesis: 
 
H-1: A new or a renegotiated tax treaty exerts a non-negative total effect on FDI.  
4.2.2 Tax Treaties and the Effective Tax on Repatriation 
A MNE has different means to repatriate profits, either by paying interests on previously pro-
vided intercompany loans, by paying royalties or by paying intercompany dividends. The latter 
can be considered the most important one in terms of volume and also in the potential sensitivity 
                                                            
37 The explanation that tax treaties predominantly exert significant negative effects on FDI owing to transfer pric-
ing rules and enhanced information exchange is also contradicted by evidence dealing with tax treaty effects on 
FDI in developing countries. Whereas national tax legislation of developing countries might often lack sophis-
ticated transfer pricing rules and clear definitions of terms, a study by Neumayer (2007) finds significant positive 
treaty effects on FDI in developing countries. 
38 Details of arm’s length transfer prices are defined by OECD transfer pricing guidelines (OECD (2010)). These 
guidelines came into force by national tax legislation and should not be mistaken as the OECD model conven-
tion. 
39 Anti-avoidance measures to prevent firms from treaty shopping might have an effect if these rules are introduced 
in the course of a renegotiation of an existing tax treaty. Then, FDI measures might be affected by some reor-
ganizations of holding structures. 
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to tax treaty regulations. That is why we focus on repatriation via dividends in this paper. Cross-
border intercompany dividends can be subject to tax in the host country of the subsidiary paying 
the dividends (source country) as well as in the residence country of the firm receiving the 
dividends (home country). Without an effective treaty, double taxation is very likely. Either 
way, the taxes imposed on intercompany dividends reduce funds available for distribution to 
the shareholders. 
We have argued that the consequences of tax treaties for the taxation of FDI boil down to 
changes in repatriation taxes. In the following, let us consider the standard case of FDI in an 
incorporated subsidiary. Profits generated by a subsidiary are not taxed at the level of the parent 
firm as long as they are not distributed (deferral system). Sooner or later, however, a MNE will 
repatriate foreign profits and bring them to the sphere of disposability.  
Among the various aspects associated with a tax treaty, two issues directly affect the effective 
tax on repatriation. First, tax treaties limit the withholding tax rate imposed on intercompany 
dividends (Article 10 OECD Model Tax Convention). However, the tax treaty only affects the 
treatment of intercompany dividends if national tax legislation already claims a fiscal position 
in intercompany dividends. In this case, withholding taxes are only changed by a tax treaty if 
the cap imposed by the treaty is below the withholding tax rate already effective in the source 
country. Suppose, for example, a tax treaty that limits the withholding tax at a rate of 10%. The 
tax treaty would change the effectively imposed tax rate if the ordinary withholding tax rate 
defined by the national tax code was 15%. In contrast, the withholding tax would remain com-
pletely unaffected by the tax treaty if the withholding tax rate determined by the national legis-
lation was only 5%. Moreover, tax treaties between member states of the EU are very likely to 
have no material effect on withholding tax rates because the EU parent-subsidiary directive has 
already eliminated any withholding taxes imposed on intercompany dividends.   
Second, tax treaties include an agreement on either the credit method or the exemption method 
to avoid double taxation of intercompany dividends at the level of the parent company (Article 
23 OECD Model Tax Convention). However, national tax legislations also take into account 
that the repatriated profits have already been subject to withholding taxes and also to corporate 
taxes at the level of the subsidiary. If the exemption method is applied, repatriated intercompany 
dividends are tax exempt at the level of the firm that receives the dividends. Germany is one of 
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the countries exempting intercompany dividends from taxation. In the case of a credit system, 
intercompany dividends are subject to tax but taxes paid abroad reduce the tax liability.40  
We also have to consider the interplay between the tax treaty and the national tax legislation. A 
DTT changing the method to avoid double taxation can significantly cut the effectively imposed 
repatriation tax. Yet, there are many cases where the method introduced by a tax treaty effec-
tively leaves the repatriation taxes unchanged. One case is an excess credit position. An excess 
credit arises if foreign taxes exceed the tax liability of the home country on foreign income. If 
the excess credit cannot be used, e.g., in subsequent periods, a credit system effectively equals 
the exemption system. In this case, introducing the exemption method does not effectively 
change repatriation taxes. Correspondingly, if the tax code of the home country already deter-
mines the exemption of intercompany dividends, the taxation of repatriated profits is effectively 
unchanged by a tax treaty referring to the indirect credit method. This is also true if the treaty 
refers to the same method that is already in force. Similarly, if the tax rate of the home country 
exceeds the tax credit, a reduction of the withholding tax, e.g., caused by a new tax treaty, has 
no material effect. The interplay of treaty effect and national tax legislation may also help to 
explain why the previous literature has often failed to find positive treaty effects.41 
The discussion has shown that in conceivable cases tax treaties do not effectively change repat-
riation taxes. Please refer to the Appendix (Appendix to Section 4) for a detailed description 
how the effective repatriation tax is calculated. We set up the following hypothesis: 
H-2: A new or renegotiated tax treaty exerts a positive effect on FDI if it has effectively 
decreased the repatriation tax imposed on intercompany dividends.  
4.2.3 Repatriation Taxes and Retentions 
Concerning the effect on FDI we consider a change in repatriation taxes the most important 
aspect of DTTs. Therefore, we derive testable hypotheses for additional empirical analyses 
about the impact of repatriation taxes on FDI. 
The traditional view on dividend taxes is deduced from the fact that taxes on dividend payments 
are an excess burden on corporate investment. Since investors anticipate this additional tax, 
                                                            
40 If a direct credit is applied, the foreign tax credit includes the withholding taxes imposed on intercompany 
dividends. An indirect credit also includes foreign corporate taxes paid by the subsidiary. 
41 In additional robustness checks, the study by Blonigen and Davies (2004), for example, comes up with several 
positive treaty effects on US inbound FDI, whereas no robust effects are found in the case of US outbound FDI. 
The latter results may hint at an offsetting effect of the former US credit system and changes of withholding tax 
rates.  
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cost of equity capital rises with the dividend tax (Harberger (1962)). If marginal rates of return 
on capital are declining, the optimal investment size is negatively affected by dividend taxes. 
The repatriation taxes imposed on intercompany dividends are a particular type of dividend tax. 
Consequently, this “old” view on corporate taxation predicts negative effects of repatriation 
taxes on FDI.  
Yet, another strand of literature, dealing with the so-called “new” view on corporate taxation, 
predicts insignificant effects of repatriation taxes and, therefore, of tax treaties. Starting with 
the seminal works by King and Auerbach (King (1974a), King (1974b), Auerbach (1979), 
Auerbach (1983)), this literature suggests that dividend taxes do not affect investment if a cor-
poration can use retained earnings as its marginal source of finance. Unlike the Old View, these 
models consider the fact that dividend taxes can be deferred by retaining and reinvesting earn-
ings within the corporation. As repatriation taxes, like withholding taxes or home country taxes 
on foreign income, are usually imposed on distributed income rather than on accruals, Hartman 
(1985) and Sinn (1984) apply these arguments to repatriation taxes on international intercom-
pany dividends. In accordance with these models, repatriation taxes exert a negative effect only 
if new equity injection is the marginal source of finance, e.g., when a new subsidiary is founded 
(Sinn (1993)). 
Applying the logic of the New View to repatriation strategies of MNEs suggests that repatria-
tion taxes do not affect the timing of repatriations if current tax conditions are not expected to 
change over time. The rationale for this result is the following: Repatriation taxes do not affect 
the marginal investment decision because the subsidiary has to pay these taxes irrespective of 
whether it reinvests the profits or distributes them right away. 
Empirical studies show that firms smooth their repatriation payments over time (Desai et al. 
(2007), Bellak and Leibrecht (2010)). Desai et al. (2007) argue that intercompany dividends 
can be quite well explained by agency conflicts between local managers and the central man-
agement of the firm, financial constraints of the multinational group and last but not least by 
the incentive that, in turn, the MNE has to pay smooth dividends to its external shareholders.  
Previous results also suggest that repatriation taxes negatively affect repatriations (Desai et al. 
(2001), Desai et al. (2007), Bellak and Leibrecht (2010)). The most convincing explanation for 
an impact of repatriation taxes is the expectation that withholding taxes and home country taxes 
on foreign income in fact vary over time. Then, repatriation taxes are, of course, no longer 
irrelevant for the decision whether to retain or to repatriate foreign income. The expectation of 
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varying repatriation taxes was, for example, fulfilled for US multinationals in 2004 and 2005, 
when the US government offered a temporary reduction in US taxes on repatriated foreign in-
come. Several empirical studies provide striking evidence that US firms jumped at the chance 
and repatriated billions of USD (Clemons and Kinney (2008), Redmiles (2008), Blouin and 
Krull (2009), Albring et al. (2011), Dharmapala et al. (2011)). Similarly, Egger et al. (2015) 
show that after a change in the method to avoid double taxation in the United Kingdom (from 
the credit to the exemption system) that meant a reduction of the repatriation tax, the repatriation 
of dividends increased. 
It is very likely that multinationals all over the world expect some variation in repatriation taxes. 
More precisely, it is very likely that they expect falling repatriation taxes, since the extension 
of the EU parent-subsidiary directive, changes in national legislations, newly set up DTTs as 
well as treaty renegotiations show a clear overall trend of declining withholding taxes. We col-
lected data on dividend taxation of a 57x56 country and 13 year matrix. Based on this data, 
there are 1,674 cases of declining withholding taxes. In 684 of these cases, it even shrunk to 
zero. By contrast, there are only 339 cases where the withholding tax increased, e.g., due to the 
expiration or cancellation of DTTs or changes in the national legislation. Figure 4.1 shows a 
striking negative trend in the average taxes withhold from cross-border intercompany divi-
dends. 
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If a firm expects a cut in repatriation taxes in subsequent years and internal funds are the mar-
ginal source of finance, the expected change in repatriation taxes indeed affects investment 
decisions. The higher the repatriation tax rate, the higher is the probability and the benefit of a 
tax cut in the future. In this case, it becomes rational to defer distributions and reinvest profits 
until the expected tax cut will come into force.  
Moreover, tax treaties are often negotiated for years and often become effective one or two 
years after they were being finalized and published.42 Thus, multinationals can be expected to 
see the legal amendments in advance. This anticipation causes higher investment by the sub-
sidiary right before the change. If repatriation taxes are significantly reduced or abolished, the 
incentive to retain profits and to invest in assets declines. Therefore, the growth path or even 
the stock of assets is expected to significantly decline just after a cut in repatriation taxes. 
Hence, in the short run, such cuts may have a negative effect on FDI but in the long run this 
                                                            
42 For example, the revision of the treaty between Germany and Switzerland has been signed on March 12, 2002, 
has come into force on March 24, 2003 and is effective from January 1, 2004. For the treaty between Italy and 
Russia, the corresponding dates are April 9, 1996, November 30, 1998 and January 1, 1999. The treaty between 
the United States and Luxembourg was signed on April 3, 1996, came into force on December 20, 2000 and 
was effective from January 1, 2001.  
Figure 4.1: Average withholding tax on intercompany dividends  
 
Notes: Average withholding tax rate on dividends in all combinations in a sample of 56 countries, in %. The 
values denoted above are the annual means of the added up 56 country-specific average withholding taxes. 
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effect may switch to a positive sign. In line with that, Millimet and Kumas (2007) find positive 
effects of tax treaties on FDI measures particularly for observations succeeding the conclusion 
of a new DTT by many years. 
Consequently, high repatriation taxes can be associated with additional investment due to re-
tention. If marginal returns are decreasing, local investment opportunities, for example in fixed 
assets, are however limited. At some day repatriation of free cash flow becomes rational. How-
ever, as mentioned already in the introduction, Weichenrieder (1996) points at investment in 
the capital market as another opportunity to reduce the excess burden repatriation taxes exert 
on equity endowment. Investment in the capital market or in shares of other affiliated firms is 
independent from investment opportunities within the subsidiary. Consequently, the available 
interest rate in the world capital market is the lower boundary for the investment of retained 
earnings. Moreover, Altshuler and Grubert (2003) note that, in particular, buying shares is a 
means to funnel funds to other affiliates and at the same time, to avoid repatriation taxes. Put it 
differently, investing in shares of affiliated firms is an alternative means to funnel equity to 
other investment opportunities of the multinational group without paying repatriation taxes. 
Indeed, Foley et al. (2007) show that US multinationals hold extensive amounts of cash in for-
eign subsidiaries because repatriation will be taxed. Note, as a side remark, that this may change 
with the US tax reform from 2018, which included a change from the credit to the exemption 
system. Hanlon et al. (2015) show that the holdings of cash also increase acquisition activity. 
Therefore, excessive retention owed to high repatriation taxes is expected to cause financial 
investment, but not additional (local) investment in fixed assets.      
In a nutshell, the effects of repatriation taxes on financial assets and on real investments are 
expected to have opposing signs. If FDI data does not allow disentangling physical investment 
from financial investment, the positive effect of high repatriation taxes on financial assets might 
dominate the opposing effect on real capital. Based on these considerations, we set up the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
 
H-3: Repatriation taxes positively affect financial investment in the capital market 
whereas repatriation taxes exert negative or even insignificant effects on 
real investments.  
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4.2.4 Repatriation Taxes and Financial Structures 
In addition to the investment effects of repatriation taxes corresponding effects on capital struc-
tures have to be expected. Combining the arguments of the Old and New View on corporate 
taxation leads to the conclusion that a negative investment effect is expected if the source of 
finance is new equity. Sinn (1993) shows in a dynamic framework that repatriation taxes there-
fore initially lead to a nucleus of investment abroad. Then, however, the firm grows to maturity 
through retained earnings only. According to his model, the size of a mature subsidiary is un-
affected by repatriation taxes. Nevertheless, the proportions of endowed equity capital (sub-
scribed capital) and retained earnings (revenue reserves) are indeed affected by repatriation 
taxes because initial equity injection is negatively affected by repatriation taxes.  
Moreover, the discussion in subsection 4.2.3 suggests additional retention if repatriation taxes 
are still high and are expected to decline someday. Then, the share of revenue reserves in total 
capital but also the share of nominal capital should be affected by repatriation taxes. Thus, we 
formulate the following hypothesis regarding the structure of equity finance: 
H-4: Repatriation taxes negatively affect the share of nominal capital in total cap-
ital whereas they positively affect the share of revenue reserves.  
4.3 Investigation Approach  
In order to analyze how tax treaties and dividend taxes affect investments and financial struc-
tures of multinational subsidiaries, we use firm-level data taken from the Deutsche Bundes-
bank’s Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), which comprises administrative data on FDI 
of German multinational enterprises. We start by taking total assets as the dependent variable 
of our analysis, which is in accordance with the previous literature dealing with effects of tax 
treaties. We run our regressions with the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)), 
a GMM dynamic panel-data estimator, which considers a first-differences model:  
𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛥𝛥𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝛥𝛥𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (4.1) 
The subscript i denotes the subsidiary where the investment takes place and t the respective 
year. The vector X includes tax variables but also a set of firm-level information and host-
country characteristics. Concerning tax variables, we consider the host-country statutory profit 
tax rate, a variable indicating whether a new tax treaty is enforced and measures of withholding 
and repatriation taxes.  
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We include the lagged dependent variable since investment is assumed to be sticky over time 
(new investment would be associated with considerable adjustment costs). In addition, we as-
sume unobserved subsidiary-specific effects. We cannot solve the later problem by using fixed 
effects because than the errors would affect the lagged dependent variable (Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011)). Instead we use first differences to remove unobserved subsidiary-specific ef-
fects. However, now 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 is correlated with the error’s first difference (which implies 
1st order autocorrelation of the errors). Therefore, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 is included as an instrument for this 
estimator (in case of autocorrelation of higher order, higher lags are used). So far our approach 
is equivalent to the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson and Hsiao (1982)). However, we use 
the Arellano-Bond estimator, since it uses the explanatory and control variables (besides the 
lagged dependent variable) as additional instruments, which increases efficiency (Wooldridge 
(2002)).   
Total assets include all types of investment. In order to test our hypotheses, we distinguish 
between different investment types in additional sets of regressions. Moreover, we also test our 
hypotheses on the impact of repatriation taxes on the financial structures. 
Future research may also investigate how the US tax reform from 2018, which, as mentioned 
above, included a change from the credit to the exemption system and therefore presumably a 
decline in the repatriation taxes, affects investment. Therefore, however, considering US mul-
tinationals (and not Germans as in this analysis) would be necessary. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, the GILTI instrument, which is also part of this reform, may counteract this switch of 
the systems (see footnote 27 on page 62). 
4.4 Data 
As mentioned above, the empirical analysis uses firm-level data taken from the MiDi database. 
The comprehensive micro database covers information on both, direct investment positions 
held in Germany by foreign companies and direct investment positions of German enterprises 
held abroad. In this study, we only analyze subsidiaries that are located outside Germany and 
are owned by a multinational enterprise having its headquarters in Germany.43 The data allows 
us to trace groups and their affiliates as well as the detailed ownership chains over time from 
1996 to 2008. The data collection is imposed by German law, which requires reporting for 
                                                            
43 We exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special 
tax regimes may be available there. Furthermore, we exclude observations whose German parent is not an in-
corporated and legally independent entity as well as subsidiaries that are not legally independent. 
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certain international transactions and positions.44 This aspect of MiDi is worth emphasizing as 
we are thus able to observe virtually all major German outbound investments.  
We consider a sample of subsidiaries located in 56 countries with Germany serving as the res-
idence country of the parent company. Our sample consists of subsidiaries in the four BRIC 
countries, 29 countries that were members of the OECD in 2008 (excluding Germany) and the 
eight EU member states that were not OECD countries in 2008.45 In order to complete the pic-
ture of major investment flows, we also include tax havens and those larger economies that 
show substantial investment stocks of German multinationals.46 Whereas the headquarters of 
the multinational groups covered in our dataset are always located in Germany, we consider the 
investments in directly and indirectly held subsidiaries that are wholly-owned by a German 
firm. The total sample applied here consists of 84,625 observations of 18,229 subsidiaries.   
As our dependent variable, we first consider the investment level in total assets of each subsid-
iary. Moreover, in the further estimations we focus on different investment types and consider 
fixed assets and internal financial assets (shares of affiliates) as dependent variables.47 Concern-
ing the financial structures, we also run additional regressions using the share of either revenue 
reserves or nominal capital in total capital (minus profit and loss for the financial year) as de-
pendent variables.  
As regards tax variables, we consider the statutory profit tax rate of the host-country corporate 
income tax. Concerning DTT reforms, we consider the dummy variable New DTT indicating 
                                                            
44 The mandatory collection is determined in the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation 
(Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). The criteria, when an investment has to be reported varied over time. From 
1999 until 2001, FDI had to be reported if the participation was 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the 
respective foreign investment exceeded 5 million Euros or if the participation was 50% or more and the balance-
sheet total exceeded 500.000 Euros. From 2002 until 2006, FDI had to be reported if the participation was 10% 
or more and the balance-sheet total exceeded 3 million Euros. Since 2007, the threshold of 10% applies only for 
direct shares, whereas for indirect shares or a mixture of direct and indirect shares the threshold has been raised 
to 50% (for details see Schild and Walter (2016)). We uniformly apply the threshold of 3 million Euros, in fact, 
by slightly diverging from this rule in order to receive the results efficiently, observations with total capital of 
less than 3 million Euros (instead of up to 3 million Euros) are not considered, and full ownership is always 
required. 
45 The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India and China. The covered OECD countries are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the US. Moreover, we consider sub-
sidiaries located in the EU countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Romania. 
46 Included tax havens are the Bermuda Islands, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein and Singapore. 
Moreover, we consider subsidiaries in Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, 
the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay. 
47 We take the natural logarithm of total, fixed and internal financial assets. To avoid the loss of observations for 
those variables we replace the levels with a 1 if they are listed as a 0 in the database. Logarithms are not taken 
from revenue reserves and nominal capital since scaling issues are already accounted for by the division through 
total capital. 
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whether an observation is from a year after a tax treaty reform is enforced. It turns to one if a 
new DTT for the respective home- and host-country pair has been introduced or if there has 
been a reform of the existing treaty. The dummy variable is zero for years before a reform has 
taken place. Table A 16 in the Appendix provides an overview of the tax treaty changes between 
1996 and 2008 that have been used to set up this variable. 
Our basic dataset covers the period from 1996 to 2008 and recognizes both directly and indi-
rectly held subsidiaries. We only regard cases where holdings have full ownership of the sub-
sidiaries. As indirectly held subsidiaries of German multinationals are included, we can monitor 
effects of changes in the withholding tax rates between each single pair of the 57 countries 
(including Germany). We combine our firm-level data with detailed data on taxation of cross-
border inter-company dividends. Altogether, our matrix of withholding tax relationships shows 
57 x 56 combinations each for 13 years resulting in 41,496 cells. Concerning the methods of 
how incoming dividends are dealt with by the parent company or the holding location, we gath-
ered information for the same number of combinations. We browsed all tax treaties of the rele-
vant country pairs and considered when they came into force or were terminated. We also con-
sidered that the tax treaty information may be overridden by a more favorable national rule or 
by multilateral legislation like the parent-subsidiary directive. Please refer to Table A 17 and 
Table A 18 in the Appendix for excerpts of these two matrices.  
From all the 41,496 conceivable withholding tax combinations, we see 1,674 cases (4.0%) 
where the withholding tax is lower as compared to the previous year and 339 cases (0.8%) 
where it is higher as compared to the previous year. The rare cases where the withholding tax 
is higher than in the past mainly stem from situations where there is no DTT between two 
countries and in addition the subsidiary country starts levying a withholding tax for the first 
time. Some country combinations do not appear at all in the sample used for the regressions, 
whereas others are frequently observable. The comprehensive information on bilateral with-
holding taxes and methods to avoid double taxation is used to construct two additional varia-
bles. First, we consider the nominal withholding tax effectively imposed on intercompany div-
idends (Withholding Tax). Second, the variable Repatriation Tax also takes into account the 
treatment of intercompany dividends in the home country of the receiving entity of the MNE. 
As additional control variables we consider host-country GDP, GDP per Capita and Inflation 
Rate taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Moreover, a variable Coun-
try Risk scaling from 0 to 7 with higher values corresponding to higher risk is derived from the 
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OECD. Furthermore, we refer to the subsidiary-level profitability as a control variable. Table 
4.1 provides an overview of the definitions, mean values and standard deviations of the varia-
bles employed in this study. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets* Total assets reported in the financial statements; meas-
ured in EUR '000. 
223,307 2,850,654 
Fixed Assets* Fixed and intangible assets reported in the financial 
statements; measured in EUR '000. 
20,118 283,219 
Shares of Affiliates* Financial assets in the form of shares of affiliated en-
terprises reported in the financial statements; meas-
ured in EUR '000. 
25,631 566,096 
Share of Nominal Capi-
tal 
Subscribed or called-up capital, endowment capital and 
contributions by partners reported in the financial state-
ments divided by total assets. 
0.275 0.317 
Share of Revenue Re-
serves 
Revenue reserves plus profit/loss carried forward as re-
ported in the financial statements divided by total as-
sets. 
0.148 0.308 
Tax Rate Statutory profit tax rate.  0.317 0.076 
New DTT A tax treaty has been newly introduced or changed.  0.185 0.389 
Withholding Tax 
 
Withholding tax on dividends for the respective coun-
try/country pair. It is the smaller of the domestic rate 
and the rate of an effective tax treaty. 
0.016 0.041 
Repatriation Tax The additional tax that needs to be paid effectively on 
repatriation. Differs from Withholding Tax due to 
recognition of the credit system and the company tax. 
(cf. the first page of the Appendix for further details)  
0.030 0.048 
Profitability Profit or loss for the previous financial year as reported 
by the balance sheet divided by total assets. 
0.063 0.139 
GDP*  Gross Domestic Product measured in billion USD. 2,226 3,621 
GDP per Capita* Gross Domestic Product per capita; measured in cur-
rent USD. 
29,397 15,371 
Inflation Rate Inflation rate. .030 0.037 
Country Risk OECD Country Risk Classification Method measures 
the country credit risk. Risk categories span from a low 
credit risk (0) to a high credit risk (7).  
.555 1.211 
Notes: Firm-specific variables stem from the Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) 1996-2008 of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) (no DOI is available for the used version, but for more 
recent ones, e.g., for 1999-2015: DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9915.03.04). Tax variables are derived from IBFD 
Tax Handbooks and the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. GDP, GDP per Capita and Inflation 
Rate stem from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, edition 2009. Country Risk is based on infor-
mation from the OECD. 
*In the regressions, logarithms are used. 
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4.5 Regression Results 
4.5.1 Total Investment 
In this section, we present our empirical results. We start by testing our hypotheses regarding 
the effects of tax treaty reforms and repatriation taxes on total investment. The respective results 
are presented in Table 4.2.  
We start our analysis by considering a simple binary variable that indicates that a new tax treaty 
is enforced or that there has been a reform of a formerly existing DTT (New DTT). We do not 
find significant effects exerted by the introduction or modification of a DTT. Therefore, the 
results on the binary variable do not confirm hypothesis H-1 of a general non-negative tax treaty 
effect on FDI.  
According to our second hypothesis, a DTT only affects FDI if it has effectively changed the 
taxation of the dividends. Therefore, in columns (2) and (3) we enrich our regressions by the 
variable Withholding Tax. In columns (4) and (5), we consider the variable Repatriation Tax. 
This variable stems from the withholding tax rates on dividends, but takes further aspects into 
consideration, such as whether the credit or exemption method is applied in the country of the 
parent company. Whereas we consider those new variables separately in columns (2) and (4), 
we combine them with the treaty dummy in columns (3) and (5). We expect that the more 
refined consideration of the variation in the effective repatriation taxes may improve identifi-
cation. Nevertheless, in columns (2) to (5), Table 4.2 shows that withholding taxes or repatria-
tion taxes also yield insignificant effects on total assets. Consequently, we are unable to find 
any significant effects of either tax treaty reforms or more detailed measures of repatriation 
taxes if total asset stocks are considered. 
Concerning the control variables, the statutory profit tax rate in the host country, GDP per capita 
and inflation are significant. The tax rate has the expected negative effect. The positive impact 
of GDP per capita on assets can be explained by the tradeoff between labor intensive and capital 
intensive production: As GDP per capita can be seen as a proxy for labor costs, an increase of 
this variable should lead to a more capital intensive production and hence an increase in total 
assets. The coefficient of inflation can be explained by the fact that in a phase of monetary 
expansion, i.e., high inflation, investment is assumed to increase. On the other hand inflation is 
also an economic risk for investment. Hence, we are not surprised to find a negative effect of 
this variable on investment in financial assets (see Section 4.5.2).  
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Table 4.2: Effects of tax treaty changes and repatriation taxes on total assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets 
      
Dependent Variable t-1 0.818*** 0.819*** 0.819*** 0.817*** 0.818***  
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
New DTT -0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
Withholding Tax 
 
0.108 0.101 
  
  
(0.138) (0.140) 
  
Repatriation Tax 
   
-0.024 -0.030 
    (0.109) (0.110) 
Tax Rate -0.162** -0.158* -0.158* -0.162** -0.163**  
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Profitability -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
ln(GDP) 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012  
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.196***  
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) 
Inflation 0.046* 0.046* 0.046* 0.046* 0.046*  
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Country Risk 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Number of observations  84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 
Number of firms 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(2))∆ 0.439 0.439 0.438 0.443 0.440 
Number of instruments 29 29 30 29 30 
Hansen-test∆ 0.000467 0.000481 0.000475 0.000476 0.000469 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1996-2008 (no DOI is available for the used version, but for more recent 
ones, e.g., for 1999-2015: DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9915.03.04). 
Notes: ∆p-value reported. The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust. 
Year dummies for 1998-2008 are included but not reported. We actually have data from 1996 to 2008. Due to the 
consideration of first differences as the dependent variable we have observations in the regression however only 
starting from 1997. In addition, one year dummy has to be dropped because otherwise each year dummy could be 
fully explained by the others. We apply the Arellano-Bond estimator, i.e., a GMM dynamic panel-data estimator 
where all variables enter in first differences (Arellano and Bond (1991)). In line with this estimator, we instrument 
the first differences of the lagged dependent variables with their second lags. *, ** and *** show significance at 
the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
We also control for the lagged dependent variable. As can be seen from the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable, the assets stocks are quite sticky over time, i.e., they are strongly 
influenced by the situation of the previous period. As mentioned in Section 4.3, we have to 
instrument this variable with its second lag. This requires that there is no second-order autocor-
relation, which we test and confirm with an Arellano-Bond-test (reported at the bottom of Table 
4.2). Because of the p-values of the Hansen-tests of over-identifying restrictions we would have 
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to reject the assumption of valid instruments in the Arellano-Bond estimator, which we are 
using. They are below the acceptable threshold of 0.25 (Roodman (2009b)). However, this is 
not the case for the following regressions with fixed and internal financial assets as dependent 
variables. Following the reasoning of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), those different test results 
across the different specifications may be explained by varying lags used as instruments. Indeed 
we use different lags for the different dependent variables (due to different autocorrelation of 
the errors). However, like Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) we are not too concerned about this 
issue because the size of the effect of the lagged dependent variable is not relevant for our 
empirical approach. 
4.5.1 Real Investments 
Taking into account the discussion in Section 4.2, opposing effects of repatriation taxes are 
expected if different investment types are considered. The insignificant effects of repatriation 
taxes on total assets might be a consequence of opposing responses to repatriation taxes of 
different investment types. If these elements are differently affected, their changes might net 
out leading to a total effect that is insignificant. Therefore, we decompose the overall effect of 
the repatriation tax on investment by separately considering different asset categories. In Table 
4.3 we regress fixed assets on repatriation taxes, withholding taxes and the variable indicating 
whether a tax treaty amendment took place. 
The results shown in Table 4.3 suggest that fixed assets are negatively affected by repatriation 
taxes as well as withholding taxes. The coefficient of -0.485 in column (4) of Table 4.3 indicates 
that a 1 percentage point increase in the repatriation tax results in a stock of fixed assets that is 
0.485% smaller. The coefficient for withholding taxes in column (2) is slightly larger.  
The effect of repatriation and withholding taxes supports our assumption that a closer look at 
those variables is advisable. Moreover, in columns (1), (3) and (5) we also consider the variable 
indicating whether a tax treaty amendment took place. The effect of a tax treaty reform proves 
to be insignificant. This finding supports the view that the effective changes of repatriation 
taxes and withholding taxes affect FDI whereas the various issues also concluded in a tax treaty 
do not really matter. At least, they do not seem to exert a negative impact on FDI in our sample.    
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Table 4.3: Effects of repatriation taxes on fixed assets  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Fixed Assets Fixed Assets Fixed Assets Fixed Assets Fixed Assets 
      
Dependent Variable t-1 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.490***  
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
New DTT 0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.003  
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
Withholding Tax 
 
-0.506* -0.518* 
  
  
(0.276) (0.274) 
  
Repatriation Tax 
   
-0.485* -0.491*     
(0.260) (0.262) 
Tax Rate -0.458** -0.472** -0.474** -0.477** -0.478** 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) 
Profitability 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.228***  
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
ln(GDP) 0.177** 0.183** 0.183** 0.174** 0.174**  
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) 
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.204** 0.208** 0.208** 0.216** 0.217**  
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) 
Inflation 0.175 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173  
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) 
Country Risk 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Number of observations  84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 
Number of firms 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(2))∆ 0.0160 0.0161 0.0161 0.0160 0.0160 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(3))∆ 0.802 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.802 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(4))∆ 0.593 0.595 0.595 0.596 0.595 
Number of instruments 27 27 28 27 28 
Hansen-test∆ 0.624 0.631 0.631 0.627 0.627 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1996-2008 (no DOI is available for the used version, but for more recent 
ones, e.g., for 1999-2015: DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9915.03.04). 
Notes: ∆p-value reported. The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust. 
Year dummies for 1998-2008 are included but not reported. We actually have data from 1996 to 2008. Due to the 
consideration of first differences as the dependent variable we have observations in the regression however only 
starting from 1997. In addition, one year dummy has to be dropped because otherwise each year dummy could be 
fully explained by the others. We apply the Arellano-Bond estimator, i.e., a GMM dynamic panel-data estimator 
where all variables enter in first differences (Arellano and Bond (1991)). Because of autocorrelation of the errors, 
we instrument the first differences of the lagged dependent variables with their fourth lags (Roodman (2009a)). *, 
** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
  
As regards control variables, now also the profitability and GDP are significant with an ex-
pected positive effect on investment, whereas inflation becomes insignificant.  
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4.5.2 Financial Investments 
In Table 4.4 we show the effect of DTTs and repatriation taxes on financial assets. We suppose 
that high repatriation taxes cause firms to increase their financial asset stock in the host country 
if they expect a decline of such taxes in the future. Then, in the presence of high repatriation 
taxes, companies act rationally when they reinvest their profits instead of repatriating them. 
Investing in financial assets grants access to investment opportunities not limited to the host 
country of the respective subsidiary. Financial assets also include portfolio investments as well 
as investments within the MNE. Portfolio investments are however not very attractive if the 
firm has investment opportunities for the latter. We therefore focus on investments in shares of 
affiliated firms. Those are means to funnel equity to investment opportunities within the MNE 
– without paying repatriation taxes. 
Indeed, the results in columns (4) and (5) show a positive and significant effect of repatriation 
taxes on shares in affiliated firms. The coefficient of 0.849 in column (5) means that a one 
percentage point increase in the repatriation tax results in a 0.849% increase in the subsidiary’s 
financial asset stock. However, the withholding tax alone, which is part of the repatriation tax, 
and the treaty dummy alone do not prove to be significant (columns (1), (2), (3) and (5)).  
Concerning the control variables, the tax rate, GDP and GDP per capita are insignificant. The 
negative effect of inflation may be explained by the fact that it is an economic risk for invest-
ment.   
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Table 4.4: Effects of repatriation taxes on financial assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable Internal Finan-
cial Assets 
Internal Finan-
cial Assets 
Internal Finan-
cial Assets 
Internal Finan-
cial Assets 
Internal Finan-
cial Assets 
      
Dependent Variable t-1 0.802*** 0.805*** 0.803*** 0.805*** 0.804***  
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
New DTT -0.046 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.035  
(0.041) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.042) 
Withholding Tax 
 
0.556 0.436 
  
  
(0.624) (0.655) 
  
Repatriation Tax 
   
0.906* 0.849*     
(0.484) (0.496) 
Tax Rate -0.405 -0.375 -0.392 -0.355 -0.370 
 (0.382) (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) 
Profitability 0.176** 0.176** 0.176** 0.176** 0.176**  
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
ln(GDP) -0.403 -0.408 -0.408 -0.395 -0.396  
(0.381) (0.381) (0.382) (0.380) (0.380) 
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.290 0.285 0.287 0.266 0.269  
(0.358) (0.356) (0.357) (0.355) (0.356) 
Inflation -0.178* -0.178* -0.177* -0.176* -0.175*  
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Country Risk -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019  
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Number of observations  84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 
Number of firms 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(2))∆ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(3))∆ 0.954 0.947 0.951 0.947 0.951 
Number of instruments 28 28 29 28 29 
Hansen-test∆ 0.318 0.331 0.325 0.335 0.331 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1996-2008 (no DOI is available for the used version, but for more recent 
ones, e.g., for 1999-2015: DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9915.03.04). 
Notes: ∆p-value reported. The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust. 
Year dummies for 1998-2008 are included but not reported. We actually have data from 1996 to 2008. Due to the 
consideration of first differences as the dependent variable we have observations in the regression however only 
starting from 1997. In addition, one year dummy has to be dropped because otherwise each year dummy could be 
fully explained by the others. We apply the Arellano-Bond estimator, i.e., a GMM dynamic panel-data estimator 
where all variables enter in first differences (Arellano and Bond (1991)). Because of autocorrelation of the errors, 
we instrument the first differences of the lagged dependent variables with their third lags (Roodman (2009a)). *, 
** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
  
4.5.3 Capital Structures 
In a final step we also analyze whether the structure of revenue reserves and nominal capital is 
affected by DTTs and repatriation taxes in particular. Since the impact of repatriation taxes on 
total capital, which corresponds to total assets, is insignificant, we consider the effects on its 
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elements revenue reserves and nominal capital. For the two we run separate estimations. Table 
4.5 shows the effect of DTTs and repatriation taxes on the financial structures of multinational 
subsidiaries. 
In line with the previous results, the dummies do not have an effect. In columns (2) and (3) we 
focus on the effect of the withholding as well as repatriation taxes on the revenue reserves of a 
subsidiary. The signs for the coefficients are positive, as expected (cf. H-4), and significant. 
The coefficient of 0.137 in column (3) means that a one percentage point higher repatriation 
tax leads to a 0.137% smaller share of revenue reserves. If firms expect a decline of withholding 
respectively repatriation taxes in the future, they act rationally when retaining profits and, in 
doing so, increasing their revenue reserves.  
Columns (5) and (6) show, by contrast, that nominal capital is significantly negatively affected 
by withholding as well as repatriation taxes on dividends. This result was also expected and 
corresponds well to our findings regarding revenue reserves.  
As in the case of total assets, the Hansen-test fails but again we assume that this is not affecting 
the validity of our empirical approach. 
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Table 4.5: Effects of repatriation taxes on shares of revenue reserves and nominal capi-
tal 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Share of 
revenue re-
serves 
Share of reve-
nue reserves 
Share of reve-
nue reserves 
Share of 
nominal capi-
tal 
Share of 
nominal capi-
tal 
Share of 
nominal capi-
tal 
Dependent Variable t-1 0.789*** 0.788*** 0.788*** 0.834*** 0.834*** 0.833***  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
New DTT -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Withholding Tax 
 
0.146*** 
  
-0.092* 
 
  
(0.053) 
  
(0.051) 
 
Repatriation Tax 
  
0.137*** 
 
 -0.085**    
(0.049) 
 
 (0.038) 
Tax Rate -0.076** -0.072** -0.070** -0.059* -0.062* -0.062* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Profitability 0.552*** 0.551*** 0.551*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329***  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln(GDP) 0.024 0.022 0.025 -0.027 -0.026 -0.028  
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
ln(GDP per Capita) -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 0.019 0.020 0.021  
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Inflation 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Country Risk 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of observations  84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 84,625 
Number of firms 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 18,229 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(2))∆ 0.00323 0.00326 0.00331 0.0575 0.0575 0.0578 
Arellano-Bond-test (AR(3))∆ 0.804 0.810 0.812 0.744 0.740 0.739 
Number of instruments 28 29 29 28 29 29 
Hansen-test∆ 0.00333 0.00282 0.00268 0.0579 0.0542 0.0550 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank), Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi) 1996-2008 (no DOI is available for the used version, but for more recent 
ones, e.g., for 1999-2015: DOI = 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9915.03.04). 
Notes: ∆p-value reported. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust. Year dummies for 1998-2008 are 
included but not reported. We actually have data from 1996 to 2008. Due to the consideration of first differences 
as the dependent variable we have observations in the regression however only starting from 1997. In addition, 
one year dummy has to be dropped because otherwise each year dummy could be fully explained by the others. 
We apply the Arellano-Bond estimator, i.e., a GMM dynamic panel-data estimator where all variables enter in first 
differences (Arellano and Bond (1991)). Because of autocorrelation of the errors, we instrument the first differ-
ences of the lagged dependent variables with their third lags (Roodman (2009a)). *, ** and *** show significance 
at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
We have analyzed how tax treaties and repatriation taxes affect investment and capital struc-
tures of multinational subsidiaries. If we follow the approach taken by previous studies and 
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consider a simple binary variable indicating the enforcement of a new tax treaty, we find insig-
nificant effects on total assets. Then, we have particularly tested whether changes of repatriation 
taxes affect total investment of multinational subsidiaries. Yet, we do not find any statistically 
significant effects of repatriation taxes on total investment.  
In additional analyses, however, we have taken into account that different types of investment 
might be adversely affected by changes of repatriation taxes. Our findings are in accordance 
with expectations on the effect of repatriation taxes. Investment in fixed assets is negatively 
affected by repatriation taxes leading to the conclusion that new equity is the marginal source 
of finance for such assets (at least for the initial equity injection). Moreover, our results suggest 
that firms postpone repatriation because they have the general expectation that, due to new tax 
treaties, high repatriation taxes will decrease in the future. Thereby they avoid the high taxes 
and pay lower taxes in future. In the absence of local investment opportunities, the respective 
funds are then invested in the capital market and especially in shares of affiliated firms. Ac-
cordingly, we find a positive effect of repatriation taxes on internal financial investments. 
Hence, repatriation taxes actually increase retained earnings but this only affects such invest-
ment. 
The behavioral response to repatriation taxes is also confirmed by corresponding effects of re-
patriation taxes on financial structures of the subsidiaries. Our results suggest significant effects 
on the structure of equity finance. Higher repatriation taxes are associated with a significantly 
higher share of revenue reserves and at the same time with significantly smaller new equity 
injections.  
The results suggest that the effect of repatriation taxes on dividends is worth analyzing. They 
seem to exert a significant impact on specific kinds of investments. The opposing effects, e.g., 
on investment in fixed and financial assets presumably lead to an overall insignificant effect on 
total investment. These opposing effects might explain previous findings of an insignificant 
effect of tax treaties on aggregated FDI. Our results suggest that changes of the repatriation 
taxes exert statistically significant effects on both investment and the structure of equity financ-
ing. Therefore, tax treaties seem to be strongly considered by multinational companies if the 
treaty effectively affects repatriation taxes. By contrast, our results indicate that the general case 
that a tax treaty exists or was rephrased does not exert a significant effect on investment. Since, 
however, parts of the previous research have found effects of such treaties (see Section 4.1), 
their findings (e.g., considering particularly relevant subsamples) could be combined with the 
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approach of this paper (particularly looking at different asset types) for future research. In ad-
dition, the effects of the 2018 US tax reform, which included a switch from the credit to the 
exemption method, may be of particular interest for future research on repatriation taxes. 
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5. Main concluding remarks 
Tax avoidance of MNEs is of considerable interest since it affects not only tax returns of coun-
tries but also several other issues, e.g., investment incentives of firms or questions of tax inci-
dence. This thesis contributes to the understanding of tax avoidance, first, by generally investi-
gating profit shifting and investment effects in the first analysis, and, second, by addressing two 
puzzles on firm’s tax avoidance behavior that previous research has left. 
In my first analysis, I address a well-known way of tax avoidance, namely profit shifting within 
MNEs. This means that relationships between subsidiaries of MNEs are arranged in such a way 
that those in high-tax countries have to make payments to those in low-tax countries. Two com-
mon ways through which profit shifting is conducted are that low-tax subsidiaries give a credit 
respectively the right to use certain intellectual property, i.e., patents or trademarks, to high-tax 
subsidiaries. Then, with the interest payments respectively license fees, the profits are shifted 
to the low-tax subsidiaries. I investigate firms that previously had no affiliates in other countries 
but become part of a MNE through an acquisition and therefore at once have opportunities for 
such profit shifting. For acquired firms in high-tax countries, more investment projects should 
therefore be profitable after taxes. Indeed, I observe that after M&As real investment, i.e., in-
vestment in PPE, is larger for targets in high-tax countries. In addition, I observe the opposite 
sign for financial revenues, indicating that targets in low-tax countries become destinations for 
profit shifting themselves (though here I presumably observe only profit shifting via interests). 
Furthermore, the effect on real investment cannot be observed if the country of the acquirer’s 
GUO applies a CFC rule, which is an anti-avoidance measures that is targeted against such 
profit shifting.  
Future research could build on this approach particularly in three ways. First, currently, the 
relatively strict restriction is made that only those targets are considered where at once 100% 
of the shares are acquired. This assumption could be relaxed, which may increase the sample, 
thereby also the statistical power and hence maybe lead to additional support of the hypotheses 
(not all hypotheses could be confirmed yet). In addition, it may allow for further divisions of 
the sample, which could enable the precise modelling of the M&As as an exogenous effect with 
respect to tax planning. This would enhance the identification of the causal effects of both, 
profit shifting opportunities and CFC rules on profit shifting and investment. Second, one ro-
bustness check indicates that targets may anticipate the acquisitions and therefore already in-
crease investment beforehand. This could also be addressed in future research. Third, previous 
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research has indicated that MNEs relocate their headquarters away from countries with CFC 
rules. Hence, the ones that remain in such countries may simply be less tax aggressive. Future 
research could investigate whether it is indeed less the constraint of CFC rules but rather the 
smaller tax aggressiveness that drives the finding that the investment effect can no longer be 
observed in case of such rules.  
In the second analysis, I focus on measuring the exact extend of a specific way of tax avoidance, 
namely debt financing. I explain that in case the investment is conducted via a M&A, this debt 
financing is particularly advantageous at the level of holdings. In addition, I show theoretically 
that accounting for such debt financing requires the consolidation of the debt ratios of the op-
erating firms and the holdings. I discuss theoretically and confirm empirically that this increases 
the measured debt ratios and, in accordance to that, the positive effect of the tax rate on the debt 
ratio. However, the results also indicate that the usage of holdings for debt financing may be a 
rather recent development. 
The analysis could be enhanced by future research. First, not all hypotheses could be confirmed 
so far, which could be addressed by additional investigations. For example, given the reasoning 
from above, a high tax rate should also increase the probability of the usage of holdings in case 
of M&As. As mentioned in the analysis, it could be necessary to account for capital gains taxes 
in order to identify this effect. Second, while the focus of this study was to identify the changes 
in the effect of taxes on debt financing due to the consolidation, other innovations in current 
research dealing with tax-induced debt financing could be included. For example, the incentives 
for debt financing in the respective firm could be elaborated relative to the incentives in its 
affiliates in other countries. Here, tax rate differentials to affiliates may be particularly relevant 
(see, e.g., Huizinga et al. (2008), Büttner and Wamser (2013), Overesch and Wamser (2014)). 
Or one could use an estimator that accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is bounded 
between zero and one (see, e.g., Egger et al. (2014a)). 
The third analysis differs from the two others, since it does not focus on the avoidance of profit 
taxes in the host country of firms, but on the avoidance of taxes that are raised on dividends 
flowing between affiliates (or to the parent), located in different countries (repatriation taxes). 
The analysis investigates the investment effects of DTTs, which reduce repatriation taxes, re-
spectively of repatriation taxes in general. Whereas the results do not indicate an effect for 
DTTs in particular, repatriation taxes seem to affect investment: fixed assets decline in those 
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taxes while financial assets increase. The latter finding supports the assumption that firms ex-
pect coming declines in those taxes, delay the distribution of profits and therefore reinvest prof-
its in financial assets as long as those taxes are high.  
Given that the findings for DTTs in particular are insignificant, additional research could com-
bine the approach of this analysis (especially looking at different asset types) with the ones of 
other papers that found effects for DTTs (foremost using relevant subsamples that they identi-
fied). In addition, the consequences of the US tax reform from 2018 could be investigated, 
which presumably led to a considerable decline of repatriation taxes due to the change in the 
method to avoid double taxation. 
As regards policy implications, the findings support several reform options. The discussed tax 
avoidance highlights aspects of the current tax system that do not suit a world where firms 
pursue the maximization of their (after-tax) profits. Profit shifting, which is based on exploiting 
international tax differentials, clearly points at a lack of harmonization. Here, several reform 
options could be implemented, such as a common corporate tax base (European Commission, 
2016) or a move towards levying taxes at the location of consumption (presumably the first 
paper making respective suggestions was by Bond and Devereux (2002)). Regarding debt fi-
nancing, which includes besides profit shifting also external debt, the tax system favors such 
financing over equity financing, since interests reduce the tax base. Besides the above men-
tioned general reform options, there are several solutions that focus particularly on overcoming 
this bias towards debt financing, which also leads to bankruptcy risks (see Spengel et al. (2018a) 
for an overview of such approaches). The results for the third analysis show that firms react to 
double taxation until it is overcome through a reduction of the repatriation taxes. The negative 
effects of such taxes on real investment highlight the importance of limits to such taxes. 
To conclude, this thesis investigates how MNEs avoid taxes. First, it confirms previous findings 
that profit shifting within MNEs has positive effects on investment, but is prevented by the anti-
avoidance measure of CFC rules. Second, it shows that, in case of M&As, the effect of tax 
avoidance via debt financing is larger if one accounts for debt financing at the level of holdings. 
Third, it shows that the effect of repatriation taxes on cross-border dividend flows differs for 
fixed and financial assets, which may lead to an overall insignificant effect. This may contribute 
to the explanation of the findings of some previous studies, according to which DTTs, which 
often lead to a limitation of those taxes, may have no or even negative effects on investment. 
As mentioned above, those findings are also relevant for policy makers. Firms, when acting 
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rational as (after-tax) profit maximizers, are expected to use those legal opportunities for tax 
avoidance. Therefore, fundamental tax reforms such as a common corporate tax base or a move 
towards a rather consumption oriented taxation may be needed.  
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Appendix 
Appendix to Section 2 
Table A 1: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; anti-avoidance 
measures at target-level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Transfer pricing documen-
tation rules 
Thin-capitalization / 
earnings-stripping rules 
Transfer pricing documen-
tation rules and thin-capital-
ization / 
earnings-stripping rules  
    
postMAyear -1.275* -1.057** -1.168 
 (0.745) (0.491) (0.749) 
TarSTR -2.742 -2.246 -2.702 
 (2.711) (3.203) (3.258) 
postMAyear#TarSTR 3.762 3.264** 3.316 
 (2.585) (1.645) (2.627) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.492*** 0.418*** 0.479*** 
 (0.162) (0.117) (0.154) 
TarLoss_lag 0.086 0.052 0.074 
 (0.120) (0.133) (0.121) 
lnTarGDP 8.513 6.197 7.121 
 (6.797) (5.430) (8.188) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -7.022 -4.727 -5.669 
 (6.430) (5.043) (7.441) 
TarGDP_growth -0.056* -0.011 -0.062* 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.035) 
TarCorruption -0.372 -0.754 -0.485 
 (0.407) (0.491) (0.425) 
Constant -158.959 -116.294 -134.494 
 (120.970) (100.153) (152.249) 
Observations 512 577 481 
Deals 74 84 69 
R-squared 0.224 0.209 0.216 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). For variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table A 2: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (Non-CFC rule MNEs; anti-
avoidance measures at target-level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Transfer pricing documen-
tation rules 
Thin-capitalization / 
earnings-stripping rules 
Transfer pricing documen-
tation rules and thin-capital-
ization / 
earnings-stripping rules  
    
postMAyear 1.801 2.338 1.739 
 (3.636) (1.709) (5.662) 
TarSTR 11.372 8.873 11.645 
 (12.197) (12.773) (16.844) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -7.389 -9.306 -7.082 
 (11.915) (6.519) (18.566) 
lnTarPPE 0.237 0.157 0.358 
 (0.243) (0.198) (0.244) 
TarLoss_lag -0.901 -0.605 -0.845 
 (0.763) (0.642) (0.876) 
lnTarGDP -15.335 -19.801 -16.176 
 (35.917) (17.169) (78.318) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 14.819 16.640 15.593 
 (36.781) (16.258) (76.147) 
TarGDP_growth 0.065 0.068 0.064 
 (0.132) (0.103) (0.200) 
TarCorruption -0.158 0.398 0.111 
 (2.814) (2.660) (6.646) 
TarInflation -0.122 0.019 -0.255 
 (0.153) (0.158) (0.296) 
Constant 282.437 390.185 299.268 
 (625.275) (320.639) (1,412.607) 
Observations 248 286 227 
Deals 38 46 35 
R-squared 0.113 0.0914 0.109 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). 
For variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and 
year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target 
country level. 
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Table A 3: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; anti-
avoidance measures at target-level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Transfer pricing documen-
tation rules 
Thin-capitalization / 
earnings-stripping rules 
Transfer pricing documen-
tation rules and thin-capital-
ization / 
earnings-stripping rules  
    
postMAyear -5.054 -1.708 -5.354 
 (12.028) (4.113) (37.436) 
TarSTR 18.295 34.095* 15.838 
 (285.128) (18.229) (51.026) 
postMAyear#TarSTR 27.028 15.953 29.554 
 (38.774) (15.544) (120.818) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.495 1.931** 1.178 
 (1.555) (0.834) (1.164) 
lnTarEmployees -0.729 -1.203 0.020 
 (2.845) (1.827) (3.190) 
lnTarSales 2.445 2.295* 2.308** 
 (2.029) (1.192) (0.922) 
TarLoss_lag 0.287 -0.118 0.048 
 (4.568) (2.524) (5.391) 
lnTarGDP -25.021 -22.873 -13.323 
 (912.821) (39.726) (561.708) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 11.825 17.830 0.641 
 (1,255.897) (38.951) (531.278) 
TarGDP_growth 0.110 0.092 0.090 
 (2.841) (0.126) (0.667) 
TarCorruption -0.199 -3.024 1.264 
 (118.314) (4.777) (31.128) 
Constant 511.064 380.946 302.908 
 (12,352.062) (712.575) (10,154.877) 
Observations 183 211 173 
Deals 34 39 31 
R-squared 0.218 0.212 0.210 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). For variable descriptions 
and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are 
estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table A 4: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acqui-
sition date (as if it had happened in an earlier year)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change acquisition date to 5 years before acquisi-
tion 
4 years before acquisi-
tion 
3 years before ac-
quisition 
2 years before ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_m5 -0.351    
 (0.884)    
postMAyear_m4  -0.678   
  (0.879)   
postMAyear_m3   -0.697  
   (0.780)  
postMAyear_m2    -0.921 
    (0.571) 
TarSTR -4.367 -4.601 -4.888 -4.251 
 (4.237) (3.503) (3.422) (3.055) 
postMAyear_m5#TarSTR 1.453    
 (2.532)    
postMAyear_m4#TarSTR  2.411   
  (2.560)   
postMAyear_m3#TarSTR   3.182  
   (2.419)  
postMAyear_m2#TarSTR    3.356* 
    (1.866) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.417*** 0.424*** 0.422*** 0.424*** 
 (0.112) (0.114) (0.122) (0.114) 
TarLoss_lag 0.060 0.049 0.031 0.054 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.120) (0.124) 
lnTarGDP 7.504 7.791 8.289* 7.977 
 (5.874) (5.651) (4.950) (5.147) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -6.212 -6.421 -6.816 -6.520 
 (5.604) (5.383) (4.686) (4.833) 
TarGDP_growth -0.022 -0.027 -0.031 -0.026 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
TarCorruption -0.225 -0.252 -0.273 -0.295 
 (0.552) (0.532) (0.576) (0.529) 
Constant -137.007 -142.792 -152.710* -147.050 
 (103.949) (101.343) (88.208) (92.845) 
Observations 622 622 622 622 
Deals 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.192 0.194 0.204 0.199 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). post-
MAyear_m[x] is a dummy variable that is 1 for all years following the year x before the acquisition. For all other 
variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year 
fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table A 5: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acqui-
sition date (as if it had happened in a later year)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change acquisition date to 1 year after acquisi-
tion 
2 years after acquisi-
tion 
3 years after acqui-
sition 
4 years after acqui-
sition 
     
postMAyear_p1 -1.292    
 (0.851)    
postMAyear_p2  -1.641   
  (1.092)   
postMAyear_p3   -1.180  
   (1.856)  
postMAyear_p4    -0.140 
    (3.453) 
TarSTR -3.909 -3.901 -3.517 -3.350 
 (2.986) (3.191) (3.346) (3.080) 
postMAyear_p1#TarSTR 4.435*    
 (2.592)    
postMAyear_p2#TarSTR  5.057   
  (3.656)   
postMAyear_p3#TarSTR   3.311  
   (6.978)  
postMAyear_p4#TarSTR    -2.197 
    (13.434) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.406*** 0.399*** 0.407*** 0.418*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.115) (0.111) 
TarLoss_lag 0.047 0.036 0.059 0.065 
 (0.123) (0.131) (0.129) (0.128) 
lnTarGDP 8.118 8.600* 7.746 7.771 
 (4.996) (5.067) (5.219) (5.339) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -6.643 -7.118 -6.438 -6.515 
 (4.649) (4.639) (4.807) (5.009) 
TarGDP_growth -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.019 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) 
TarCorruption -0.243 -0.240 -0.215 -0.236 
 (0.568) (0.558) (0.572) (0.523) 
Constant -149.460* -157.732* -141.322 -141.381 
 (90.358) (92.386) (94.750) (96.133) 
Observations 622 622 622 622 
Deals 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.200 0.202 0.195 0.195 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). post-
MAyear_m[x] is a dummy variable that is 1 for all years following the year x before the acquisition. For all other 
variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year 
fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table A 6: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (Non-CFC rule MNEs; var-
iation of acquisition date (as if it had happened in an earlier year)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change acquisition date to 5 years before acquisi-
tion 
4 years before acquisi-
tion 
3 years before ac-
quisition 
2 years before ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_m5 -2.016    
 (4.114)    
postMAyear_m4  0.979   
  (2.516)   
postMAyear_m3   1.127  
   (1.806)  
postMAyear_m2    1.658 
    (1.634) 
TarSTR 0.545 6.077 5.823 8.924 
 (11.366) (9.666) (9.805) (9.693) 
postMAyear_m5#TarSTR 6.753    
 (11.811)    
postMAyear_m4#TarSTR  -1.238   
  (7.048)   
postMAyear_m3#TarSTR   -1.838  
   (5.565)  
postMAyear_m2#TarSTR    -5.540 
    (5.227) 
lnTarPPE 0.010 -0.017 -0.020 0.022 
 (0.209) (0.196) (0.188) (0.203) 
TarLoss_lag -0.618 -0.605 -0.645 -0.576 
 (0.636) (0.663) (0.659) (0.620) 
lnTarGDP -9.312 -11.614 -11.793 -14.321 
 (17.566) (16.819) (15.696) (15.369) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 7.825 9.684 9.779 11.852 
 (17.962) (16.792) (15.751) (15.693) 
TarGDP_growth 0.089 0.098 0.104 0.102 
 (0.092) (0.088) (0.090) (0.087) 
TarCorruption -0.391 -0.126 -0.019 0.078 
 (2.095) (2.029) (1.883) (1.914) 
TarInflation -0.017 -0.000 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.123) (0.121) (0.123) (0.117) 
Constant 190.355 233.178 237.210 285.380 
 (304.111) (299.437) (277.790) (268.598) 
Observations 314 314 314 314 
Deals 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.0742 0.0775 0.0777 0.0764 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). 
postMAyear_m[x] is a dummy variable that is 1 for all years following the year x before the acquisition. For all 
other variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and 
year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target 
country level. 
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Table A 7: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (Non-CFC rule MNEs; var-
iation of acquisition date (as if it had happened in a later year)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change acquisition date to 1 year after acquisi-
tion 
2 years after acquisi-
tion 
3 years after acqui-
sition 
4 years after acqui-
sition 
     
postMAyear_p1 1.838    
 (1.840)    
postMAyear_p2  1.558   
  (3.156)   
postMAyear_p3   4.432  
   (5.088)  
postMAyear_p4    2.993 
    (10.533) 
TarSTR 9.101 6.376 6.586 6.131 
 (10.204) (9.800) (8.977) (9.621) 
postMAyear_p1#TarSTR -8.486    
 (6.323)    
postMAyear_p2#TarSTR  -6.358   
  (10.091)   
postMAyear_p3#TarSTR   -17.284  
   (18.913)  
postMAyear_p4#TarSTR    -10.483 
    (44.321) 
lnTarPPE 0.032 0.008 0.009 0.004 
 (0.221) (0.229) (0.210) (0.192) 
TarLoss_lag -0.596 -0.587 -0.557 -0.581 
 (0.633) (0.628) (0.699) (0.635) 
lnTarGDP -12.854 -12.643 -13.257 -12.118 
 (16.636) (15.859) (14.589) (16.212) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 10.424 10.544 11.137 10.174 
 (16.771) (15.956) (14.788) (16.503) 
TarGDP_growth 0.104 0.093 0.081 0.095 
 (0.076) (0.089) (0.089) (0.083) 
TarCorruption -0.342 -0.163 -0.218 -0.047 
 (1.675) (1.890) (1.714) (1.687) 
TarInflation -0.006 -0.007 0.010 -0.001 
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.120) (0.103) 
Constant 260.106 253.371 264.349 242.334 
 (292.016) (276.978) (256.072) (281.621) 
Observations 314 314 314 314 
Deals 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.0840 0.0742 0.0805 0.0729 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). 
postMAyear_p[x] is a dummy variable that is 1 for all years following the year x after the acquisition. For all other 
variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year 
fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table A 8: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation 
of acquisition date (as if it had happened in an earlier year)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change acquisition date to 5 years before acqui-
sition 
4 years before acquisi-
tion 
3 years before ac-
quisition 
2 years before ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_m5 -9.524    
 (26.310)    
postMAyear_m4  -10.582   
  (13.089)   
postMAyear_m3   -9.085  
   (10.933)  
postMAyear_m2    -5.876 
    (7.351) 
TarSTR 47.250 56.735 74.503 79.643 
 (86.587) (64.847) (74.668) (68.243) 
postMAyear_m5#TarSTR 39.065    
 (83.571)    
postMAyear_m4#TarSTR  35.919   
  (42.702)   
postMAyear_m3#TarSTR   21.592  
   (30.125)  
postMAyear_m2#TarSTR    7.287 
    (22.618) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.945* 1.876* 1.848 1.762* 
 (1.049) (0.989) (1.127) (1.045) 
lnTarEmployees -2.832 -2.419 -2.408 -2.731 
 (2.095) (2.269) (2.220) (2.372) 
lnTarSales 3.206** 3.034** 3.160 3.179* 
 (1.368) (1.508) (2.533) (1.798) 
TarLoss_lag -0.087 -0.392 0.254 -0.354 
 (2.604) (3.111) (3.618) (3.127) 
lnTarGDP -30.703 -26.786 -21.373 -16.810 
 (74.879) (71.591) (65.016) (65.919) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 38.876 35.709 30.036 24.931 
 (73.662) (69.139) (61.826) (63.116) 
TarGDP_growth 0.392 0.306 0.267 0.453* 
 (0.279) (0.267) (0.275) (0.256) 
TarCorruption -24.272 -23.422 -22.851 -22.825 
 (21.554) (20.571) (20.865) (20.073) 
Constant 390.096 314.527 217.480 145.134 
 (1,339.174) (1,293.899) (1,190.997) (1,206.433) 
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Deals 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.253 0.250 0.252 0.256 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). postMAyear_p[x] is a 
dummy variable that is 1 for all years following the year x after the acquisition. For all other variable descriptions 
and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are 
estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table A 9: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation 
of acquisition date (as if it had happened in a later year)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change acquisition date to 1 year after acquisi-
tion 
2 years after acquisition 3 years after ac-
quisition 
4 years after ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_p1 -1.864    
 (11.105)    
postMAyear_p2  5.115   
  (83.421)   
postMAyear_p3   5.927  
   (76.526)  
postMAyear_p4    45.680*** 
    (10.481) 
TarSTR 77.192 80.658 81.287 86.690 
 (59.622) (65.523) (62.484) (53.901) 
postMAyear_p1#TarSTR 14.858    
 (33.904)    
postMAyear_p2#TarSTR  -21.383   
  (268.299)   
postMAyear_p3#TarSTR   -25.297  
   (251.653)  
postMAyear_p4#TarSTR    -183.273*** 
    (42.776) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.940 1.895* 1.958** 2.060*** 
 (1.218) (1.089) (0.996) (0.611) 
lnTarEmployees -2.559 -2.552 -2.556 -2.455 
 (2.143) (2.272) (2.127) (1.513) 
lnTarSales 3.084** 3.079* 2.984** 2.958*** 
 (1.461) (1.741) (1.302) (0.584) 
TarLoss_lag 0.113 0.005 0.104 0.353 
 (2.533) (3.280) (2.437) (1.171) 
lnTarGDP -18.673 -16.571 -16.996 -14.932 
 (50.709) (76.293) (69.379) (50.520) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 26.256 22.909 23.252 21.149 
 (48.265) (73.539) (66.820) (45.349) 
TarGDP_growth 0.373 0.391 0.391* 0.384 
 (0.256) (0.249) (0.221) (0.237) 
TarCorruption -22.473 -22.677 -22.801 -24.174 
 (20.238) (20.692) (19.980) (16.085) 
Constant 175.596 154.411 163.342 128.949 
 (942.812) (1,367.920) (1,262.178) (961.954) 
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Deals 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.249 0.245 0.244 0.261 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). postMAyear_p[x] is a 
dummy variable that is 1 for all years following the year x after the acquisition. For all other variable descriptions 
and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are 
estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table A 10: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (tax rate differential to GUO instead of 
tax rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
(only passive in-
come included) 
     
postMAyear -0.119 -0.092 -0.169 0.248 
 (0.106) (0.120) (0.146) (0.234) 
STR_Diff -0.348 -2.684 1.906 3.938 
 (1.296) (2.605) (2.654) (2.517) 
postMAyear#STR_Diff -0.100 0.095 -1.041 -2.918 
 (0.570) (0.721) (2.203) (3.761) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.494*** 0.417*** 0.557*** 0.411** 
 (0.085) (0.120) (0.102) (0.171) 
TarLoss_lag -0.068 0.060 -0.132 -0.020 
 (0.088) (0.121) (0.118) (0.143) 
lnTarGDP 7.099*** 6.641 8.539** 3.428 
 (2.532) (5.630) (4.025) (6.257) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -6.008** -5.320 -7.578** -3.160 
 (2.405) (5.344) (3.784) (5.813) 
TarGDP_growth -0.024* -0.018 -0.033* -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.043) 
TarCorruption 0.128 -0.243 0.500 0.671 
 (0.291) (0.543) (0.494) (0.629) 
Constant -129.189*** -123.286 -153.172** -57.544 
 (43.947) (100.334) (71.255) (113.863) 
Observations 1,505 622 883 331 
Deals 213 91 122 66 
R-squared 0.213 0.191 0.243 0.217 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable. STR_Diff is the tax rate differential 
to the GUO. For all other variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions 
include target firm and year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and 
are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table A 11: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (tax rate differential to 
GUO instead of tax rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear -0.460* -0.472 -0.571* 
 (0.263) (0.577) (0.300) 
STR_Diff -0.982 3.717 -2.898 
 (3.631) (7.705) (4.632) 
postMAyear#STR_Diff -3.564* -3.777 -1.863 
 (2.104) (3.318) (3.902) 
lnTarPPE 0.238** -0.033 0.369*** 
 (0.097) (0.198) (0.130) 
TarLoss_lag -0.219 -0.533 0.012 
 (0.255) (0.615) (0.226) 
lnTarGDP -7.193 -11.321 -7.121 
 (7.322) (15.218) (9.251) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 6.140 9.519 6.611 
 (7.137) (15.049) (9.576) 
TarGDP_growth 0.028 0.097 -0.040 
 (0.041) (0.082) (0.071) 
TarCorruption 0.648 0.066 1.263 
 (1.366) (1.958) (1.443) 
TarInflation 0.036 0.001 0.041 
 (0.072) (0.122) (0.078) 
Constant 142.726 229.615 132.182 
 (132.986) (269.360) (160.722) 
Observations 731 314 417 
Deals 114 50 64 
R-squared 0.072 0.078 0.112 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable. STR_Diff is the tax 
rate differential to the GUO. For all other variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. 
All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in 
parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table A 12: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (tax rate differential to GUO 
instead of tax rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 0.789 2.139 -0.452 
 (1.915) (2.012) (4.385) 
STR_Diff 13.304 78.686 -43.558 
 (33.544) (63.100) (87.562) 
postMAyear#STR_Diff -1.795 12.284 -62.685 
 (9.922) (13.925) (43.148) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.440 2.021* 1.158 
 (1.427) (1.093) (1.759) 
lnTarEmployees -1.868 -1.941 -3.040 
 (2.283) (2.188) (5.220) 
lnTarSales 1.789 3.080 1.099 
 (1.389) (1.935) (2.908) 
TarLoss_lag -1.155 -0.625 -1.046 
 (1.313) (3.472) (2.493) 
lnTarGDP 34.595 -0.111 66.962 
 (31.616) (75.954) (57.150) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -23.826 3.909 -57.423 
 (24.829) (71.734) (48.471) 
TarGDP_growth 0.353 0.408 0.450 
 (0.240) (0.270) (0.530) 
TarCorruption -12.189 -21.807 -2.453 
 (9.089) (19.347) (8.538) 
Constant -738.928 -89.041 -1,257.655 
 (621.444) (1,370.538) (1,084.591) 
Observations 515 225 290 
Deals 93 43 50 
R-squared 0.083 0.272 0.125 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable. STR_Diff is the tax rate differential to the 
GUO. For all other variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include 
target firm and year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clus-
tered on the target country level. 
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Table A 13: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (excluding non-PPE assets from the 
control variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
(only passive in-
come included) 
     
postMAyear -0.061 -1.045* 0.819 1.025 
 (0.416) (0.629) (0.756) (1.163) 
TarSTR -0.756 -2.976 2.516 0.800 
 (1.634) (3.077) (2.887) (4.264) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -0.102 3.311 -3.289 -2.641 
 (1.456) (2.217) (2.709) (4.061) 
TarLoss_lag -0.168** -0.051 -0.209* -0.160 
 (0.074) (0.156) (0.124) (0.188) 
lnTarGDP 8.600*** 8.714 10.895*** 7.327 
 (2.926) (6.258) (4.179) (6.769) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -7.053*** -6.876 -9.476** -5.996 
 (2.723) (6.077) (3.960) (6.501) 
TarGDP_growth -0.019 -0.017 -0.020 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.045) 
TarCorruption -0.242 -0.523 0.013 0.026 
 (0.301) (0.522) (0.431) (0.664) 
Constant -151.391*** -156.945 -189.816*** -129.867 
 (51.964) (110.008) (73.422) (120.420) 
Observations 1,505 622 883 331 
Deals 213 91 122 66 
R-squared 0.094 0.104 0.107 0.137 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). For variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table A 14: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (excluding PPE from the 
control variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 1.646 2.126 1.360 
 (1.232) (1.760) (1.505) 
TarSTR 2.811 6.365 4.977 
 (6.080) (11.410) (6.402) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -7.802* -8.952 -7.437 
 (4.513) (6.647) (5.479) 
TarLoss_lag -0.286 -0.521 -0.141 
 (0.265) (0.564) (0.252) 
lnTarGDP -3.228 -8.130 -0.168 
 (8.702) (17.595) (9.838) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 2.222 6.259 -0.214 
 (8.560) (17.719) (9.871) 
TarGDP_growth 0.037 0.063 -0.004 
 (0.044) (0.080) (0.069) 
TarCorruption 0.229 -0.098 0.734 
 (1.191) (1.848) (1.315) 
TarInflation 0.042 0.022 0.033 
 (0.068) (0.099) (0.076) 
Constant 76.842 172.011 16.307 
 (156.055) (308.644) (172.912) 
Observations 758 323 435 
Deals 117 51 66 
R-squared 0.071 0.090 0.090 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). 
For variable descriptions and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and 
year fixed effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target 
country level. 
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Table A 15: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (excluding non-PPE assets, 
employees and sales from the control variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All MNEs non-CFC rule MNEs CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 12.203 9.652 11.867 
 (8.868) (12.813) (11.671) 
TarSTR 28.378 94.351 -0.247 
 (40.174) (105.867) (69.079) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -55.544* -55.349 -51.014 
 (31.867) (49.602) (42.719) 
TarLoss_lag -3.270** -5.056* -2.445 
 (1.477) (2.871) (1.584) 
lnTarGDP 51.280 6.238 76.086 
 (61.836) (80.795) (91.758) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -52.292 -12.114 -72.672 
 (55.333) (73.758) (80.297) 
TarGDP_growth 0.218 1.143 -0.273 
 (0.376) (0.762) (0.506) 
TarCorruption -14.386* -19.134 -13.815 
 (8.575) (19.010) (8.519) 
Constant -842.740 -33.242 -1,293.051 
 (1,145.174) (1,503.880) (1,703.292) 
Observations 1,072 428 644 
Deals 161 66 95 
R-squared 0.047 0.062 0.071 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Notes: Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see expression (2.1). For variable descriptions 
and data sources, see Section 2.3 and Table 2.2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are 
estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Appendix to Section 4 
Methods to Avoid Double Taxation and Repatriation Taxes 
If the exemption method is applied, repatriated intercompany dividends are tax exempt at the 
level of the firm receiving the dividends. Yet, in a few countries like France, Germany or Bel-
gium a share 𝛼𝛼 is still subject to tax, whereas in most countries applying the exemption method,  
𝛼𝛼 = 0. Then, the tax 𝑠𝑠 imposed on one currency unit of intercompany dividends amounts to: 
𝑠𝑠 =  𝛼𝛼 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅 + 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆 (A 1) 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅 is the corporate tax rate of the home country and 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆 is the withholding tax rate im-
posed on intercompany dividends by the source country. 
In the case of a system applying the credit method, intercompany dividends are subject to tax 
but taxes paid abroad reduce the tax liability. If a direct credit is applied, the foreign tax credit 
includes the withholding taxes imposed on intercompany dividends. Then, the additional tax 
imposed on one currency unit of intercompany dividends amounts to: 
𝑠𝑠 =  𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅 − min {𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅;𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆} + 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆 (A 2) 
An indirect credit also includes foreign corporate taxes 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆 paid by the subsidiary. The additional 
tax imposed on intercompany dividends is computed in accordance with the following expres-
sion:  
𝑠𝑠 = 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆) − min � 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆) ;  𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆) + 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆� + 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆 (A 3) 
Expressions (A 2) and (A 3) show that the repatriation tax is determined by the tax rate of the 
home country. It can be deducted from the formulas that there is a conceivable situation where 
a decrease in the withholding tax 𝜔𝜔𝑆𝑆 is just subsidized by a proportional increase in 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅. This is 
the case if the tax rate of the home country exceeds the tax credit. Then, a reduction of the 
withholding tax, e.g., caused by a new tax treaty, has no material effect.  
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Table A 16: Selected tax treaty changes between 1996 and 2008 
Parent Subsidiary 
1st Tax 
Treaty 
Treaty 
Revision 
WHT 
before 
WHT 
after Parent Subsidiary 
1st Tax 
Treaty 
Treaty 
Revision 
WHT 
before 
WHT 
after 
Australia Austria  2002 .15 .15 Belgium United States 2000  0 0 
Australia Canada 1998  .2 .1 Brazil Belgium  1997 .05 .05 
Australia Czech Republic 2001  .1 .1 Brazil Chile  2004 0 0 
Australia Finland  2002 0 0 Brazil Finland  2007 .1 .05 
Australia Malaysia  2006 0 0 Brazil Germany  2006 .15 .211 
Australia Mexico 2008  0 0 Brazil Mexico 1998  .25 .05 
Australia Norway  1997 .25 .05 Brazil Norway 2004  .35 .05 
Australia Romania  2007 .15 0 Brazil Portugal 2002  .25 .1 
Australia Russia 1998  0 0 Bulgaria Canada 2002  .1 .1 
Australia Slovak Republic 2001  .05 0 Bulgaria Croatia 1999  .15 .05 
Australia Taiwan 2001  .15 .1 Bulgaria Cyprus 2000  .25 .1 
Australia United Kingdom  1998 0 0 Bulgaria Czech Republic  2000 .15 .1 
Australia United States  1997 .05 .05 Bulgaria Greece 2006  0 0 
Austria Australia  2002 .15 .15 Bulgaria Ireland  2002 0 0 
Austria Canada  2003 .15 .15 Bulgaria Latvia 2007  0 0 
Austria Croatia 2002  .25 0 Bulgaria Lithuania 2000  .2 .05 
Austria Czech Republic  2008 0 0 Bulgaria Portugal 2001  0 0 
Austria Estonia  2004 .25 0 Bulgaria Singapore  2003 .05 .05 
Austria Finland  1998 0 0 Bulgaria Slovak Republic 2002  .2 .1 
Austria Germany  1997 .15 .1 Bulgaria Slovenia  2008 0 0 
Austria India  2001 .25 .1 Bulgaria Thailand  2008 .15 .1 
Austria Korea  1996 .07 .05 Bulgaria Turkey 2001  .2 .1 
Austria Latvia 1996  .2 .05 Canada Australia  2003 .15 .05 
Austria Lithuania 2006  0 0 Canada Belgium  2008 0 0 
Austria Mexico 2004  .3 0 Canada Bulgaria  2000 .15 .1 
Austria Netherlands  2003 0 0 Canada Chile 2003  0 0 
Austria New Zealand   1997 .15 .15 Canada Croatia 2000  .25 .05 
Austria Norway  2003 .15 .05 Canada Czech Republic  2003 .1 .05 
Austria Poland 2004  .35 .05 Canada Denmark 2005  .35 .05 
Austria Romania  1999 .1 .05 Canada Finland  1999 0 0 
Austria Russia 2000  0 0 Canada France 2001  0 0 
Austria Singapore 2001  0 0 Canada Germany 1998  .1 .05 
Austria Slovenia 2007  0 0 Canada Hungary 2005  0 0 
Austria Sweden  1998 0 0 Canada Iceland 2002  .25 .05 
Austria Switzerland  2006 0 0 Canada India  1999 .15 .1 
Austria United Arab Emirates 1996  .25 0 Canada Indonesia  1997 .1 .1 
Austria United States  2000 0 0 Canada Ireland 1996  0 0 
Belgium Brazil  2008 .15 .1 Canada Japan  2007 0 0 
Belgium Canada  2005 .15 .05 Canada Korea  2003 .15 .05 
Belgium China 2005  0 0 Canada Latvia 2001  0 0 
Belgium Croatia 2005  .1 .05 Canada Lithuania 1999  0 0 
Belgium Cyprus 2001  .17 .1 Canada Luxembourg 2005  0 0 
Belgium Czech Republic  2001 .15 .05 Canada Mexico 2007  0 0 
Belgium Denmark  1999 .15 .05 Canada Netherlands 2002  .15 0 
Belgium Estonia  1996 .25 .05 Canada Norway  2006 .05 0 
Belgium Germany  2003 .1 .05 Canada Peru  2006 0 0 
Belgium Greece 1999  .25 .05 Canada Portugal  1998 .25 .1 
Belgium Hong Kong  2005 0 0 Canada Romania 1997  0 0 
Belgium Iceland 2000  0 0 Canada Russia  1998 .25 .15 
Belgium Indonesia 1997  0 0 Canada Slovak Republic 2000  0 0 
Belgium Latvia 1999  0 0 Canada Slovenia 2007  0 0 
Belgium Lithuania 2005  0 0 Canada Spain 2003  0 0 
Belgium Luxembourg 2007  0 0 Canada Sweden  2006 0 0 
Belgium Mexico 2006  .25 .05 Canada Switzerland  1998 0 0 
Belgium Netherlands  1998 .05 .05 Canada United Arab Emirates 2008  0 0 
Belgium Poland 1997  0 0 Canada United Kingdom  1998 0 0 
Belgium Portugal 1997  .15 .1 
etc. 
Belgium Romania 2005  .15 0.5 
Belgium Russia  1997 .25 .1 
Belgium Singapore 2008  0 0 
Belgium Slovak Republic 2004  .15 .05 
Belgium Slovenia 2005  0 0 
Belgium Spain  1997 0 0 
Belgium Taiwan 1998  .3 .15 
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